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ABSTRACT 
In one of his publications, the politician and merchant Anthony Bacon asked if ‘some honest 
Persons, of plain Understanding, and of tolerable Judgement and Experience, could be 
engaged, at the Government’s Expence, to make the general Tour of North America’.  This 
person, he thought, would be able to forge a connexion between the metropolitan centre 
and the far-flung reaches of America and improve the relationship between mother country 
and colony by increasing the level of understanding of the other on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  Bacon appreciated that this lack of knowledge of their American brethren meant 
that British politics and politicians were often working with limited, or biased, information 
when formulating imperial policy. 
This thesis analyses the ways six MPs with significant American connexions operated 
throughout the imperial crises of the 1760s and 1770s.  It establishes that these men 
operated at the highest levels of British politics at this time and sought to create themselves 
as the predominant experts on the American colonies.  In the debates on the nature of the 
British Empire throughout the 1760s and 1770s, these men were at the forefront of the 
political mind and, at least until the hardening of opinions in the 1770s, had an impact on 
the way in which the colonies were governed.  More than that, however, this work has 
shown that – contrary to much earlier belief – the House of Commons in the later 
eighteenth century was not working in ignorance of the situation in the Americas: rather, 
there were a small but significant number of men with real and personal connexions to, and 
knowledge about, the colonies.  As the imperial grounds shifted through the 1770s, however, 
even the most well-versed of these ‘American MPs’ began to appear to have suffered some 
disconnection from the colonial viewpoint. 
This thesis takes into account the Atlantic and imperial networks under which these MPs 
worked and formed their political theories and opinions.  In addition, it seeks in some way 
to bring the politics of the American Revolution into the fold of Atlantic History and to 
assess the ways in which those with the greatest experience of working in the peripheries of 
empire sought to reshape and reorganise its structure from the metropole after the close of 
the Seven Years War. 
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INTRODUCTION  
‘Unhappily England,’ commented a nobleman after the defeat of the British army at 
Yorktown, ‘bankrupt in genius as well as other resources does not offer one man […] 
capable of preserving the Empire.  An exuberancy of declamatory eloquence is to be found 
in either House of Parliament.  But an individual where experience, judgement, integrity, 
sound discretion unite is not the produce of this season’.
1
  The members of the House of 
Commons, certainly, generally had little personal acquaintance with the American colonies, 
and only five American-born MPs sat between 1763 and 1783.
2
  As the great crises between 
Great Britain and British America in the 1760s and 1770s erupted into full-scale warfare, 
leading ministers were forced to try to comprehend both the nature of the American 
grievances and, perhaps more importantly, how to deal with them. 
To what extent, therefore, did MPs during this critical time have connexions with, or 
knowledge of, the American colonies?  Similarly, how did the members that sat in the House 
come to know America and what were their impressions of this new England across the 
Atlantic?  In addition, did the men with any significant knowledge of the colonies find their 
political careers aided or hindered by it, and to what extent did this information affect the 
alliances they made and their general political trajectory?  Finally, how did these ‘American 
MPs’ view the British Empire – to what extent did they, for example, adhere to the idea of 
an eighteenth century ‘Atlantic World’ in which Britain and her various American colonies 
(including the West Indies) were connected through bonds of language, culture, sovereignty 
and liberty? 
The main purpose of this thesis, then, will be to examine the above questions.  In order to 
do this, the dissertation will examine several MPs with significant American connexions 
through the 1760s and 1770s.  In his book, England in the Age of the American Revolution, 
Sir Lewis Namier established a list of sixteen MPs with, as he classed it, ‘acquaintance with 
the American colonies’. 
3
 These men were the foremost experts on colonial issues and 
served in the House of Commons during much of the American Revolution; they were active 
and keen politicians and participated in many of the great Parliamentary debates of the 
                                                 
1
 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Reports of the Manuscripts of the Marques of Lothian (London: 
HMSO, 1905), p. 412.  Quoted incorrectly in P. Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 (London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1993), pp. 516-17.   
2
 L. Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution (London: Macmillan and Co., 1930), p. 230. 
3
 Ibid., pp. 229-33. 
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period.  Their importance as a group, however, has as yet been somewhat ignored by 
historians.  Most of the work on them thus far was conducted by Namier in the 1920s and 
included in his ‘The House of Commons and America’ chapter.  This chapter’s work is 
decidedly unfinished (Namier himself admits that it is the zekher lekhurban of the book)
4
 
and is classed as ‘interesting but less important’ by Bellot and given almost no consideration 
by Pease in his review.
5
  Almost eighty years on, this unfinished chapter must now occasion 
some modern attention and study. 
The Sixteen 
The sixteen MPs are an odd collection of soldiers, merchants, civil servants, and colonial 
agents and representatives.  Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Barré had served extensively in the 
Americas as a soldier and maintained an active and engaged interest in the colonies 
throughout his parliamentary career.  Richard Jackson (nicknamed ‘the omniscient Jackson’) 
was the agent for Connecticut and assistant-agent for Massachusetts and was a friend of 
Edmund Burke and Benjamin Franklin, with whom he carried on a prolonged and somewhat 
verbose correspondence, published and annotated by Carl van Doren in 1947.
6
  Charles 
Garth was the agent for South Carolina.  Edmund Burke was the agent for New York as well 
as a key historical figure and prolific writer.  Thomas Pownall had been Lieutenant-Governor 
of New Jersey and Governor of Massachusetts, and he wrote extensively on the issues 
raised by the imperial crisis of the 1760s and 1770s and on the idea of ‘Empire’.  Thomas’s 
elder brother, John Pownall, although serving in Parliament for a very short period of time 
(from November 1775 to May 1776), is also listed by Namier as one of the leading and 
influential American ‘experts’ in the House of Commons due to his position as Secretary to 
                                                 
4
 ‘Pious Jews in Eastern Europe, when building a new house, leave one place unfinished; it is called in 
Hebrew ‘zekher lekhurban’ (‘the memorial of destruction’), and commemorates the destruction of the 
Temple.  I [Namier] had concluded my researches for the rest of this book, but not on the complex 
subject of the Colonial agents, when the Arab attack in Palestine, in August 1929, compelled me to 
relinquish my historical studies earlier than I had planned, and to take up work in the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine.  After that I could do no more than complete the parts for which the material was ready; this 
unfinished chapter has to be the zekher lekhurban of my book’.  Ibid., p. 251. 
5
 H.H. Bellot, ‘[Review of] England in the Age of the American Revolution’, p. 678 and T. Pease, ‘[Review of] 
England in the Age of the American Revolution’, American Historical Review, XXXVI No. 3 (April 1931), pp. 
583-85. 
6 C. Doren, The Letters and Papers of Benjamin Franklin and Richard Jackson, 1753-1785 (Philadelphia: 
The American Philosophical Society, 1947). 
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the Board of Trade and Plantations.  These men, in Namier’s view, were the most learned 
and knowledgeable in Westminster regarding American affairs and American policies.
7
  
There was, however, a sub-group of men ‘less prominent as experts on America, but not 
unimportant’ listed by Namier.
8
  These men were mainly merchants, traders and soldiers 
who had served or worked in, or traded extensively with, the American colonies.  There 
were two merchants: Anthony Bacon, who traded extensively with the southern colonies 
and published several pamphlets on the relations between Britain and the Americas; and 
John Sargent, who also worked as a ‘special agent’ for New York.  Admiral Sir Charles Hardy 
served extensively in the Americas with the Royal Navy and was Governor of New York from 
1755 to 1757.  William Harvey and William Amherst had served in the Americas during the 
Seven Years War.  These ‘secondary’ MPs in Namier’s list are more problematic than his 
original men, and there seems to be little reason for the inclusion of some of them as 
distinguished ‘American’ MPs.  Whereas Bacon was a prominent member of the Commons 
who published work on the American problems and made several recorded speeches in the 
chamber, other MPs have left no discernable trail or record in the available sources.
9
  It 
seems unclear, therefore, why certain of these men were listed by Namier among the 
leading ‘American’ MPs when others, who were perhaps more prominent and had more 
influence throughout the period of the American Revolution were mentioned but are 
effectively ignored in this original list.  For example, William Henry Lyttelton or Alexander 
Mackay, who had both served in the Americas (as Governor of South Carolina and Jamaica, 
and as a military officer, respectively), served as MPs for much of the 1760s and 1770s and 
spoke often in the House regarding American affairs and policies.  
The final five MPs in the original sixteen are the least controversial.  They are simply in the 
list because they were born in the Americas: John Huske and Paul Wentworth were born in 
New Hampshire; Barlow Trecothick was probably born at sea, but was raised in Boston; and 
Henry Cruger and Staats Long Morris in New York.  Again, some of these men are more 
important for this study than others: Trecothick was an influential member of Rockingham’s 
group while Wentworth never actually got to sit in the House – he was brought in by 
Administration for Saltash in 1780, but the dissolution was announced before he could take 
                                                 
7
 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, pp. 229-30. 
8
 Ibid., p. 229. 
9
 L. Namier and J. Brooke, The History of Parliament The House of Commons, 1754-1790 (London: three 
vols, Secker and Warburg, 1985), II. 35-6: Bacon, Anthony (c. 1717-1786). 
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his seat and he came bottom of the poll at the following general election.
10
  Nevertheless, 
there seems little reason to argue with Namier’s logic in including these American-born MPs 
(perhaps with the exception of Wentworth, who never truly served in the Commons). 
Although Namier lists these sixteen MPs at the start of the chapter as the most significant, 
the rest of the chapter discusses several other MPs with similar qualifications and qualities.  
There are sections on the West Indians, naval and army officers, merchants and traders, and 
land speculators.  All-in-all, there are well over 60 MPs with noteworthy connexions with the 
Americas between 1760 and 1780: this figure includes West Indians such as Rose Fuller and 
all army and naval officers who served in the Americas, as well as notable merchants who 
had significant interests in, or involvement with, the American colonies.  While several of 
these men were important, some of them had little or nothing to say in the House of 
Commons about the American crises, or indeed anything else.   
Nevertheless, there remains a core few men with significant documentary evidence to 
support historical analysis.  For the purpose of this study, we shall look at six MPs who were 
listed by Namier as being heavily involved with, and knowledgeable about, the Americas.  
These MPs are: Anthony Bacon; Isaac Barré; Edmund Burke; Richard Jackson; Thomas 
Pownall; and Barlow Trecothick.  Each of these MPs has been chosen as the main focus of 
this work for several reasons.  They were all active and vocal in the House of Commons and 
sat for most, if not all, of the period of the American Revolution (c. 1760-1780).  More than 
that, their speeches and correspondence are largely intact (for example, Edmund Burke’s 
correspondence has been published several times in multiple volumes) and available to the 
historian for analysis.  Perhaps of most importance, however, is the fact that each of these 
men held strong opinions on the nature of Empire and the ‘imperial crisis’ in the eighteenth 
century, and several of them shared these opinions, ideas and suggestions through 
pamphlets and other publications.  There also exists for these men some secondary source 
work on which to begin and base my own research: Pownall, for example, has a biography 
and several articles written about him and his ideals, while works on Edmund Burke 
abound.
11
 
                                                 
10
 D.H. Watson, Barlow Trecothick and other Associates of Lord Rockingham during the Stamp Act Crisis, 
1765-1766 (unpublished MA dissertation: University of Sheffield, 1957) and Namier and Brooke, The 
House of Commons, III. pp. 623-24: Wentworth, Paul (d. 1793). 
11
 J.A. Schutz, Thomas Pownall: British Defender of American Liberty.  A Study of Anglo-American Relations 
in the Eighteenth Century (California: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1951); J.A. Schutz ‘Thomas Pownall’s 
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These MPs have been selected mainly because of the wealth of information available on 
their political activities, thoughts and opinions.  However, they also represent a broad cross-
section of the various ‘types’ of men who interested themselves in the Americas: the list 
contains former governors (Pownall), merchants (Bacon), soldiers (Barré), American 
colonials (Trecothick), and representatives of the various American assemblies (Jackson and 
Burke).  Although the major focus will be on these six central MPs, the other MPs also 
connected with America will not be ignored through this study.  Rather, where appropriate, 
various MPs will be used to support and augment the arguments and conclusions drawn to 
provide a greater wealth of evidence and a more wide-ranging and satisfying account.  The 
overall hope, therefore, is to provide evidence of the impact these American expects had on 
British policy towards the colonies across the Atlantic and, in some way, perhaps Namier’s 
unfinished chapter can be brought one step closer to completion. 
Historiography of the Eighteenth Century Atlantic World 
The debate over the American Revolution has, in the past half-century, shifted dramatically.  
Moving away from ‘Progressive Interpretations’ which focused on class conflicts in the 
Revolution, as championed by Carl L. Becker, into discussions of defending and fighting for 
democracy (such as that discussed by Robert E. Brown and B. Catherine Brown), and 
ultimately into issues of clashes of sovereignty, the debate has now largely moved away 
from legal and constitutional discussions.  No modern-day historian regards George III as an 
absolute or arbitrary monarch trying to establish an English universal monarchy; and no 
historian now sees, in Lord North, a down-trodden, ‘yes-man’ first minister serving his 
monarch loyally and trying to extinguish liberty from the British Isles and American mainland.  
Likewise, historians – on both sides of the Atlantic – now see that, while the Americans did 
have grounds for their claims and cause, the British government was in an impossible 
position, could not understand or comprehend the American claims and demands, and 
sought only to strengthen British liberties throughout the Empire.
12
 Recent historiography 
has therefore shifted its focus to deal largely with issues of nationality and the idea of an 
‘Atlantic World’ in the eighteenth century in light of these new understandings.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Proposed Atlantic Federation’, The Hispanic American Historical Review, XXVI No. 2 (May, 1946), pp. 
263-8; and G.H. Guttridge, ‘Thomas Pownall’s The Administration of the Colonies: The Six Editions’, 
William & Mary Quarterly, XXVI No. 1 (January, 1969), pp. 31-46. 
12
A. Grant, Our American Brethren: A History of Letters in the British Press During the American Revolution, 
1775-1781 (London: McFarland, 1995), p. 1. 
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Much of the original work that this thesis is based on comes from Namier and those working 
in the Namierite tradition.  This tradition is one which heavily influenced the interpretations 
of, and appreciation for, Parliamentary history for a number of decades.  While not lacking 
in controversy at the time of publication (for example, Sir Herbert Butterfield attacked 
Namier for ‘taking the ideas’ out of history), this interpretation has done much to distance 
many American historians from the field of British politics and the War for Independence.  
Indeed, in this vein in 1957, Edmund Morgan wrote that the Namierists had worked to 
‘discredit, in different ways, the old Whig interpretation.  The imperial historians have 
examined the running of the empire before the Revolution and pronounced it fair.  The 
Navigation Acts, they have shown, were no cause for complaint.  The Board of Trade did as 
good a job as could be expected’.  This system of analysis did nothing, Morgan stated, to 
‘redeem the fallen Revolutionary patriots but rather show[ed] them up as hypocrites 
pursuing selfish interests while they mouth[ed] platitudes about democracy and freedom’.  
In this interpretation, the Revolutionaries’ ‘objections to parliamentary taxation are reduced 
to mere tax evasion, with the arguments shifting as the character of the taxes shifted.  Their 
insistence on freedom and equality is shown to be insincere, because in setting up their own 
governments they failed to establish universal suffrage or proportional representation.  
They were, it would appear, eager to keep one foot on the lower classes while they kicked 
the British with the other’.
13
 
More than that, however, Namier’s attack on the Whigs and the Whig tradition left the 
American’s main allies in Parliament – the Whigs, and especially the Rockinghamites – on 
uncomfortable ground.  Namier and his students attacked the Whig tradition and great 
Whig leaders and spokesmen.  ‘This deflation of Fox and Burke and the other Rockingham 
Whigs,’ Morgan noted, ‘while accomplished with scarcely a glance in the direction of the 
colonies, nevertheless deprives the American revolutionists of a group of allies whose high-
minded sympathy had been relied upon by earlier historians to help demonstrate the justice 
of the American cause’.
14
  Morgan stressed, however, that this change in the perception of 
British politics was not done to alter American Revolutionary historiography: quite the 
contrary, the Namierites were working without America at the forefront of their mind and 
were interested merely in the British political world in the British Isles, while those studying 
the War for Independence were forced to adapt to these new interpretations.  The state of 
                                                 
13
 E. Morgan, ‘The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising’, William and Mary Quarterly, XIV, 
No. 1 (January 1957), pp. 4-5. 
14
 Ibid. 
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the study of British politics in the eighteenth century at Morgan’s time of writing left him to 
believe that Britain should effectively be removed from the equation.  He suggested instead 
that ‘without abandoning what we have gained from the imperial idea and from economic 
interpretations, we must dissect the local institutions which produced the American 
Revolution, the institutions from which were distilled the ideas that enabled men of that age 
to stand as the architects of modern liberty’.
15
  In other words, historians interested in the 
founding of the United States should, Morgan suggested, look principally at the American 
aspect, studying local American politics, society and economy, while effectively side-lining 
the role played by British politics. 
This decision was made in a large part because of the ideas of Namierism.  Namier believed 
that ideas played no role in the politics of the eighteenth century Houses of Parliament.  
Men were interested only in local concerns and voted along those lines.  More than that, 
they were heavily influenced by the social circles in which they moved, and voted along 
these lines.  The older distinctions of party – and, crucially, party ideology – were washed 
away by Namier.  This transformation of British politics left American historians on difficult 
ground: if principles, belief, party played no part in eighteenth century British politics, how 
could the grand ideologies of the American Revolution be compared and discussed 
meaningfully in a wider imperial framework?  As a result of this, those interested in the 
American Revolution have paid since the 1950s only a passing interest in the role of British 
politics during the Revolution. 
By 1997, however, T.H. Breen was able to revise some of the claims made by Morgan.  
Breen established that Morgan had summed up Namier as producing ‘iconoclastic writings 
[which] depicted an empire governed by narrow-minded, complacent country gentlemen 
who defined politics almost solely as a scramble for patronage’.
16
  Breen stressed, however, 
that Morgan’s revisions were then in need of further revision.  He argued that while 
Namier’s work might have ‘soured American historians on the society that produced George 
III and Lord Bute, the newer literature has had just the opposite effect’.  This new work 
draws attention ‘back to Great Britain, to a highly commercial, modernising North Atlantic 
world, and to a shifting relation between an expansive metropolitan state and a loosely 
integrated group of American colonies’.  Breen argued that this reinterpretation of the 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., pp. 14-5. 
16
 T. Breen, ‘Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution: Revisions Once More in 
Need of Revising’, Journal of American History LXXXIV, No.1 (June, 1997), p. 13. 
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British – or the Atlantic – political world did two things: ‘first, the recent work fundamentally 
recasts how we think about the origins and development of American nationalism.  And 
second, it provides new insights into the character of popular political ideology on the eve of 
independence, suggesting why the natural rights liberalism associated with John Locke had 
broader emotional appeal during this period than did classical republicanism or civic 
humanism’.
17
  These new appreciations for, and understandings of, the nature and shape of 
the British political, social and economic world meant that historians now saw a ‘newly 
aggressive English state’ which worked to ‘force the Americans to leap out of history and to 
defend colonial and human equality on the basis of timeless natural rights’.
18
  While this is 
perhaps a bit grand and self-congratulatory, it has allowed once more for American 
historians to re-engage with their British brethren and to once more connect their works 
across the Atlantic. 
This thesis aims to use these new interpretations to recast the role played by the House of 
Commons in the American Revolution once more.  It aims not to revive all of what Namier 
and his school did, but seeks to salvage what was good in their approach (notably, for 
example, a prosopographical approach to understanding real imperial connexions amongst 
MPs).  It seeks to abandon the interpretative biases inherent in the works of Namier and 
reinsert concepts such as ‘party’ and ‘ideology’ back into the British political world at this 
time in order to once again connect ‘patriots’, ‘loyalists’ and others with ‘Administration’, 
‘Opposition’ and others on both sides of the Atlantic.  In some small way, it hopes to place 
once again British politics – and British politicians – at the very centre of the American 
Revolution. 
Nationalism and National Identity 
The archetypal work on British nationalism, or Britishness, has to be Linda Colley’s Britons: 
Forging the Nation, 1707-1837.
19
  The groundbreaking book places the development of a 
sense of British nationalism in a political and social context.  Colley’s main argument is that 
it was Protestantism that allowed for the formation of a powerful sense of Britishness to 
develop in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  ‘Protestantism,’ Colley argues 
‘was the foundation that made the invention of Great Britain possible’ and it ‘provided the 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., p. 14. 
18
 Ibid., p. 38. 
19
 L. Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London: Yale University Press, 1992). 
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majority of Britons with a framework for their lives’.
20
  Of perhaps equal importance to the 
formation of the Briton, in Colley’s opinion, is the constant threat from the French ‘Other’: 
‘Britishness was superimposed over an array of internal differences in response to contact 
with the Other, and above all in response to conflict with the Other’.
21
   
Colley further explains why Britons chose to be patriotic and support the Hanoverian regime.  
As she points out, it has been argued before that the Hanoverian dynasty – established after 
the death of the last Stuart monarch, Queen Anne, in 1714 – relied heavily on military force 
and a slim political and social base to remain in power.  That argument, likewise, suggests 
that Britons had ‘nothing to choose between the “close-knit élite” oppressing them at home, 
and the “absolutism of Bourbon France”’.
22
  Colley establishes, however, that this was not 
necessarily the case: Hanoverian politics and society, although still dominated to a large 
degree by the landed aristocracy, were heavily influenced by trade and commercialism.  This 
belief, that trade – especially long-distance trade – and commercial pursuits were the basis 
of English, or British, liberty, wealth and power infiltrated all aspects of society.  The logical 
conclusion, therefore, was that stability in government (particularly after the tumults of the 
Jacobite uprisings) was paramount to maintaining wealth, property and prosperity.  
Patriotism, at least in the years of the reigns of George I and George II, was therefore a self-
motivated economic concern as much as anything else.
23
 
Likewise, Tamara L. Hunt’s monograph, Defining John Bull: Political Caricature and National 
Identity in Late Georgian England, analyses how Britons saw themselves through the use of 
caricature and propaganda during the reign of George III.
24
  The work, which has surpassed 
that of Dorothy George’s English Political Caricature according to one review,
25
 looks 
specifically at how the depictions of various national symbols (notably Britannia and John 
Bull) tells us about the national character and national identity.   
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Hunt’s central line of argument is that the replacement of Britannia with John Bull in the 
late-eighteenth century as the main national symbol shows a transformation in how Britons 
viewed themselves.  Britannia, which had been the national emblem of Britain since Roman 
times and which had undergone somewhat of a revival under the latter Stuarts (particularly 
during Charles II’s reign), slowly became replaced by the image of John Bull as the 
representative of the nation.
26
  Part of the reason for this, Hunt explains, was due to worry 
over the increasing roles of woman in British politics.
27
  Perhaps more significantly, however, 
the shift away from the classical, feminine, vulnerability of Britannia to the respectable, 
strong-willed, industrious, Francophobe John Bull shows a development in the national 
character of Britons.  That is to say, Britons, as Colley likewise established, began to class 
themselves as different from the idle, slothful, and – crucially – Catholic Europeans.
28
 
Hunt also deals with how the American War for Independence impacted on the image of 
John Bull.  In The Bull Roasted; or the Political Cooks Serving their Customers, we see George 
III, Lord Bute, America, France and Spain cooking and eating parts of a bull, which is clearly 
meant to represent the people.  Similarly, John Bull Triumphant ‘depicts a rampaging bull 
threatening figures representing America and her European allies’ and, to disparage the 
British government, further shows ‘Lord North, Bute, and others restraining the bull’.
29
  
Generally, however, most of the attacks in the prints are on America’s European partners.  
Colley also discussed this theme in some detail and likewise comes to the conclusion that 
Britons found it difficult to ‘hate’ their American brethren: ‘this time the enemy was not 
Roman Catholic.  And while High Church clerics might find it easy to condemn the American 
colonists as latter-day puritans and vile republicans, large numbers of ordinary [Britons] 
seem to have felt persistently uncomfortable about going to war with their co-religionists 
across the Atlantic’.
30
 
T.H. Breen has taken this type of study further: he has looked primarily at how each side of 
the Atlantic, Britain and America, were connected through trade and shared culture.
31
  
Unlike Colley, however, Breen sees an empire attempting to accommodate and adjust to 
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English national identity.
32
  At first, he explains, Americans tried to be more British than 
Britons, and proclaimed their loyalty to the kingdom and the House of Hanover.  Soon, 
however, Americans realised that they were in fact not British brethren.  By the mid-1760s, 
Americans began to complain of what they viewed to be their second-rate status in an 
English empire: ‘We won’t be their Negroes […] I say we are as handsome as old English 
folks, and so should be as free’.
33
  Similarly, James Otis Jr, asked whether the inhabitants of 
British America were ‘all a parcel of transported thieves, robbers and rebels, or descended 
from such?  Are the colonists blasted lepers,’ he asked, ‘whose company would infect the 
whole House of Commons?’.
34
  Breen’s main argument here, then, is that it was English 
nationalism, and the development thereof, that forced Americans to think of themselves as 
separate and distinct from Britons. 
Discussions of nationality have, naturally, been drawn to look at how the members of the 
Atlantic World compared, likened, and contrasted themselves against both external foes 
(notably, the French Catholic ‘Other’) and fellow members of the empire (Britons in Britain 
versus ‘Britons’ in America).  The question, then, is how historians have constructed an 
understanding of the eighteenth century British Empire and what the debate regarding it is. 
Atlantic History 
 At the end of the nineteenth century, John Robert Seeley published perhaps one of the 
greatest selling books on the issue of the British Empire.  The Expansion of England, first 
published in 1883, protested against the separation of British and British Empire history, of 
domestic and imperial history, and looked to include the white settler colonies (America, 
Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa) into a general imperial history.
35
  After 
almost 100 years, and the extinction of the British Empire, the calls for a ‘Greater British 
history’ were rekindled by J.G.A. Pocock in 1973.  Pocock argued in favour of placing British 
history in its proper terms: he advocated looking at all of British history (that is, including 
England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland and the American colonies across the Atlantic), at least 
until American independence.
36
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It was in this light, for example, that Jack P. Greene tried to place American constitutional 
problems (both during and after the Revolution) into a wider, Atlantic, context.  His work, 
Peripheries and Centre: Constitutional Developments in the Extended Polities of the British 
Empire and United States, 1607-1788, suggests that the generally-accepted belief that post-
Revolutionary American constitutional issues were a clean break from English, or British, 
constitutional practice is flawed.
37
  On the contrary, Greene states, that the concerns over, 
firstly, American liberty in the British Empire and, secondly, American liberty as part of the 
United States, comes from the disagreement between metropolitan officials anxious to 
stamp central (or imperial) authority on a group of provincial locals (in Ireland, Scotland, 
England or North America) who identified themselves as freeborn Britishmen with local 
autonomy.  Disagreements naturally followed, then, over rights of life, liberty, property, and 
Parliamentary sovereignty.   
The major issue of contention, according to Greene, was the separation of colonial and 
British understandings of the role of the King-in-Parliament.  While, in the British Isles, the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 had permanently stamped the authority of Parliament over the 
three kingdoms, Americans continued to believe themselves to be subject to the authority 
of the Crown, and the Crown alone.  In their minds, the various American legislatures were 
miniature examples of Westminster-in-the-wilderness and were not subject to 
Parliamentary authority.
38
   
More recently, there have been attempts at placing British early modern and colonial 
American (note the different names to describe effectively the same period on either side of 
the Atlantic)
39
 into one category for analysis.  As David Armitage points out, however:  
The work of Bernard Bailyn, Jack Greene, Ned Landsman, Susan O’Brien, David Cressy, David 
Hackett Fischer, Stephen Foster, Joyce Chaplin, James Horn, David Hancock, and Eliga Gould, 
among others, has amply revealed the necessity for historians of British America to attend to the 
[…] history of Britain and Ireland in their studies of the polities of the northwestern Atlantic basis, 
especially in the period before 1783.  Early modern British history has become indispensable for 
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historians of colonial America: why, then, have British historians almost completely failed to join 
hands across the ocean with colonial Americanists?
40
 
The combination of studies of British history and American history, Armitage suggests, 
would remove the problems of ‘American particularlism’ and of ‘Anglo-British self-
congratulation’.  He further points out, however, that should historians ignore the various 
island colonies in the Caribbean and the Canadian territories, that ‘Atlantic’ history would 
turn into ‘the acceptable face of American (for which, read “United States of American”) 
exceptionalism’.
41
 
 Similarly, historians have recently been looking at just how British the Empire actually was.  
Armitage, again, looks at how increasing involvement of (particularly) Scots in the far-flung 
reaches of the British world destroyed a predominantly English Empire and replaced it with 
a truly British one.
42
  Likewise, Stephen Brumwell explains how the forging of a sense of 
Britishness amongst the redcoats in the American wilderness helped to cement a British 
national identity that included Scots.
43
  So important is this fact to Brumwell’s argument, 
that he devotes an entire chapter to the experience of Highlanders in the American army: he 
discusses here how it was ‘through these costly campaigns [in the Americas and Caribbean] 
that the Highlanders established the reputation that was to gain them a permanent place 
within the structure of the British Army’.
44
  Brumwell is careful to point out, however, that 
even in the 1760s, English ‘Scottophobia’ and even ‘soldier-phobia’, made particularly 
potent because of the impact of John Stuart, Earl of Bute, and his supposed illicit dealings 
with the young George III’s mother, had not entirely vanished.
45
  Nevertheless, the full 
inclusion of Scottish Highland regiments in the Americas meant that the ‘“American Army” 
prefigured notions of “Britishness” that would only reach fruition within society at large 
during the more protracted struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France’.
46
  
Looking more specifically at the ‘Idea of Empire’ in the eighteenth century Atlantic World, 
Eliga Gould has produced several works discussing the nature of American national identity 
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before, and during, the Imperial Crisis of the 1760s and 1770s and at how the British reacted 
to, and dealt with, the loss of the American colonies.  Gould notes that, ‘of the Whig 
regime’s various outlying provinces […] none appear to have been more susceptible to these 
metrocentric tendencies than the English-speaking colonies on the North American 
seaboard’.  Further, he goes on to say, ‘early Americanists generally concede that on the 
revolution’s eve Anglomania was a far more conspicuous feature of colonial society than the 
separatist sentiments that appeared so suddenly during the controversy over parliamentary 
taxation’.  Moreover, Gould establishes that it was this ‘Anglomania’ and patriotism that 
‘helped British authorities gain a far broader voluntary obedience than they possibly could 
have hoped to secure through more authoritarian forms of government’.
 47
   
Gould interestingly turns the discussion on its head: Americans, he claimed, rebelled against 
George III and his ministers not because they had become too ‘American’ but, rather, 
because ‘they had become so thoroughly “British” that they refused to sacrifice any of the 
rights of self-government enjoyed by their cousins on the European side of the Atlantic’.
48
  
Gould’s main argument here is that it was a sense of Britishness throughout both the First 
and Second British Empires that secured their success.  He establishes that, although the 
British Imperial state could, and did, act unilaterally with force on occasion (for example, 
over the slave trade), generally the empire remained connected because of a shared 
nationality and consciousness.  It was ultimately, in his opinion, therefore the creation of 
new nationalities (Australian, Canadian, South African, and so on) which superseded the 
British one in the colonies which led to the dismemberment of the Empire in the twentieth 
century.
49
 
In his book, The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American 
Revolution, Gould further points out why many Americans chose to rebel in the 1770s.  If, as 
he and others had already suggested, the British Empire in the eighteenth century was made 
up from Britons in Britain and Britons in the Americas, then rebellion and revolution would 
seem an odd choice.  As Gould points out, however, Britons and colonists were ‘armchair 
patriots’: instead of marching off to war, waving the Union Flag, Britons paid taxes.
50
  When 
the Americans therefore refused to pay taxes, they stopped being patriotic and – to some 
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extent – stopped being British.  It was this removal of Americans as Britons from national 
consciousness that, for example, stopped the Forms of Prayer in Anglican services after 
1778 as referring to the Americans as rebels; rather, they had now become foreign 
enemies.
51
  
Stephen Conway’s work on the impact of the War for American Independence on the British 
Isles must also be considered.
52
  In this monograph, Conway discusses the various aspects to 
the American Revolution in the British Isles, looking at troop mobilisation, the economy, 
society, culture, politics (local and national) and identity (again, local and national).  
Interestingly, Conway’s conclusions on nationality are that regional identities (such as Welsh 
or Irish) cohabited with, and contributed to, an overall sense of Britishness.  The Revolution, 
Conway argues, was the testing ground for the type of Britishness that developed during the 
wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.  Moreover, in direct contrasts to Piers 
Mackesy’s statement that ‘the struggle which opened at Lexington was the last great war of 
the ancien régime’ he suggests that the American Revolution was not the last war of the old 
order, but the first of the new one due to the levels of troop mobilisation and the deep 
impact it had on everyday society.
53
 
Finally, as mentioned above, any discussion of the Atlantic World in the eighteenth century 
must contain reference to the West Indies.  Not to include discussion on this topic, as has all 
too often been the case, leaves a wide gap in our understanding of the Anglo-American 
Empire.  In that vein, Andrew J. O’Shaughnessy’s recent book, An Empire Divided: The 
American Revolution and the British Caribbean, ‘aims to redress the omission of the British 
West Indies from the scholarship of the American Revolution’.
54
   O’Shaughnessy’s book 
looks at why the West Indies remained loyal to the Crown during the American Revolution 
and the impact this loyalty had on the islands in the longer term.  His main conclusions are 
that the West Indies remained loyal for self-motivated reasons: they were, in 
O’Shaughnessy’s words, ‘sojourners’ with no real alternative culture to combat the British 
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metropolitan influence.
55
  Moreover, the large proportion of black slaves – and therefore, 
fears amongst the white populations of unrest, revolt and rebellion from their slaves – 
meant that ‘the island colonies [had] created a white garrison mentality whose intensity 
reflected local racial demographic patterns’.  As a result, therefore, the armed forces in the 
West Indies were not viewed as the tool of an evil oppressing tyrant as they were on the 
American mainland; instead, the ‘besieged minority’ of whites on the islands relied heavily 
on, and requested a more obvious presence from, the armed forces to protect them.  The 
West Indians were, therefore, dependent on British imperial might for their own survival.
56
  
 All of the above research has, ultimately, provided a solid bedrock on which this work can 
be based.  As leading members, and examples, of the ‘Atlantic Community’ and ‘Atlantic 
Empire’, the ‘American’ MPs provide us with an alternative and interesting account of this 
idea.  Moreover, this thesis aims to fill some of the gap mentioned by Armitage above by 
looking to include British history into the wider context of the Atlantic Empire. In this vein, 
British history can hopefully to some small degree begin to ‘join hands across the ocean with 
colonial Americanists’.
57
  Similarly, by looking at how the men viewed their national identity 
in the Empire, the dissertation aims to augment our understanding of nationalism and 
Britishness in the eighteenth century Anglophone world. 
 
Thesis layout 
This thesis will be split into four main thematic chapters.  The first two chapters deal with 
the actions of MPs with American connexions in the House of Commons from the close of 
the Seven Years War in 1763 to the passage of the Coercive Acts and Quebec Act in 1774.  
These chapters are built from the vast wealth of information on Parliamentary debates 
recorded (especially from the mid- to late-1760s) by diarists, newspapers, and interested 
individuals.   
The first of these two chapters, titled ‘Governing an Empire: The House of Commons and 
America’ analyses the reaction of the American MPs to the Stamp Act, the Stamp Act Crisis, 
the Townshend Duties, and the Townshend Duties Crisis.  It stops just before the Boston Tea 
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Party.  Looking at British politics in the 1760s, the chapter shows and discusses the myriad 
ways in which the American MPs established themselves as the leading experts on all things 
colonial, and the impact they had on imperial policies at this time.  Unlike during the passing 
of the Coercive Acts, the MPs here held sway over the House of Commons and were able at 
times to change and alter the ways in which Britons attempted to govern their empire.  
More than that, however, this chapter shows that the House of Commons was in fact far 
more knowledgeable about the colonies than previously thought: while the focus remains 
on the core MPs here mentioned, the work shows that from the 1750s through to the early 
1780s, there were over one-hundred MPs with personal knowledge of, or connexion to, the 
American colonies.   
The second chapter, ‘Losing an Empire: the House of Commons and America’ focuses on the 
British political reaction to the Boston Tea Party, through the Coercive Acts and the passing 
of the Quebec Act.  Following on from the first chapter, this section details the ways in 
which the MPs’ opinions on America had changed, developed or become unworkable.  This 
chapter proves, firstly, that the House of Commons was not ignorant as to American affairs 
or the likelihood of an American rebellion in response to their actions.  Rather, it shows that 
the American MPs tried – and tried hard – to explain to an uninterested House the real 
nature of American resistance.  More than that, however, it shows a lack of connexion 
between the imperial MPs and the Americas: the expert opinions held so dear throughout 
the 1760s had, by the mid 1770s, become outdated.  The American situation, and the cries 
of the colonists, was no longer truly in tune with the majority of the MPs here studied.  This 
chapter analyses the reaction of the MPs to the various pieces of legislation passed as part 
of the Coercive Acts and the Quebec Act, and details the ways in which these connected 
men viewed the British Empire as it started to come unstuck. 
‘Truths Which Should Be Known: The Political Texts of Bacon and Pownall’, the third chapter, 
focuses on the political publications and writings of the men.  The main focus here is on 
Pownall and Bacon as these men published several pamphlets and books on the issues of 
the American colonies and the American Revolution.  Major political works by these men, 
such as Pownall’s Administration of the Colonies and Bacon’s A Short Address to the 
Government by a Member of Parliament, are analysed in turn, along with discussion of their 
importance to contemporary politics and politicians.  As Pownall’s works went through 
several editions from the 1760s to the 1780s, some focus is also on why the changes to each 
edition were made in order to track Pownall’s changing conception of Empire, the American 
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colonies, and the Atlantic World.  Moreover, this chapter will compare the authors’ works, 
and will discuss how contemporaries and historians have viewed and used the publications 
through time.  The major purpose of this chapter is to establish what insight the authors’ 
works give us into their Empire-related thoughts and opinions during the American 
Revolution. 
The final chapter, titled ‘An Empire of Liberty? The British Atlantic World’ analyses in some 
depth how the MPs viewed the British Empire.  In more detail, this chapter looks at the 
ideas of Empire and the Atlantic World in the eighteenth century, particularly with regards 
to the colonies in the Americas (although not limited solely to them).  The chapter discusses 
how the men viewed their Empire before the onset of the Revolution, and how the 
destruction of Anglo-America in the 1770s affected their conceptions of the Grand Marine 
Dominion forged between Britain and her New World colonies.  This chapter makes use of 
recent advances in our understanding of the eighteenth century British Empire and, further, 
looks at how the MPs’ ideas of sovereignty and imperial relations both affected 
contemporary politics and how they fit with what is our modern-day understanding of 
colonisation and metropolitan authority in the eighteenth century. 
The Six 
Our ‘American’ MPs formed no cohesive or single group in Parliament: some opposed all of 
the North Administration’s American policies; some opposed a few of the policies; and some 
worked with the government.  The study of the men herein is not an attempt to assign any 
particular label or group to the men other than that of ‘American expert’.  The men are 
interesting in that they were contemporaries of roughly the same age (the eldest being 
Anthony Bacon, who was baptised in 1717, and the youngest Edmund Burke, who was born 
in 1729) who shared an interest in, and knowledge of, the American colonies at a time when 
that expertise was most crucial.  Although certain of the men were personally connected 
(for example, Burke and Jackson were friends, and both were good friends of Benjamin 
Franklin), they each used their knowledge of the American colonies in separate and distinct 
manners, and to different ends. 
Anthony Bacon 
Baptised in 1717 at St Bees, Cumberland, Anthony Bacon, son of William Bacon and 
Elizabeth née Richardson, was born into a merchant and naval family.  His father and 
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grandfather were ships’ captains and made coal runs between Whitehaven and Ireland, 
although his father also made several voyages to Chesapeake.
58
  By 1738, Bacon was made 
master of the York and became involved in the Maryland tobacco trade working with the 
leading tobacco merchant in London, John Hanbury.  Upon moving to London in the 1740s, 
Bacon became heavily involved in the Atlantic trade: he traded extensively with Maryland 
and, by the 1750s, had added a significant number of connexions in Virginia and the Spanish 
wine trade to his portfolio.
59
 
During the Seven Years War, Bacon worked as an important and essential contractor for, 
initially, the Royal Navy and also the army.  He traded extensively with outposts in Africa 
and the West Indies, provided pay and provisions to the army and navy, and leased slave 
labour in the Caribbean islands to the army for the building of fortifications.  In 1760, he was 
very briefly appointed as agent for North Carolina’s Lower House to provide a petition to the 
House of Commons: ‘to present this address they appointed Anthony Bacon, a merchant of 
London, as special agent.  A few days later the lower house again passed a combined aid and 
agent bill which substituted Bacon for Abercrombie’.  Bacon was caught between the 
colonial assembly and the colonial governor: the assembly refused to accept that it did not 
have the power to appoint agents, while the governor refused to accept that it did.  After 
numerous attempts to install Bacon as their agent, and seriously challenging the relationship 
between governor and assembly, Governor Dobbs dissolved the assembly.
60
  In order to 
further his government connexions, Bacon attempted to enter the House of Commons.  In 
1763 he stood for, but was defeated, after an ‘expensive and riotous’ election in Honiton.
61
 
He nevertheless achieved election to the borough of Aylesbury (which had previously been 
represented by John Wilkes) in 1764. Bacon built a strong interest in the ‘squalid and venal’ 
seat, survived two contested elections in 1774 and 1780, and ultimately served until 1784.
62
   
Bacon was mostly quiet and unremarkable debater in the House of Commons: he spoke 
against Grenville’s proposal for taxing American imports; introduced a Bill, in 1764, to 
prohibit paper currency in the American colonies from becoming legal; claimed to have 
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opposed the Townshend duties (‘a more absurd or insufficient tax was never conceived, 
both with respect to the Americans or ourselves’); and eventually fell into line and 
consistently supported the North Administration.
63
 
Of greater importance than his parliamentary activities were Bacon’s publications: he wrote 
three pamphlets on the American crises in the 1760s and 1770s.  The True Interest of Great 
Britain, with respect to her American colonies, and impartially considered, by a Merchant of 
London, published in 1776, argued against the Stamp Act and opposed most forms of British 
taxation of the American colonies.  The pamphlet is exceptionally careful to point out that 
any criticisms made are not being levied against the government, or any individual ministers, 
but are instead critiques of the ‘system’.
64
  Likewise, Considerations on the Present State of 
the North American Colonies, published in 1769 and A Short Address to the Government, the 
Merchants, Manufacturers and the Colonists in America, and the Sugar Islands, on the 
Present State of Affairs, by a Member of Parliament, published in 1775, look at Britain’s 
deteriorating relationship with her colonies from a mercantile viewpoint and put a heavy 
focus on issues of taxation, trade and commerce.  The pamphlets, nevertheless, provide an 
interesting insight into how a merchant member of the Atlantic World viewed the collapse 
of the imperial system in the 1760s and 1770s. 
Bacon has largely been ignored by historians: Namier compiled his entry for the History of 
Parliament volumes and also wrote an article, in 1929, on him and his business and political 
activities.
65
  While he seems to be a relatively well-known MP amongst historians, there has 
been little direct attention on him.  Most interest in him is made in a passing or cursory way, 
or to highlight a certain point (usually the lack of any in-depth studies on merchants and the 
Empire).  For example, in Citizens of the World by David Hancock, Bacon is mentioned only 
in a footnote and in reference to Namier’s work mentioned above: ‘London’s merchants 
remain largely unstudied, and the influence of London on trans-Atlantic commerce has 
seldom been explored […] there are some exceptions [such as] the dozen or so biographical 
accounts of Augustan London merchants written by Lewis Namier and his followers’.
 66
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Isaac Barré 
Born in Dublin in 1726, Barré was the son of two Huguenot refugees, Peter Barré and Marie 
Madelaine, née Raboteau.  Educated at Trinity College, Dublin, Barré initially was intended 
to serve at the bar, but chose – against his parents wishes – to focus on a career in the army.  
His career was a distinguished one: he was commissioned as an ensign in the 32
nd
 foot in 
1746; was promoted to lieutenant in 1755 and to captain in 1757.  He saw active service at 
Louisburg in 1758 and at Quebec in 1759, where he lost an eye after being struck by a bullet.  
On the death of Wolfe, his military patron, he returned to Britain and was made captain in 
the 28
th
 foot.  By 1761, and through the patronage and friendship of Lord Shelburne, Barré 
was promoted to lieutenant-colonel in the 106
th
 and was brought into the House of 
Commons on 5 December in that year.
67
  Barré sat, from 1761 until 1774, for the 
uncontested borough of Chipping Wycombe and from October 1774 to 1790 for Calne in 
Wiltshire.
68
 
Upon entering the House of Commons, Barré immediately made a large impact.  He was 
described by Horace Walpole as follows: 
My ear was struck with sounds I had little been accustomed to of late, virulent abuse on the last 
reign, and from a voice unknown to me.  I turned and saw a face equally new; a black robust man, 
of a military figure, rather hard-favoured than not young, with a particular distortion on one side 
of his face, which it seems was owing to a bullet lodged loosely in his cheek, and which gave a 
savage glare to one eye.  What I expected less from his appearance, was very classic and eloquent 
diction, and as determined boldness as if accustomed to harangue in that place.  He told the 
House that in the late King’s reign we had been governed solely by Hanoverian measures and 
councils; and although called to order (in truth unparliamentarily,) he proceeded with the same 
vociferous spirit to censure all ministers but Lord Bute; and for Mr. Pitt, who was not present, he 
received the appellation of a profligate minister, who had thrust himself into power on the 
shoulders of the mob […] The reader must imagine the astonishment occasioned by this martial 
censor.  He was a Colonel Barré, of French extraction, born at Dublin, and had served for some 
years in the war in America with reputation, prosecuting his studies with assiduity in the intervals 
of duty […] In his younger years he had acted plays with so much applause, that, it was said, 
Garrick had ordered him a thousand pounds a-year to come upon the stage.
69
 
Ironically, later in his career and despite this initial attack, Barré supported the Chathamite 
policy that Parliament had no right to tax the American colonies.  It was in this vein, for 
example, that he coined the phrase of ‘Sons of Liberty’: a phrase which described the 
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American colonists so well, they adopted it themselves.
70
  He consistently used his 
knowledge and experience of the Americas to forewarn the largely ignorant House of 
Commons on the dangers of trying to quash American designs through the use of military 
means.  He did, however, follow the Chathamite line in 1774 when he supported the Boston 
Port Bill and demanded a strong Parliamentary reaction to the ‘outrage’ of the Boston Tea 
Party.
71
 
Being a somewhat more renowned Member of Parliament, Barré has occasioned a much 
larger volume of work on him than Bacon above.  His name and discussion of some of his 
Parliamentary activities appear in almost every text regarding British politics and the 
American Revolution, 
72
 but there is no real definitive account of his career.  Notably, 
however, in 1848, John Britton wrote a book, titled The Authorship of the Letters of Junius 
Elucidated: Including a Biographical Memoir of Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Barré, M.P., in 
which he suggests that it was Barré, along with the help of Lord Shelburne, who was the 
mysterious author of the Junius letters.
73
  While his conclusions are almost certainly 
wrong,
74
 it is nevertheless interesting that Barré was considered a prominent enough 
politician and political figure to be considered as a possible Junius. 
Edmund Burke 
Given the vast quantities of work already completed on Burke, any attempts at sketching a 
biography here would appear to be redundant and unnecessary.
75
  Nonetheless, he stood 
for Wendover from 1765 to 1774; for Bristol (a seat with properly contested elections) from 
1774 to 1780; and for Malton from 1780 to 1794.  Furthermore, from 1771 to 1776, Burke 
was employed by New York provincial assembly as its agent.  Burke’s Parliamentary career is 
marked by two main themes: he was an excellent orator, with a keen intellect and great 
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abilities; he never, however, developed leadership skills and, as a result, his career as a 
practical politician never reached the heights perhaps expected from his gifts.
76
  Although 
different from the rest of the six MPs inasmuch as he never visited the Americas, Burke’s 
extensive correspondence with Americans, and his understanding of colonial issues has 
meant he cannot be omitted from any list of American experts.  
Burke’s view on the Empire, and on the American crises, are easily summed in a speech by 
him in the Commons on 19 April 1774:  
The Parliament of Great Britain sits at the head of her extensive empire in two capacities: one as 
the local legislature of this island, providing for all things at home, immediately, and by no other 
instrument than the executive power.  The other, and I think the nobler capacity, is what I call her 
imperial character, in which, as from the throne of heaven, she superintends all the several 
inferior legislatures, and guides and controls them all, without annihilating any.  As all these 
provincial legislatures are only co-ordinate with each other, they ought all to be subordinate to 
her; else they can neither preserve mutual peace nor hope for mutual justice nor effectually 
afford mutual assistance.  It is necessary to coerce the negligent, to restrain the violent, and to aid 
the weak and deficient by the over-ruling plenitude of her power.
77
 
He likewise showed a sense of the connexions between the various parts and members of 
Greater Britain when talking of his relationships with Rockingham when he stated that ‘we 
know not in what mountain of Scotland, what bog of Ireland, or what wild in America, that 
genius may now be rising who shall save this country’.
78
  A conservative throughout, Burke 
nonetheless provides excellent commentary on the nature of the Anglo-American conflict. 
Richard Jackson 
Richard ‘omniscient’ Jackson, born 1721-2 was the son of a dissenting Irish merchant, 
Richard Jackson and his wife Elizabeth née Clark.  Educated at Queens’ College, Cambridge, 
he entered Lincoln’s Inn in 1739, and was called to the bar in 1744.  Jackson’s main interests 
lay in the American colonies: he was agent for Connecticut from 1760 to 1770, for 
Pennsylvania from 1763 to 1769, and for Massachusetts from 1765 to 1766.
79
  He was a very 
close friend and associate of Benjamin Franklin, and they worked together on the 
publications of Jackson’s controversial Historical Review of the Constitution and Government 
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of Pennsylvania (published anonymously) in June 1759 and on Franklin’s The Interest of 
Great Britain with regard to Canada and Guadeloupe in 1760.
80
 
Jackson was elected, quite unexpectedly, for Weymouth and Melcome Regis in 1762 and 
served for there until 1768.  From 1768 to 1784, he sat for the Cinque Port of New Romney.  
His Parliamentary career focused mainly on American issues: his first and last recorded 
speeches were regarding the colonies.  As the disagreements between Americans and 
Britons grew stronger in the 1760s, he found his dual position as MP and colonial agent 
particularly uncomfortable.  He supported Parliamentary sovereignty, but increasingly found 
it difficult to justify his position in the colonies.  Ultimately, upon being promoted to the 
Board of Trade in 1770, Jackson resigned his commissions as colonial agent.   
Although generally a supporter of the government, he warned of the dangers of applying 
the Stamp Act and later claimed to have ‘uniformly voted for the repeal of the Stamp Act, 
against the Boston port bill, and the other bills, which [were] the cause of our 
misfortunes’.
81
  Moreover, he stated that 
The commencement of the American war always appeared to me as an impolitic measure, the 
continuance of it cannot be less than ruin to this empire, and will be an object that I cannot be 
near without an anxiety that will be too much for me to bear.
82
 
He continued to feel a strong connexion to America and believed Britain and the United 
States to be forever part of one nation.  Even in 1783, he stated that the British nation was 
one ‘whether resident in Europe or America… a common origin, manners and language 
make a nation, though different parts of it may be governed by distinct and independent 
sovereignties’.
83
    
Much of the historical focus on Jackson has been because of, and through, his friendship 
with Franklin.
84
  He has occasioned some interest because of their interesting and detailed 
correspondence and because of their collusion together on the writing of several 
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pamphlets.
85
  Jackson’s fame for his knowledge was both a gift and a curse; and although he 
was gifted, his ‘lack of personal [political] ambition, his solitary habits, his nervous, if not 
neurotic modesty, and the diffusion of his interests over an enormous range of knowledge’ 
meant he was unable to perform any great role in the House of Commons.  Moreover, as 
Doren points out, ‘he may never have realised that his concern for America, which was as 
near as he ever came to a special interest, would give him his chief reason for being 
remembered in the second [and third] centur[ies] after his death’.
86
 
Thomas Pownall 
The son of William Pownall and Sarah née Burniston, Thomas Pownall was born into a 
middling and unimpressive family in Lincoln in 1722.  Educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, 
he graduated in 1743 with a BA.  After failing to try to sort his family’s finances in Lincoln, 
Pownall moved to London and obtained a position – through the influence of his brother, 
John Pownall – with the Board of Trade.  He was quickly promoted and, in 1753, became 
private secretary to the second Earl of Halifax’s brother-in-law, Sir Danvers Osborne (the 
then governor of New York).  Not long after Pownall arrived in New York, however, Osborne 
committed suicide.  This left Pownall free from official duties and allowed him to explore the 
colonies; he visited all the major seaboard cities, was present at the Albany congress 
(although as a minor and insignificant figure), and made lasting friendships and connexions 
with leading Americans (notably, again, Benjamin Franklin).
87
 
Largely due to his growing influence in the Americas, and again through his brother’s 
connexions, Pownall was given the post of Lieutenant-Governor of New Jersey in 1755.  He 
was further promoted, after turning down the governorship of Pennsylvania, to ‘secretary 
extraordinary’ to the British commander in America, the Earl of Loudon.  Pownall used his 
position here exceptionally well: he worked hard to discredit the Governor of Massachusetts, 
William Shirley, which ultimately led to his dismissal as governor.  Although the whole 
controversy showed Pownall’s darker side (‘his vanity, his contempt for the knowledge of 
others, his hot temper, his over-powering ambition, and his conspiracy against Shirley’)
88
 he 
was nevertheless given the governorship of Massachusetts in Shirley’s place.  His time as 
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Governor of Massachusetts was mainly taken up with the issues of warfare, and of trying to 
get a reluctant colonial assembly to support the imperial forces.  After three years in 
Massachusetts, he was appointed Governor of South Carolina, but chose instead to return 
to England in hope of better, higher, advances there.
89
 
After serving for two years with the army in Germany, and marrying the wealthy Lady 
Fawkener, Pownall became an active member of London political society.  He rented a 
house in Albemarle Street, where Horace Walpole and Benjamin Franklin were regular 
guests, and ultimately was elected to Parliament in 1767 as the member for Tregony.  He 
served there until 1774, when he was defeated during the general election but was re-
elected in a by-election for Minehead later that same year.
90
  In Parliament, he purposefully 
sought to establish himself as an expert on the American colonies.  As the crisis deepened in 
the 1760s and 1770s, Pownall also attempted to show himself to be a strong supporter of 
American liberties.  Gould has also suggested that Pownall might have played a role in 
writing some of the Junius letters; 
91
 and he proved to be a strong supporter of the 
American cause after the mid-1770s.  He did, however, vote in favour of the Boston Port Bill 
in 1774.  By 1777, he had broken finally with North’s Administration and called for a treaty 
which recognised American independence and liberty. 
Like Bacon, Pownall’s major contribution can be found in his literary achievements.  
Although his works seemed designed to give, as one eighteenth-century commentator 
noted, a ‘most excruciating head-ach’, he was nevertheless a prolific writer.
92
  His 
Administration of the Colonies went through several reprints and editions throughout the 
1760s and 1770s as Pownall, first, attempted to come to terms with the imperial situation 
and, secondly, tried to keep up with the many changes in the relationships between the 
mother country and the colonies.  He continued to write through the 1770s and 1780s, 
publishing articles such as A Memorial, Most Humbly Addressed to the Sovereigns of Europe, 
on the Present State of Affairs between the Old and New World (1780) and Two Memorials, 
not Originally Intended for Publication, now Published (1782).  These works, which will be 
covered in some detail in the third chapter, set out the causes of, and proposed cures to, 
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the rift between America and Great Britain.  In them, Pownall’s famous proposal of a ‘Grand 
Marine Dominion’ – involving the British Isles, the American colonies, the West Indies and 
even Spanish America – was laid down and explained.  
Pownall, like Barré, is a well-known figure in the eighteenth century British Empire.  Again, 
like Barré, he receives mention in most books on the American Revolution’s British 
dimensions.
93
  More specifically, however, there has been a significant focus on Pownall by 
John Schutz.  Schutz published, in 1947, a biography of Pownall and also published two 
articles on Pownall’s imperial proposals in 1945 and 1946.
94
  Similarly, in the 1960s, G.H. 
Guttridge published an article detailing the development of Pownall’s Administration of the 
Colonies with some details of how, and why, Pownall made alterations and changes as time 
went on.
95
  Undoubtedly an influential and interesting politician, if perhaps somewhat of a 
difficult-to-like character, Pownall provides a fascinating insight into a peculiar and distinct 
view of the eighteenth century Empire. 
Barlow Trecothick 
Trecothick can properly be classed as one of the ‘true’ American men in our list: born either 
at sea, or in Stepney, in 1718 to Captain Mark Trecothick and his wife Hannah née Greenleaf, 
he spent the first portion of his life in the colonies.
96
  He is quoted as having said that he 
lived ‘at Boston from 7 years old to 22, then lived 7 years in Jamaica.  Returned to New 
England for about 3 years, and after that came and settled in London’.  He further stated 
that he ‘has been concerned in the N. American trade there and here about 23 years on his 
own account.  Has been a merchant in London for 15 years past, and has been employed in 
purchasing goods for the merchants in N. America’.
97
 
After being turned down as a possible candidate for the City because he was not a freeman, 
he likewise refused to be sent ‘by the Treasury to a venal and expensive borough and repaid 
by contracts – the type unpopular with the City electorate’ and therefore turned down 
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offers of standing for New Shoreham under the Duke of Newcastle.
98
  He nevertheless 
worked to support Newcastle and Rockingham throughout the Stamp Act Crisis, became 
colonial agent for New Hampshire from 1766 to 1774, and was London’s sheriff in 1766 and 
its mayor in 1770.  Much of his important political work was therefore carried out before he 
entered the House of Commons. 
Nevertheless, Trecothick was returned as one of the members for London in 1768.  Initially, 
while ‘scarcely within the doors of this House’, he sought to remove himself from his 
supposed American connexions: ‘I look upon America as deluded,’ he stated, ‘There may be 
a few factious individuals.  We have factions here.  The town of Boston does not contain a 
thirtieth part of the inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay’.  Moreover, he ‘desired 
to be thought an Englishman and act the part of one’ and expressed ‘his concern at the 
present state of America’.
99
  His time in the House proved to Trecothick that America was 
being governed by ‘misguided despotism’ and he constantly sided with the Opposition.  
During the debate on the ‘Boston Massacre’, in an indignant tone, Trecothick announced 
that ‘we have shown the Americans that we are not incapable of ideas, and even systems, of 
despotism… We choose to govern by will, rather than by reason… We have acted the parts 
of bullies to America’.
100
  Suffering from increasingly poor health after 1771, Trecothick 
stepped down from the Commons in 1774 and died in 1775. 
The major works thus far on Trecothick are unpublished MA dissertations.
101
  He has also 
received a few passing comments in some articles.  We are told, for instance, that he 
‘usually opposed the government’ and ‘argued both that the colonists were “deluded” 
victims of factious men and that they naturally resisted acts of Parliament because they 
feared new taxes’ and that he ‘made essentially this point [that Parliament had no right to 
lay internal taxes on the American colonies] when he observed that “the Americans think 
the imposition of internal taxes ought to be confined to their own assembly”’.
102
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Our attention must now turn, in some detail, to the Parliamentary, political, literary and 
personal actions of these men: in the following chapters, as described above, each of these 
themes will be taken and analysed in turn.  With the understanding provided by current 
historiography, and basing the work on extensive primary sources, the rest of the thesis 
aims to answer the question of how these American experts influenced British politics, and 
the British Empire, from the 1760s to the 1770s. 
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CHAPTER I  
G O V E R N I N G  A N  E M P I R E :  T H E  H O U S E  O F  C O M M O N S  A N D  
A M E R I C A  
‘The legislative authority claimed by parliament,’ wrote John Dickinson in 1774, ‘over these 
colonies consists of two heads- first, a general power of internal legislation; and secondly a 
power of regulating our trade; both she contends are unlimited’.
1
  This parliament was one 
‘ignorant of the wants and resources of America, and interested to lay on it the heaviest 
share of burden’ according to some of its harshest critics,
2
 and was at best vaguely aware of 
the true nature of the American colonies.  As Christie established in the 1970s, older views 
of the nature of the relationship between the Houses of Parliament and the American 
colonies were tainted by a moralistic approach and by a willingness of historians to see the 
American Revolution as a battle for liberty and the limitation of state powers: ‘the British 
were [seen to be] either very ignorant, or very corrupt, or very sinful, or all three, to fail to 
grasp the rectitude of the colonists’ position’.
3
  The extent to which the House of Commons 
was actually aware of the American situation is the focus of this chapter.  Its aim is to show 
that, contrary to popular belief, there was a significant number of MPs with significant 
American connexions, and that a core group of MPs – including, but not limited to, Bacon, 
Barré, Burke, Jackson, Pownall and Trecothick – were especially well versed in all things 
American, and sought to promote their own view of empire on the colonies. 
The role of Parliament, and particularly of the House of Commons, during the last decades 
of the First British Empire has undergone quite a transformation over the past century.  
Where once historians looked through revolutionary-tinted glasses and saw a spiteful, 
dangerous, corrupt Parliament intent on destroying American liberties, what we now see is 
a very different picture.  The first pioneering historians of the part played by Parliament in 
the American Revolution attacked what they saw as a sinister force in the disintegration of 
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imperial connexions.  Unsurprisingly, the first works on the imperial crisis – works 
completed by those who had lived through and experienced the War for Independence – 
were highly critical of Parliament and parliamentarians.  It was in this vein, for example, that 
Macaulay wrote in 1844 that Parliamentary ‘oppression provoked resistance; resistance was 
made the pretext for free oppression.  The warnings of the greatest statesmen of the age 
were lost on an imperious Court and a deluded nation […] At length the commonwealth was 
torn asunder’.
4
  Similarly, but almost one hundred years later in 1926, historians were still 
claiming that ‘If my diagnosis is correct of the British state of mind in the eighteenth century, 
and the evidence in its favour seems overwhelming, then the colonists were as justified in 
their movement of revolt as were Englishmen themselves in their movement for reform in 
the next century’.
5
 
Not content with only changing our understanding of the British Atlantic World, Seeley 
sought also to recast our appreciation of Parliament’s role in the empire.
6
  Unlike those 
before him, Seeley saw not a corrupt or venal parliamentary system but one of the ‘great’ 
eras in British history, made possible by what he termed the ‘second Hundred Years War’ 
and the competition with France.  Seeley also ‘viewed American colonial development as 
part and parcel of mainstream British history in which the Westminster Parliament did all in 
its power to make the whole imperium work effectively and “avert schism”’.
7
  The reasons 
for the split in the Anglo-American world were fairly simple: British politicians failed to grasp 
the true nature of the argument, the shifting economic, social and political situation, and 
the constitutional crisis of which they were a part; and, as a result, the British system failed 
to adapt in time.  Seeley, however, did not view the loss of the American colonies as a 
catastrophic failure: as a result of the loss of the thirteen colonies, ‘Britain changed and 
adapted its government in other parts of the expanding imperium, while an independent 
America remained a favoured trading partner and destination of emigrants from the British 
Isles’.
8
  Seeley’s view, while attractive in some regards to current historians, failed to take 
into consideration the issues of ideology, identity, economy and society surrounding the 
American Revolution; he saw, rather, ‘a great homogenous people, one in blood, language, 
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religion and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space’.  His focus remained on celebrating 
the ability of the British people(s) to spread around the globe, as opposed to establishing 
any real basis of discussion on the true nature of the Atlantic Community.
9
 
In 1930, Namier published his seminal work England in the Age of the American Revolution.  
While not exactly covering the period of the American Revolution itself, the work set the 
scene for future appreciation of the role of Parliament – particularly the House of Commons 
– in the descent to war.  Of greatest relevance to the present work is his unfinished chapter, 
‘The House of Commons and America’, in which he asks many of the same questions being 
proposed here, the primary one being: ‘what acquaintance with the American Colonies had 
the House […] How many of its Members had been to the American colonies, had 
connexions with them, or had an intimate knowledge of American affairs?’.
10
  This central 
and crucial question is the one with which this work attempts to grapple in order to better 
understand the true nature of the House of Common’s relationship with the American 
colonists.  Namier’s chapter failed to provide any real or coherent answer to the question of 
the extent to which MPs were connected to, or truly aware of, the Americas and provides 
no real discussion on the wider implications of the topic. 
Those working in the Namierite tradition have since produced massive amounts of work and 
information on Hanoverian politics.  They have kept the field alive and interesting, and have 
contributed an excellent array of articles, books and points of discussion on the matter.  The 
leading works are by historians such as P.D.G. Thomas, Iain Christie, Paul Langford, Bernard 
Donoghue, Dame Lucy Sutherland, and John Brooke; and they provide a fascinating account 
of the relationship between the political elite in the United Kingdom and the various 
American colonies.
11
  They have, however, as yet failed to answer the problems faced by 
Namier in his unfinished chapter. 
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This chapter has two main purposes: the first is to establish the numbers and details of all 
MPs during this period who had connexions of note with the American colonies.  This will 
provide us with a clearer understanding of the extent to which the House of Commons 
relied on the opinions and knowledge of men with true experience of the colonial world.  
While Namier attempted this in England in the Age of the American Revolution, he missed a 
significant number of those involved in the colonies and focused heavily on those with 
mercantile connexions.  The intention here, therefore, is to use the extensive lists of MPs in 
Namier and Brooke’s The House of Commons to build a clearer idea of the scope and nature 
of the bond between MPs and the Americas.
12
   
The second aim of this chapter will be to discuss in some detail the Parliamentary activities 
of the MPs studied in this work.  Using a number of primary sources to build a picture of the 
involvement of the six men in Parliament, the main focus will be to establish the extent to 
which the men influenced British imperial and American policy, the political ties and 
associations they made in Parliament, and to place them in a wider Atlantic World context.  
Although the six chosen MPs will be the major focus of this section of the chapter, various 
other ‘American MPs’ will be consulted and discussed, where relevant, in order to provide a 
more coherent and a fuller discussion of the House of Commons and America.  
The House of Commons and America 
If Namier asked the question ‘what acquaintance with the American colonies had the 
House?’, the answer he provided should give some illumination as to the nature of the 
colonial make-up of Parliament.  Namier split his discussion of the colonial MPs into several 
categories: primary candidates; secondary candidates;
13
 American-born MPs; West Indian 
MPs; West Indian ‘outer ring’; merchants; army officers; naval officers; and land speculators.  
Members can be in more than one group (for example, Isaac Barré is a primary candidate 
but also an army officer, while Anthony Bacon is a secondary candidate and also a merchant, 
and Barlow Trecothick is classed by Namier as ‘American-born’ but can also be found under 
the merchant heading) and are included from the general election of 1761 with no regard 
for their levels of activity or involvement in the House.  Barré, Burke, Jackson and Pownall 
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can all be found in Namier’s ‘primary candidate’ category; Bacon is in the ‘secondary 
candidate’ category. Moving away from simply a discussion of the six, or the sixteen, most 
connected MPs as listed by Namier, what can we find in a study of the remaining MPs?  
These MPs had perhaps less tangible relations with, or ties to, the American colonies and as 
a result their contribution to any Parliamentary debates is perhaps less meaningful than 
those from the primary or secondary candidate lists.  Nevertheless, this in no way 
disqualifies them from having made significant, educated or erudite contribution to the 
discussion on Anglo-American relations and, while an analysis of the activities of all of these 
men (and there are 79 of them in England in the Age of the Revolution, and 128 of them 
according to the findings in this thesis) is outside the scope of this study - or, indeed, any 
work of this size – a brief discussion of their numbers, ties and make-up will be of significant 
benefit. 
Namier’s categorisation is, at times, perhaps a little odd.  There appears to be, for example, 
no reason for the inclusion of William Harvey and William Amherst as Members in the 
‘secondary candidate’ category.  Namier states that ‘William Harvey and William Amherst, 
who had served in America during the Seven Years War, [were brought into the house] on 
24 February 1763, and 17 November 1766 [respectively]’.
14
  What these men did to occasion 
a higher status than the rest of the ‘army officers’ rank is somewhat baffling: William 
Amherst’s ‘only recorded speech was on the fortification of Newfoundland, 10 Dec. 1770’.
15
 
William Harvey should actually be William Hervey.  The two records for a William Harvey in 
The House of Commons do not match here: William Harvey Senior was elected for Essex in 
1747, never served in the armed forces and died in June 1763; and William Harvey Junior 
was born only in 1754 and would have been only a child during the Seven Years War, was 
elected for Essex on 28 November 1775, and left ‘no record of his having spoken in the 
House’.
16
  William Hervey, however, was elected for Bury St. Edmunds but is said to have  
been ‘indifferent about Parliament and not sorry to find a way of getting out’ and there is no 
record of his having ever spoke in the House.
17
  The mystery here would seem to be why 
Namier decided to list them as ‘less prominent as experts on America, but not unimportant’ 
when there are a number of other, more influential and well-documented, examples of 
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American MPs from which to choose, and ones which actively engaged with the House and 
their roles and duties as MPs.
18
 
The category of ‘American-born’ is probably the least contentious of all the lists: these men 
are here simply because of the circumstances of their birth.  It is interesting to note, 
however, as Namier does, that all of the truly American MPs were Northerners and that only 
one Southerner, a Virginian called William Lee, tried unsuccessfully in 1774 to enter the 
House by contesting the Southwark election.
19
  Namier establishes here that the 
Southerners’ refusal to ‘entertain the idea of a “British Union” was not due to differences in 
outlook […] but probably the very fact that they were squires rooted in their own land, 
made them averse to entering the territorial assembly of another country’ and that while 
merchants from the northern colonies traded extensively with Great Britain and therefore 
had business to carry out in the mother country, southern planters had nothing to do ‘and 
without that, their fortunes were not sufficient to support permanent residence in England, 
still less to finance British Parliamentary elections’.
20
  This factor is perhaps one which has 
been somewhat overlooked in recent years with the discussion of a grand Atlantic World, 
connecting Britain and all the American colonies.  It may perhaps be of note to look again 
with fresh eyes at the differing ways in which the colonies participated in the Empire from a 
practical, as opposed to an ideological, standpoint.
21
 
Looking again at the nature of the House of Commons during this period, and on the 
connexions with America, this work finds that – contrary to Namier’s suggestion of 79 
‘American MPs’, there were in actual fact 128.
22
  The vast majority of these Americanist MPs 
were involved with the colonies either through the army or by being connected with trade.  
There is no discernable pattern to the election of these MPs, aside from noting that Scots in 
particular contributed to the North American empire.  The many different ways in which 
these MPs were connected to the Americas proves that the nature of Atlantic connexions at 
this time were various, complex and formed under a number of different circumstances. 
 
                                                 
18
 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, p. 229. 
19
 Lee came third in the election with a total of 741 votes; the winner was Nathaniel Polhill with 1195 
votes. Namier and Brooke, The House of Commons, I.  387: Southwark. 
20
 Ibid., pp. 231-2. 
21
 See, for example, O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided 
22
 See Appendix I for a full list.  Information gathered from biographies of each of the MPs sitting in the 
House of Commons as described by Namier and Brooke in The House of Commons II and III. 
  
41 
 
‘Errors in American Politicks in 100 Places’: MPs and Colonial Issues 
When the great decisions regarding the future of the empire in America were being made 
during the early 1760s, the House of Commons contained no real experts on the colonial 
world.  Out of the six MPs chosen for this study, the earliest to enter the House was Isaac 
Barré in 1761.  Barré was soon followed by Richard Jackson in December 1762, Anthony 
Bacon in January 1764, and Edmund Burke in December 1765.  Thomas Pownall entered the 
House in February 1767 and Barlow Trecothick in 1768.  It is perhaps worthy of note that 
only Trecothick entered during a general election; all the others were returned at by-
elections.  Although both Barré and Bacon were elected before the end of the Seven Years 
War, neither man made any significant impact on the House of Commons before 1765.  Both 
men have only two recorded speeches in the House on American affairs before the end of 
1764: Bacon’s involvement was purely financial and dealt with the issue of colonial taxation 
on 27 March 1764 and the regulation of colonial currency on 4 April 1764; Barré spoke 
briefly on the war in December 1762 and again on military affairs, though at greater length, 
on 5 December 1763.
23
   
It is again interesting to note that, even this early on in their respective political careers, 
both Barré and Bacon were casting themselves as experts on America: Barré in particular 
appears to have established himself as knowledgeable about the conditions in the colonies: 
Colonel Barré rose, and showed how in Canada stoppages could not be made, that the severity of 
the climate made several extraordinary preparations requisite against it, not to be purchased 
there, being European commodities, but at a great expense.  This was not denied, but answered 
by producing the discretionary power given by the Treasury to General Amherst.  Colonel Barré 
praised him, but said if he had any fault, it was too great an attention to economy.
24
 
Bacon’s wide mercantile interests, however, meant that he became quite heavily involved in 
the discussion in early 1764 – only a few weeks after his entering the House – on the issue of 
colonial currency.   
The issue surrounded that of colonial paper money being used as legal tender and the 
nature of debt owed by Americans to Britons.  It has been estimated that at the outbreak of 
the American War for Independence, the colonies owed £5 million to Britain, with the 
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southern colonies in the worst financial position and Virginia alone owing £2 million.
25
  The 
colonial gentry, it was claimed, were living above their means and were therefore becoming 
indebted to British businessmen in order to continue their extravagant lifestyle.  Virginia in 
particular was cited as an example of this colonial profligacy, notably by Lieutenant-
Governor Francis Farquier who told the Board of Trade in late November 1762 that ‘there is 
a much more fundamental Cause of the rise, to wit, the Increase of their Imports, to such a 
Height that the Crops of Tobacco will not pay for them [or their lifestyle]’ and that while 
most ‘thinking gentlemen’ knew of the problems ‘the generality […] obstinately shut their 
eyes to it’ as they were ‘not prudent enough to quit one article of luxury, ‘till smart obliges 
them’.
26
  Even after quite a sharp warning from the Board of Trade to the Virginian Assembly 
in 1763 explaining that Britain would act to remove the problem of colonial currency if it did 
not mend its ways, the Board found itself ignored and decided in late 1763 that the debts 
ought to be paid in Sterling.
27
   
The Board consulted several leading colonial agents, including Richard Jackson who asked 
unsuccessfully for a postponement of the issue, seeking their views on the debate over the 
need for an Act to stop the issue of new paper money and the continuation of the then-in-
use currency.
28
  The agents reported that it was their ‘unanimous opinion, that a certain 
quantity of paper currency ought to be allowed of in each colony, to be a legal tender in all 
contracts and dealings within the colonies, and that time should be allowed for each colony 
to consider and report what that sum should be’.
29
  The decision was made, however, that 
the whole concept of legal-tender paper currency in the colonies was ‘in its nature founded 
in fraud and injustice’,
30
 and that all future paper money ought to be banned while the 
duration of existing currency could not be extended. 
Charles Garth, agent for South Carolina, thought at this time that, as the Parliamentary 
session was coming to a close, there would be no resolution on the issue that year.  He was, 
however, to be thwarted in this by Bacon who introduced a private member’s Bill at the 
start of April: 
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I have reason to believe we should have heard no more of it this year, had it not been for a Mr. 
Anthony Bacon (a North Carolina merchant) [who] since that time [1763] he has procur’d himself 
to be elected for Ailesbury, and on the 29
th
 of March started the question in the House.
31
 
The Bill was brought forward on 4 April, a ‘Bill to prevent Paper Bills of Credit hereafter to 
be issued within any of His Majesty’s Colonies and Plantations in America from being made 
legal Tender in Payments of Money’,
32
 and was debated in the House.
33
  Charles Townshend 
thought that ‘the Colonies ought to have some currency that should be legal under proper 
regulations’.  Bacon wanted a sweeping and grand gesture to be made by Parliament – a 
gesture much stronger than the Board of Trade had originally intended or discussed – by 
implementing the eradication of all colonial paper currency, but eventually had to live with 
the compromise envisaged before, that future paper currency should be illegal and current 
issues should not be prolonged.
34
  Bacon’s first major foray into politics had been to try to 
limit American powers in order to promote his own business interests and connexions: he 
sought simply to establish the basis on which debts owed to him by Americans ought to be 
paid and thought nothing of the implications for the colonies in his actions.  
‘Diarrhoea of Words’: The Stamp Act and the Crisis 
Following the transmission of the details of the Stamp Act to the colonies, Jeremy Belknap 
commented: ‘the bells tolled, and a funeral procession was made for the Goddess of Liberty; 
but on depositing her in the grave, some signs of life were supposed to be discovered, and 
she was carried off in triumph […] The popular spirit,’ he continued, ‘was sufficiently roused 
to join in any measures which might be necessary for the defence of liberty.  All fear of the 
consequence of proceeding in the public business without stamps, was gradually laid aside 
[…] To provide for the worst, an association was formed by the “sons of liberty” in all the 
northern Colonies, to stand by each other, and unite their whole force, for the protection 
and relief of any who might be in danger, from the operation of this, or any other oppressive 
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act’.
35
  This type of reaction to the ‘most obnoxious act’,
36
 the Stamp Act, was almost 
entirely unforeseen by Members of the House of Commons.
37
  The main purpose of the Act 
was to reorganise, galvanise and regulate the entire imperium along lines deemed fit by 
those in government in the metropolitan centre.
38
 
The first mention of any note relating to the American colonies in the 1765 session came on 
21 January:
39
 Charles Townshend asserted the ‘supremacy of this country over the colonies’ 
and sought to ‘keep a medium between too much force, and too much economy’.  Barré 
replied that ‘America should pay, but would wish to wait: our sovereignty should be 
acknowledged, but we should be careful not to destroy industry there, or drive them to a 
species of industry, which might hurt us’.
40
  The first major discussion of the Stamp Bill took 
place on 6 February 1765; the discussion, however, was not on the proposal of the Bill itself, 
but on resolutions proposed by Grenville and discussed in the Committee of Ways and 
Means: Resolutions for Colonial Stamp Duties.
41
 
The committee was begun by Grenville, who opened with a quite lengthy speech on the 
nature of the constitutional relationship between the Houses of Parliament and the 
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American colonies as he saw it.  Grenville stated that the taxation of America came from a 
‘public motive’ and that ‘private considerations of his own choice would have prevented him 
if they had been consulted.  [He further stated that he] wishes those who had gone before 
him had marked out a path to him which he might more easily follow.  His conduct would 
then have been less liable to misconstruction’.
42
  The rest of Grenville’s speech was aimed at 
allaying the fears of the possible repercussions of colonial taxation, justifying the measure 
both constitutionally and economically, and explaining why a stamp duty in particular would 
be effective.   
Taxation, he established, was never popular: ‘if said, they do not like it, no more does the 
west like the cyder [sic] tax; Scotland the beer tax; the middle of England, the land tax.  The 
interest of all was mutual.  The plan was not unjust, nor above their ability’.
43
  Furthermore, 
even though the ‘objection of the colonies is from the general right of mankind not to be 
taxed but by their representatives,’ Grenville established that ‘the Parliament of Great 
Britain virtually represents the whole Kingdom, not actually great trading towns.  The 
merchants of London and the East India Company are not represented.  Not a twentieth 
part of the people are actually represented’.  Notwithstanding the complaints of the 
Americans, Grenville established that ‘all colonies are subject to the dominion of the mother 
country, whether they are a colony of the freest or the most absolute government’.
44
  There 
followed a quite detailed analysis of the myriad ways in which the different grants and 
charters given, particularly by the crown, to the colonies – mainly from the seventeenth 
century – did not ‘exempt a body from the power of Parliament’.
45
 
To justify why such a tax was necessary, Grenville established the basis on which the Navy 
was now running in the Americas: ‘the Navy used to cost,’ he pointed out, ‘about £7 or 8 
hundred thousand, now it costs about £1,400,000.  The money for these expenses must be 
raised somewhere. […] This great increase of the Navy is incurred in a great measure for the 
service of North America [and] that the military force in North America is said by many 
military men to be not sufficient.  He has never heard anybody say there was more than 
necessary’.  Moreover, a debt was owed by Americans for the support they had been given 
during the Seven Years War: Great Britain had ‘expended so much on the support and 
defence of North America; we have given them so great [a] degree of security after they 
                                                 
42
 Simmons, Proceedings and Debates, II. 9. 
43
 Ibid., II. 14-5. 
44
 Ibid., II. 9. 
45
 Ibid., II. 14. 
  
46 
 
were before in continual wars; the French are now removed, but they still have some 
enemies against whom, however, Great Britain is employing her troops’.
 46
 
With regards to the propriety of a stamp duty, Grenville established that it ‘takes in a great 
degree its proportion from the riches of the people’ or, in other words, would increase with 
the wealth of the colonies without being too heavy a burden on them.  It would also be 
exceptionally easy to enforce and police, owing to the fact that non-stamped papers would 
be legally void meaning there would be ‘no great number of officers, no unconstitutional 
authority in great Boards’.  Forgery would be ‘the only fright to be apprehended’ but could, 
apparently, be avoided by ‘severe penalties […] the punishment is in this country death’. 
47
 
With these points firmly established, Grenville sought to finish his argument on a discussion 
of the foundations of civil government: ‘protection and obedience were reciprocal.  
Governors owed the first to the governed; the governed owed obedience to their Governors; 
this is the great bond of all society’ and, with that, Grenville presented himself as ‘ready to 
give all information’.
48
 
In the debate that followed, Barré, Jackson and Garth all feature heavily.  Jackson’s 
contribution is less famous and quieter than Barré’s attack: he established simply that he 
was ‘not inclined to dispute whether the Americans ought to bear a share of the burden 
they occasion or to dispute the power of the Parliament.  He does not believe the North 
Americans will dispute either’.
49
  He is recorded as having said:  
The Parliament may choose whether they will tax America or not; they have a right to tax Ireland, 
yet do not exercise that right.  Still stronger objections may be urged against their taxing America.  
Other ways of raising moneys there requisite for the public service exist, and have not yet failed; 
but the colonies, in general, have with alacrity contributed to the common cause.  It is hard all 
should suffer for the fault of two or three.  Parliament is undoubtedly the universal, unlimited 
legislature of the British dominions, but it should voluntarily set bounds to the exercise of its 
power; and, if the majority think they ought not to set these bounds, then they should give a 
share of the election of the legislature to the American colonies, otherwise the liberties of 
America, I do not say will be lost, but will be in danger; and they cannot be injured without danger 
to the liberties of Great Britain.
50
 
Jackson further wrote to Franklin in an undated letter on his speech in Parliament that ‘no 
Sober wise man can doubt the constitutional Authority of Parl[iamen]t to impose Taxes of 
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every sort on every part of the British Dominions.  Because an Universal Legislature is a 
necessary part of every intire State, the Parl[iamen]t is that Universal Legislature of the 
British Dominions & must be so unless it be contended either that the British Dominions do 
not form one Intire State or that there is some other Universal Legislature’.  Jackson 
established however that ‘though the Constitution gives this Power to Parl[iamen]t, because 
an Universal Legislature seems a necessary part of every well constituted state yet this 
Power has always been exercised with great Moderation & even Abstinence, because the 
same Wisdom & Discretion that always governs the Proceedings of Parl[iamen]t have 
prescribed Moderation & Abstinence in those Cases’.  ‘It is on this Principle,’ he wrote, ‘that 
I have argued that Parliament should not impose internal Taxes on America, not that 
Parl[iamen]t has not an universal & unlimited Power, but that Parl[iamen]t for its own Sake 
& the Welfare of all the British Dominions will wish that Assemblies may continue in 
America […] until they supply their place by calling Members from America & that the 
People of the Colonys may from thence derive a Confidence in the Legislature’.
51
 
Barré’s contribution to the discussion was somewhat more energetic and lively than 
Jackson’s modestly restrained speech.  Barré worried that ‘too much will be done on the 
one side and too much said on the other’ and that ‘we are working in the dark, and the less 
we do the better.  Power and right; caution to be exercised lest the power be abused, the 
right subverted, and 2 million of unrepresented people mistreated and in their own opinion 
slaves’.  He pointed out, as Namier did almost two hundred years later, that ‘there are 
gentlemen in this House from the West Indies, but there are very few who know the 
circumstances of North America […] The tax intended is odious to all your colonies and they 
tremble at it.  He will go no further upon this ground.  He will not raise the feeling of the 
North American if he will yield to anything for the safety of this country’.
 52
 
Part of Grenville’s speech had been to declare that the Americans were used to taxation 
being laid by Parliament, citing the example of ‘9 Queen Anne, Post Office’ which imposed a 
slight tax on the colonists in order to support the post office in the colonies.
53
  Barré, 
however, did not think this an apt comparison or a sound judgement on which to base 
imperial policy.  The colonies had been ‘small in comparison’ to what they now were and 
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‘few agents know the real sentiment of the colonies’.  Barré established, however, that ‘one 
[colonial agent] does very fully and is very able to give the best advice, and I wish his opinion 
had been hearkened to’.  It is not clear who this colonial agent might be, but it seems likely 
that Barré was referring either to Jackson (who spoke just following Barré’s speech here) or 
Garth.   
After a short speech by Charles Townshend, during which he stated that the colonies were 
‘planted with so much tenderness, governed with so much affection, and established with 
so much care and attention’, Barré’s most famous parliamentary moment followed.  
Interestingly, while the speech was recorded by at least three attendees, only one of them  
(Ingersoll) mentioned the phrase ‘sons of liberty’ in their entries.  The accounts, however, 
agree with the substance of Barré’s speech.  The record in Bancroft’s History of the United 
States contains the same ideas and general conclusions as the other sources, but provides a 
much more elaborate interpretation of Barré’s reply.  With eyes ‘darting fire and [an] 
outstretched arm, [Barré gave this] unpremeditated reply’: 
They planted by YOUR care! No; your oppression planted them in America.  They fled from your 
tyranny to a then uncultivated, unhospitable country; where they exposed themselves to almost 
all the hardships to which human nature is liable; and among others to the cruelties of a savage 
foe, the most subtle, and I will take upon me to say, the most formidable of any people upon the 
face of God’s earth; and yet, actuated by principles of true English liberty, they met all hardships 
with pleasure, compared with those they suffered in their own country, from the hands of those 
who should have been their friends.  They nourished up by YOUR indulgence!  They grew by your 
neglect of them.  As soon as you began to care about them, that care was exercised in sending 
persons to rule them in one department and another, who where, perhaps, the deputies of 
deputies to some members of this house, sent to spy out their liberties, to misrepresent their 
actions, and to prey upon them; men whose behaviour on many occasions has caused the blood 
of those SONS OF LIBERTY  to recoil within them; men promoted to the highest seats of justice, some 
who, to my knowledge, were glad, by going to a foreign country, to escape being brought to the 
bar of a court of justice in their own.  They protected by YOUR armes! They have nobly taken up 
arms in your defence; have exerted a valour amidst their constant and laborious industry, for the 
defence of a country whose frontier was drenched in blood, while its interior parts yielded all its 
little savings to your emolument.  And believe me – remember I this day told you so – the same 
spirit of freedom which actuated that people at first will accompany them still […] God knows I do 
not at this time speak from motives of party heat; what I deliver are the genuine sentiments of my 
heart.  However superior to me in general knowledge and experience the respectable body of this 
house may be, yet I claim to know more of America than most of you, having seen and been 
conversant in that country.
54
 
This impassioned speech was ‘thrown out so entirely without premeditation, so forcible and 
so firmly, and the breaking off so beautifully abrupt, that the whole House was awhile as 
amazed, intently looking and without answering a word’, reported Ingersoll.  He further 
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stated that ‘I own I felt emotions that I never felt before and went the next morning and 
thanked Colonel Barré on behalf of my country for his noble and spirited speech’.
55
 
Both Barré and Jackson, therefore, sought to fight on behalf of the colonists before the 
passage of the Stamp Bill through Parliament.  Barré’s speech was widely reported and he 
gathered a rather loyal following in the colonies,
56
 but the sentiments he showed in this 
debate were mirrored by Jackson.  Jackson’s speech was perhaps the more sensible: rather 
than any outlandish claims of colonial oppression from Britain, Jackson’s reasoned argument 
of a development towards the inclusion of Americans in the House of Commons shows an 
understanding of the issues which soon would so occupy American and British minds.  
Importantly, however, Barré went to some length here to establish his own credentials as an 
American expert, claiming to ‘know more of America than most of you’.  Setting himself as a 
man knowledgeable about, and interested in, the colonies undoubtedly set the scene for his 
political career and established him – in reputation, if not in actuality - as a father of the 
‘sons of liberty’. 
The Stamp Bill was again brought before the House on 15 February, where the debate 
focused on the issue of petitions after Rose Fuller tried to submit a petition from Jamaica.  
Similarly, Sir William Meredith offered a petition from Virginia, Garth attempted to submit 
‘one from three residents of South Carolina then in London’ and Richard Jackson ‘tendered 
one from “the Governor and Company” of Connecticut’.  While all three asked for the Stamp 
Bill not to be passed, the petitions from Virginia and Connecticut also directly challenged 
Parliament’s right to tax the colonies.  These three petitions were the only representations 
made on behalf of the colonists in Parliament at this time, and only one – that presented by 
Jackson from Connecticut – had actually come from America.
57
   
Both Barré and Jackson again spoke strongly against the Bill: Barré established that ‘the 
measure [was] inflammatory and dangerous’ and noted that he hoped to ‘find a new asylum 
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of liberty in America’.  Jackson, again the more sensible and calm of the two, noted that ‘the 
defence [for which Grenville had established the Stamp Duty was primarily supposed to pay 
for] was intended for our new colonies, not our old.  Danger of a Bourbon compact distant 
as to America.  Civil establishment in North America £40,000 a year, £80,000 in the West 
Indies.  They pay £300,000 duty on our commodities’.
58
  Ultimately, the opposition chose 
not to divide over the issue; although only five Members had spoken for the ministry and 
against the petitions, and seven against the ministry and in favour of receiving the petitions, 
the mood in the House seemed to be quite obviously in favour of the Bill.  On the debate, 
George Onslow wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: ‘I have no news for your Grace’.
59
  The Bill 
eventually passed without a vote and received the royal assent on 22 March.
60
 
Following the passage of the Stamp Act and its transmission to America and after the 
collapse of the Grenville ministry in July 1765, there appears to have been a lull in interest in 
the Americas.  The main political points of contention had not been the colonies, but had 
instead focused on a new alliance with Prussia, issues connected with general warrants, and 
the debate over allocation of offices and positions.
61
  Grenville, however, foresaw that the 
change in ministry would mean a repeal of the Stamp Act and pleaded with George III that ‘if 
any men ventured to defeat the regulations laid down for the colonies […] he should look 
upon him as a criminal and the betrayer of his country’.
62
  The response to the Stamp Act at 
first appeared erratic and unorganised, and official accounts of the troubles varied greatly.
63
  
What was unclear at this point, in Britain at least, was the true nature of the American 
resistance to the Act.
64
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Behind the scenes of the Rockingham administration, Trecothick became quite heavily 
involved in advising Rockingham and his associates.  Although Trecothick was not yet an 
MP,
65
 he was nevertheless committed to the ideal of repeal of the Stamp Act, and repeal as 
soon and quickly as was possible.  Trecothick became a central figure among Rockingham’s 
unofficial advisors and attended several dinners to discuss the ‘American situation’.  For 
example, in December 1765, Rockingham wrote to Newcastle: ‘I could not possibly come to 
your Grace this evening […] having company to dinner which consisted of Sir William Baker 
and Dowdeswell and Trecothick, Lord Dartmouth etc. upon American topics’.
66
  These 
evening meals appear to have been organised with leading merchants and politicians in 
order to discuss issues dealing with the colonies.
67
  Trecothick had been a well-known 
opponent of the Stamp Act noted by Ingersoll in 1765: 
The merchants of London trading to America also met together about this time (February 1765) 
and appointed a committee of themselves to make all the opposition they could to the Stamp Bill.  
Of this committee Mr Alderman Trecothick was deputy chairman […] They were frequently 
together and several times before the Ministry upon the Stamp and other bills that related to 
America where Mr Trecothick was always principal spokesman for the merchants.
68
 
By November, Trecothick was writing to Rockingham to attempt to persuade him of the 
benefits of repeal.  Trecothick’s view here works quite well as a true representation of the 
feeling of many merchants connected with the American trade: 
Our sugar islands will be deprived of their usual supplies of provisions lumber etc. and will 
perhaps be disabled from sending home their produce or even subsisting their slaves.  The British 
merchants will have little or no chance of remittances … these accumulated disappointments must 
prove fatal to many of the British merchants trading to America … a total stop must be put to all 
purchase of manufactures for a country whence no returns can be expected: from this state it 
naturally and unavoidably follows, that an exceedingly great number of manufacturers are soon to 
be without employ and of course without bread!
69
 
Rockingham’s reply to this letter stated that while ‘the difficulties are great: the importance 
of the obedience in the colonies … [to the] British legislature is no slight matter’.  Watson 
points out that the draft of this letter had many corrections, alterations, additions and 
deletions and must therefore have been subject to some debate in Rockingham’s mind.  The 
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pressure put on Rockingham by Trecothick and the other merchants connected with 
America was, therefore, significant.
70
  Moreover, the committee of which Trecothick was 
deputy chairman wrote at the start of December to the leading merchant and trading towns 
in the United Kingdom informing them of the situation regarding the Stamp Act and seeking 
petitions from them to submit to Parliament.
71
  The exact outcome of this action is difficult 
to determine, but Trecothick undoubtedly had a vast impact on the movement for repeal 
amongst the merchant classes in the United Kingdom and with the leading members of 
Rockingham’s administration. 
After a protracted debate and discussion on whether to repeal the Stamp Act or not, there 
was on 3 February a debate in the Commons in an ‘American committee’ on the resolution 
of the rights of Parliament.
72
  The debate that followed was very detailed, very well 
attended and lasted well into the morning of 4 February.
73
  In the debate, which started 
with Conway asserting Parliament’s right to legislate ‘in all cases whatsoever’, Burke and 
Barré feature quite heavily.  Burke urged a ‘mode of caution’ and sought to differentiate 
between ‘the ideal and practical right of the constitution [of which there were] many 
instances of the kind in our own constitution’.  Burke pointed out that there had been parts 
of the British constitution which had been allowed to lapse over time: the royal veto on 
legislation – a power not used since the reign of Queen Anne – was one such part of the 
lapsed constitution, along with ‘the three estates of the clergy have slid out of the 
constitution and nobody misses them; and if this House was no more to be missed, then the 
convocation acts would evaporate out of the constitution as silently as the convocation 
itself’.  Burke challenged the House to recognise the differences here: ‘two things,’ he said, 
‘must be laid down: first, the standard of the constitution; second the practical change’.  
Had silent changes been allowed to happen to the British constitution, Burke asked, would 
the same not also be possible of the make-up – the constitution, even – of the British 
Empire as a whole?  ‘Without subordination, it would not be one Empire.  Without freedom, 
it would not be the British Empire […] The most anxious work for the understanding of men 
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is to govern a large Empire upon a plan of freedom; but it is as noble as it is anxious, and it is 
necessary because it can be governed by no other.’
74
 
Barré soon followed Burke and rose to address the House, asking that the words ‘in all cases 
whatsoever’ be left out from the resolution as, in his view, Parliament had no right to lay 
internal taxes on the Americans.  The colonies, Barré established, had become ‘great 
Commonwealths’ and that while ‘the supreme power is uncontrollable, it should control 
itself.  In this country, grievances are sooner felt, easier complained of, and quicker 
redressed.  At that distance, this is not effected without much difficulty’. 
With regards to the colonial situation, Barré noted that the country was ‘larger than Europe 
and perhaps in the whole contain[ed] more inhabitants, peopled from this little island’.  He 
attacked Jackson’s idea of colonial representation as absurd, however, pointing out the 
practical difficulties of actual representation:  
The idea of a representative from that country is dangerous, absurd and impracticable.  They will 
grow more numerous than we are, and then how inconvenient and dangerous would it be to have 
representative of 7 millions there meet the representatives of 7 millions here.
75
 
Even though the ‘Americans have acknowledged our right of restriction of trade and 
submitted to it’, they would not be ‘deprived of their property which they acquire under this 
restriction’.  Were this to be the case, the various colonial assemblies would be ‘annihilated’ 
and it will be looked on forever as a ‘badge of slavery’.  Barré’s attack on the imperial policy 
continued: 
If you do mean to lay internal taxes, act prudently and draw the sword immediately.  If you do not 
confine yourselves to general words, the repeal of the Stamp Act alone will not satisfy them.  The 
ulcer will remain, and they will expect another Stamp Act the next year.  If you enforce the Act, 
you must draw the sword.  You will force them to submit, but the trade will be forced to submit 
likewise.  If they submit with high words only, the discontent will remain.
76
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The French think you will be bold and wrong-headed enough to force your colonies, founded upon 
a plan of freedom, to a submission which they did not require from them of provinces in the heart 
of France.  The Spaniards think you are running yourselves upon the Spanish Punctilio.  You will 
cut the throats of the gallant though undisciplined companions of your former glory. 
This grand attack on the policies pursued on behalf of the British Empire ended with a 
chilling warning to the members: ‘all colonies have their date of independence.  The wisdom 
or folly of our conduct may make it the sooner or later.  If we act injudiciously, this point 
may be reached in the life of many of the members of this House’.
77
 
Grenville spoke soon after and noted that while he differed with Barré ‘totally,’ he thought 
his ‘conduct more consistent than that of gentlemen [i.e. the administration] who propose 
such a resolution with such intentions as that of repealing the Act.  This conduct is so mean 
and so distasteful’.
78
  By quarter to three in the morning, Barré’s amendment had been 
negatived without a vote.  The mood in the house for those supporting the positions of 
Burke and Barré was quite low at this point: ‘we,’ noted Thomas Pitt, ‘debated strenuously 
the rights of America.  The resolution passed, for England’s right to do what the Treasury 
pleases with three millions of free men’.
79
  
On 3 February, Trecothick was summoned before the House of Commons to provide witness 
to the American situation.
80
  He was examined at some length on 11 February as the first 
and most important to be heard by the Committee.  Trecothick and Newcastle appear to 
have worked quite closely together on preparing for this examination: the Newcastle papers 
contain calculations in Trecothick’s hand on the money due to Britain from America and are 
identical to the information he presented to Parliament.
81
  Trecothick’s time with the 
Committee was as long as Franklin’s, and arguably more influential: Trecothick’s main 
argument was that he, a true expert on the trade between the Americas and Great Britain, 
believed the Stamp Act harmful to the British economy.  Trecothick provided hard facts on 
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the situation, whereas Franklin could provide simply the colonial viewpoint.  He noted that 
the trade with the colonies was worth some £3 million but warned that the trade in America 
was ‘almost wholly’ stopped and that ‘the most considerable exporting colonies have sent 
orders under such restrictions as disable us to comply with them.  All have restricted not to 
be shipped unless the Stamp Act is repealed’.   
Trecothick further established that, without repeal, he would stop trading with the 
Americans because he would ‘consider it as putting my property into a country [so] 
embroiled in confusion as to make it uncertain’.  The Americans, moreover, would never 
submit to the Act, even after some modifications, because ‘the people from one end of the 
continent/country to the other have set their faces against it’ and ‘think it oppressive in its 
nature and an infringement on their right’.
82
  After Trecothick’s efforts in Parliament it was 
noted that ‘Trecothick was examined four hours and gave a full and satisfactory account of 
the distress at home and abroad and stated everything as he did to your Grace [Newcastle] 
this morning’.
83
  Trecothick was, therefore, quite heavily involved in what Thomas has called 
the Rockingham Ministry’s ‘gigantic red herring’: the spotlight was on the British economic 
situation, on the impact on Britain, and focused almost entirely (through a careful selection 
of vetted witnesses) on issues likely to appeal to the greatest number of MPs, while 
effectively ignoring the American situation.
84
  Trecothick’s long and detailed discussion in 
Parliament was certainly a part of this plan and was, it seems, effective. 
In the debate on the repeal of the Stamp Act on 21 February, Barré – who had campaigned 
so forcibly before on the issue of colonial taxation – appears not to have attended.
85
  The 
debate, however, marked the start of Burke’s ascension to the ranks of renowned orator: 
‘Mr Burke spoke well and to universal satisfaction’; he said ‘many ingenious things, but [was] 
saucy’ and told the House that ‘last year we were all asleep, now were awake, and like 
people just roused, a little disordered and in confusion’.
86
  Burke was also apparently ‘the 
only man who could keep up the attention of the House on a Subject already threadbare’.
87
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Burke stated that the ‘system of government with respect to the plantations effectually 
excludes taxation’.  He established, further, that as Britain had a ‘monopoly of their [the 
American] trade’ to also tax the colonies was a ‘double monopoly’ and would jeopardise the 
colonial economy.
88
  The colonial policy adopted was completely wrong, but he wished to 
show ‘how right our ancestors were than we who are either less busy or less wise’.  Burke 
rounded off the speech stating that he ‘does not wish for experiment, because we have had 
experiments enough.  It is by the providence of God that we have escaped out of our own 
hand, not the shuttlecock of faction’.
89
  This process of repeal – after one of the most 
extensive investigations carried out by the House of Commons in the eighteenth century – 
eventually passed through Parliament and was given royal assent on 18 March. 
Throughout the passage of the Stamp Act, and then its subsequent repeal, most of the MPs 
with American connexions opposed the idea of colonial taxation.  Barré in particular was a 
vocal and dramatic opponent of the tax, while Jackson, Barré and Trecothick all similarly 
opposed it.  Interestingly, although Bacon wrote about the Stamp Act and the problems of 
colonial taxation, he appears not to have become involved in any of the debates in 
Parliament.  Given the nature of his publication in 1766, it seems most likely that Bacon felt 
his written word would have had more of an impact on the discussions surrounding the 
colonies than any contributions he might have made in debate. 
While all the American MPs might have agreed on the fundamental issues, they failed to 
form any coherent point of argument in debates.  Jackson sought colonial representation at 
Westminster; Barré attacked colonial representation as a ‘dangerous thing’ and sought 
simply to fight for American rights; Trecothick worked behind the scenes and dealt primarily 
with issues of trade, ignoring any of the constitutional battles taking place; Burke argued in 
favour of caution and conservatism, believing that while Parliament had a right to tax, it 
should not be used.  Importantly, however, with these men in the infancy of their 
Parliamentary careers, they were unable to make a significant impact on the House of 
Commons and were still seeking to place themselves as prominent experts on the colonies. 
‘Again before us, an American tax’: The Townshend Duties and the Crisis 
Following the repeal of the Stamp Act, there was again somewhat of a respite in American 
affairs in Parliament.  While the Rockingham Ministry continued to work to enhance the 
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conditions of trade, in order to try to recover some of the lost impetus in the economy after 
the end of the Seven Years War, nothing aroused public spirit in the way the Stamp Act had 
done.
90
  Burke had supported the Declaratory Act, but otherwise the American MPs made 
less contribution.  During the debate in the American committee in May 1767 on the 
‘resolutions on New York’ – dealing specifically with New York’s resistance to the Mutiny Act, 
as well as the Massachusetts Indemnity Act, and the growing disagreements between the 
colonial assemblies and Westminster - Burke spoke against the proposal to stop the New 
York Assembly from passing any further legislation until it complied with Parliament noting 
that ‘the colony could do without new laws if they chose it’ while Barré thought the Mutiny 
Act ‘odious’ in general.
91
  
On 15 May 1767, the debate in the Commons allowed for a wide-ranging discussion of 
American issues.  Townshend had announced plans to tax America a few months before this 
debate,
92
 but this debate is notable as it is the first at which Pownall became involved 
(having been elected early in 1767) and because Burke wrote a long draft of a speech he 
intended to give during the debate. 
Pownall’s speech is typically long, grandiose and verbose.  He focused on the issue of the 
Mutiny Bill and quartering of troops in America and began by explaining his own knowledge 
of America: 
Mr Speaker, Having borne so great a share in the service of North America, I hope it will not be 
thought improper, that I take some share in the present debate.  When matters are brought under 
consideration, the facts and circumstances of which cannot be supposed to be fully known to the 
House, it becomes the duty of those whose service and station have rendered them duly 
cognizant of such circumstances and facts, to bear their testimony to the state of things, and to 
give their opinion of the state of the business also.  However clear and distinctly these matters 
may lie in my own mind, in the strongest form of conviction, yet, being unaccustomed to speak in 
public, I am afraid I shall be unable so to dispose and explain them, as to exhibit that same 
distinctness, and to convey that same conviction to others.  […] it is not only from the situation in 
general in which I stood, and the relation which I have borne to the business of America, which 
seems to render it proper that I should not give a silent vote under this occasion – but the 
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particular manner in which I have been concerned in this particular business, does especially call 
upon me to give my opinion on the matter now under debate.
93
 
On the issue of the Mutiny Bill, Pownall thought it a ‘measure dangerous, […] not necessary 
[and was] so contrary and discordant to the constitution’.  Pownall’s objection to the Act 
was primarily based on what he saw as the impracticality of the measure: ‘it neither 
considers the various circumstances of the service in that country, as they arise and present 
themselves variously in various parts thereof; nor, as they must be perpetually changing, 
from time, in the same parts; but directs particular modes, and establishes regulations […] 
which must necessarily be incompatible with the nature of the country’.  ‘It endeavours,’ he 
further noted, ‘to lay down general rules, which can never be applied to numberless 
particular cases that must arise; and, under this spirit of impracticality, it allows no latitude 
in the execution thereof’.
94
  Using an Act in Massachusetts which Pownall ‘had been the 
author of’ while Governor, there follows a long and detailed list of modifications or changes 
which Pownall thinks ought to be adopted if the Mutiny Act is to be enforced in America.
95
  
Of more interest, however, is Pownall’s brief discussion here on the issue of taxation and 
sovereignty.  Pownall stated: 
If it be prudent and advisable, that Parliament should charge any expense upon the colonies, by 
way of tax, originated in this House; how shall it direct that charge to be levied and paid?  Shall 
Parliament direct the Assembly of any province or colony, to make provision and supply for it?  Or 
shall Parliament, directly and avowedly, imposing that sum upon the province of the colony as a 
tax, settle the ways and means of levying it, and appoint executive officers to collect it?  Or shall it 
direct the usual executive officer of the colony to levy and collect the tax so imposed?  If the 
imposing by a direct tax be the proper political mode, the latter step is all regular, and but 
consequential of it is conformable to law.  The people having no share in the will, or in the 
authority, must submit to the power of the Act, and have no duty left, but submissions and 
implicit obedience.   
If Parliament, the supreme legislature, shall order and impose a tax on a body of people, and shall 
order the legislative part of that body to provide the payment of it, and to see it payd, it must 
consider the members of that Assembly merely as commissioners of taxes, appointed in such case 
to receive and register the Act, to apportion and assess the tax.  Yet surely this course is 
somewhat eccentric to the system of our happy constitution; it approaches, I am afraid, too near 
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to the course taken by the arbitrary and despotic spirit of a neighbouring government, with the 
Parliaments of its several Provinces.
96
 
Pownall similarly warned that any attempt to force this issue in one particular colony – 
noting New York and Massachusetts – would create a ‘common cause’ which would ‘call up 
every other province and colony to stand forth in their justification’.  This idea of colonial 
union was one which Pownall feared considerably, and against which he would argue 
strongly in his publications. 
With regards to the nature of the colonial assemblies and their role in the Empire, Pownall 
noted that if they were to consider ‘each of the Assemblies of the provinces and colonies as 
what it is, as a legislative, deliberative body, as the will of that province or colony; it must 
have a right to deliberate, it must have a right to decide’.  ‘If it has the free will to say aye,’ 
Pownall stated, ‘it must [also] have the same power of will to say no.  You may properly 
order an executive power to execute; but how, and with what propriety, can you order this 
deliberative body to exert its will only in one prescribed direction?’.  Attacking the Act in 
particular, but with serious implications for the entire relationship between Westminster 
and the various assemblies, Pownall asked ‘if you mean to try this experiment of reducing 
these absurdities and inconsistencies to practice; if this Bill must pass, and you have not yet 
predetermined on the title of it, it seems to me the Bill may justly be intituled, an Act to 
render more effectual predestination over free-will.  For as your measure now stands, if the 
Assemblies […] will not in every mode, article, and particular provision, decide in their 
deliberative capacity, as an Act of Parliament directs and pre-ordains, you consider the 
colonies as denying the sovereignty of Great Britain’.   
Pownall here laid out his thoughts on how the empire ought to be governed, at least in the 
short term: ‘we must return again, and re-establish the system of our politics on that basis 
whereon they stood, before some late innovations in our system shook that basis.  What 
remains, but that we act, as to external taxes, with that commercial spirit and prudence, 
which the wisdom of parliament hath always exercised towards the colonies, since their first 
establishment: and that as to further supplies, when they become necessary, the colonies, 
are properly applied to be requisitions in the old accustomed, known mode, which hath 
always succeeded and been found effectual’.
97
  Pownall’s maiden speech, therefore, 
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foreshadowed many of the characteristic aspects of his Parliamentary career: his speech 
was grand, long and protracted; but, he sought to establish the basis of a constitutional and 
effectual working relationship between the mother country and the colonies, promoted his 
own knowledge of the Americas as a reason why he should be listened to, and defended 
certain colonial rights against encroachments from Westminster. 
While Burke is recorded as having spoken during this debate, there remains no account of 
what he said in the House.  There is, however, a draft version of a speech penned by Burke 
which describes the position he would have taken during the debate.
98
  As Langford notes, 
this draft proves right Burke’s claim in the following year that he opposed the Townshend 
Duties from the start.
99
  The speech is a simple attack on the idea of colonial taxation, 
wherein Burke asks whether the ‘facts are now before you from whence you can infer a 
difference in their Circumstances or a Change in your own policy’ or, in other words, he asks 
what has changed since the repeal of the Stamp Act to make the taxation of America now 
acceptable. 
Burke’s draft vociferously attacks Grenville’s proposed plan for a Test Act to apply to the 
colonies.
100
  A test, Burke established, ‘never made a principle’ but the proposal ‘may serve 
to discover one – they exclude here and there a conscientious Enemy to Your establishment’.  
Should the Americans refuse the Test, Burke believes that America would be ‘again afloat’: 
An Universal alarm is Spread; a Combination from an opinion of common distress is formed; and 
we are again voluntarily brought into our former unfortunate Dilemma.  If they submit; they will 
submit not to opinion but to Necessity – Every time they subscribe to your Test, it will remind 
them of the force which imposed it – and instead of Quieting their minds – it will pass for a new 
and more provoking badge of Servitude. 
Lastly, Burke warns that ‘above all, I would object to using all these plans, (let them never be 
so wise separately): altogether, and in the Lump – Think what a flame it will burst from one 
Budget – A standing army, Quarters enforced, Legislature suspended, Taxes laid on, Tests 
imposed all at once’.  ‘In all political remedies,’ Burke warned, ‘gradation, order, Series, 
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times are at least as necessary as the medicine itself – it is the Quiet and insensible Lapse of 
Silent Steady Policy – and not this noisy and bustling apparatus of busy Politicks!’.
101
 
The Townshend Duties – the American Revenue Bill – received its first reading on 10 June, 
its second on 11 June, and it went through Committee on 15 June.  By this time, attendance 
at the House had diminished significantly and the Bill’s third reading passed on 18 June.
 102
  
The lack of opposition to the Bill is likely due to the distinction, then accepted in Britain, that 
Americans had drawn between internal and external taxation.  This distinction is one that 
even the American MPs discussed above supported: Barré and Pownall in particular both 
mention at length the inappropriate nature of internal taxation, implicitly implying that 
external taxation should cause no such problems.  Indeed, Thomas believes that Barré’s 
absence from the – albeit scanty – reports of the debates suggests Barré supported the 
measure.
103
  Whether this is the case or not is impossible to tell, but it is certainly true that 
the American MPs failed to rally against the American Revenue Bill in the way they had done 
against the Stamp Act.  It is perhaps for this reason – this lack of understanding in Britain, 
even amongst those supposedly best connected to the colonies of the shifting nature of 
American appreciation for, and understanding of, the imperial relationship – that British 
politicians were caught unawares and surprised twice in the space of a few years over 
colonial taxation.
104
 
Colonial opposition to the Townshend Duties built during 1767 and early 1768.  The true 
nature of the American reaction to the measure, however, was not truly known in Britain 
until after Parliament had ended in March 1768.  During the summer recess, and the general 
election of 1768, American affairs played an ever-present although not all-consuming role in 
British politics.  The issue of Wilkes, his return to Britain, and his expulsion from Parliament 
were to set British politics afire during this time; America was, after the tumults of 1768, 
somewhat of a secondary consideration.
105
 
The summer did, however, see serious concern in Britain over the extent to which 
Americans would revolt.  It was widely believed that the colonists were now in open 
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rebellion against Britain and that Boston and New York in particular needed to be subdued 
by military force.  An extra two regiments were sent from Ireland to reinforce the numbers 
under Gage’s command in Boston and those in Britain waited with anticipation.  On 4 
November, news reached London that the troops had arrived peacefully – though under the 
protection of the guns from a naval escort – in Boston.  Trecothick wrote to Rockingham 
that he at first feared ‘that some unhappy incident may still arise in Boston’, but soon found 
that ‘by the ships arrived today I find the two regiments from Halifax were quietly landed in 
the town and quartered in the public buildings’.  The Americans had backed down and were 
viewed by Britons as ‘vain blusterers whose bluff had been called’; this allowed Grafton to 
‘propose conciliation […] seemingly in a position of strength’.
106
  The cabinet reshuffle which 
brought in Grafton as the Prime Minister in October 1768, and which led to the resignation 
of Shelburne, saw Barré follow suit and resign his post.  This resignation, along with a return 
to the Opposition benches, allowed Barré to return to the forefront of politics, and to his 
greatest talent: criticism of government policy.  The debates of the late 1760s and 1770s are, 
therefore, filled with attacks on ministers and ministerial policy from this renowned orator, 
which is something that had been sorely lacking during the Chatham administration. 
On 8 November 1768, the King’s Speech discussed in some detail the American situation.
107
  
The reply in the House of Commons contained an impassioned speech by Burke attacking 
the entire basis of the Townshend Duties while Barré urged for a calm, considered approach 
to the colonists.  Burke stated that the issue was ‘a very great crisis of the tranquillity of the 
country, and of the subjection, and obedience of America’.  All the problems in America had 
been ‘regularly created by ministerial mismanagement’ and to not complain of the poor 
treatment of the empire would be ‘a crime’.  Speaking of the repeal of the Stamp Act, Burke 
noted that it was a ‘deliberate Act of this House’ and that the ministers then had 
‘commercial opinions of all kinds from the greatest philosophers to a shoemaker.  It was a 
call of the merchants of England upon an affair of the first magnitude.  You called for the 
commerce of England. It was the correction of a former mistake’.
108
 
Barré spoke on the ‘principle point’ being ‘what are we to do with regard to our colonies [?]’.  
Barré continued 
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I fear we are not likely to meet it with that temper it requires.  Without having the smallest 
respect for men, or parties, I speak to your understandings whether in place, or out of place.  The 
administration say, that everything is quiet.  The Address speaks war.  There is room to expect 
some great disturbances in Europe [over the French occupation of Corsica].  It says, you are to 
coerce the colonies.  Let us when we speak of America, let us speak without being angry.  The 
Government has teased the colonies.  Many reports came from the Commissioners of the 
Customs.  May we not suppose, that the accounts are not quite fair?  May not a little mob be 
called a tumult, and a little insurrection be called a rebellion?  It gives me concern to see, that a 
disposition for war, and landing should be made against the colonies.  They have mimicked their 
mother country in being riotous […] You have no right to tax the Americans: you wish to have their 
money, if not by one way, by another.  Why not get their money by requisitions?  If they refuse 
that, everybody must turn out under those circumstances.  This country can not last long, if we 
are reduced to our little insular insignificance.  I would show the colonies, that we will adopt no 
language of a minister, without knowing what that language is.
109
 
Barré was not the only MP during this debate to call for measure and caution in dealing with 
the Americans.  Indeed, the general sentiment of the debate was one of moderation.  While, 
certainly, there was shock and condemnation of the lengths to which the Americans had 
gone, Barré’s wise words here helped sooth the minds of MPs, and helped Grafton to 
formulate a policy which would appease most Members.  There remained, however, a 
strong – and growing – sentiment that the Americans were ungrateful and childish, and that 
they needed to be ‘put in their place’ by Britain. 
A week later, on 15 November, Lord North withheld from the House ‘A Remonstrance from 
the Assembly of Virginia to the British Parliament’ on the ground that it would ‘be attended 
with bad consequences [and] would stir up the resentment of Parliament’.  Trecothick here 
replied that he saw the Americans as ‘deluded’ but point out: ‘there may be a few factious 
individuals.  We have factions here.  The town of Boston does not contain a thirtieth part of 
the inhabitants of the colony of Massachusetts Bay’.  Trecothick was here urging the House 
to remain calm and to appreciate that, while reports had been given of the problems in 
Boston, this did not mean a widespread and infectious rebellion was taking place 
throughout all of Massachusetts, or all of America.  Similarly, during a debate on the 
presentation of a petition from Pennsylvania (which was the only petition submitted, as it 
was less outrageous than the ones from other colonies although it still implicitly denied the 
right of Parliament to levy a tax), Jackson stated that he believed it did not ‘contradict the 
rights of England’.  The Americans ‘don’t deny the power, they complain of the exercise of 
the power, and they deprecate, etc.’.
110
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Again during a wide-ranging debate on American affairs on 7 December, Trecothick and 
Barré used their knowledge of the colonies to try to influence the discussion.  Trecothick, 
mirroring what Burke had said a few weeks before, noted that ‘to be silent upon this 
occasion would be criminal’ before trying to prove the worth of the American colonies – 
even without any internal or external taxes levied on them by Parliament – to the British 
Empire as a whole.  ‘Everybody who is acquainted with the geography, the natural history of 
America, with the genius of its inhabitants,’ he said, ‘will agree with me, that it amazingly 
abounds with everything necessary for the great purposes of supporting a commercial 
nation: manufactures, commerce, navigation; with everything to increase the power of the 
mother country’.  Trecothick further attests to his own appreciation for the colonies saying: 
‘Without vanity I would put it upon the test of my own affirmation, of my own experience.  
The general complexion of the country was submissive to Great Britain for the regulation of 
trade.  I speak from knowledge, from facts, from belief, as I should speak before the great 
tribunal of all’.  As Bacon and Barré had done when they established themselves in 
Parliament at the start of the 1760s, and as Pownall had done in the latter 1760s, Trecothick 
was here presenting himself to the House – only a few months after his election – as an 
expert on America and as someone who from his ‘own knowledge says’ what the conditions 
of the colonies were, and what actions the ministry should pursue. 
On the issue of government policy and colonial taxation, Trecothick’s view had not changed 
since before the repeal of the Stamp Act.  Great Britain, he thought, drew ‘from America 
everything.  We obliged them to come to our market for her supplies: in that restriction is a 
tax above all taxes’.  However, he also believed that ‘America ought to be taxed: she ought 
to bear a part of the public burden; that is clearly on the side of contenting yourselves with 
the exclusive trade to America […] We should monopolise the trade of America, so far as 
would be useful to us, otherwise we act against ourselves’.  To conclude, Trecothick 
beseeched the House that ‘soothing, conciliating arts should be used [as] they [the 
Americans] are an high spirited people’ and he asked that the ‘matter may be taken up upon 
an extensive plan, and not let the wound continue rankling, till it becomes a gangrene’.
111
 
Later in the same debate, Barré attacked the ministry – and particularly Lord North – in his 
usual manner.  Exclaiming ‘Why confine it to Boston?  Has not the contagion spread through 
all the colonies?  We know whom we may trust, and whom not.  It is the cause of the whole’.  
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‘If we are to believe the King’s Speech, there are disturbances in more than one colony.  All 
Europe say that America is shaking off her dependence.  Notwithstanding the assurances of 
France, will she not force us into a war by taking advantage of our present situation, 
deprived of the assistance of two, or three millions?’  He continued, 
The noble lord says, we are to content ourselves with the Declaratory Act.  Troops are sent, not for 
the defence, but for keeping down the spirit of the Americans.  If a war breaks out before this 
wound is healed, you will be glad to take the Americans, after having denied you their strength, 
you then will be glad to take them into your bosom again, sooner than leave them a prey to other 
countries […] I tremble for the colonies, I wish to give them a rule to go by.  We have been told, 
one administration proposes a Stamp Act, another repeals it; this is enough to torture the minds 
of people in America.
112
 
The debate continued – with Pownall stating unimaginatively that the charters of the 
colonies made distinctions between external and internal taxation – with the eventual 
defeat of the motion to lay before Parliament a full inquiry into the American situation. 
Following the break for the Christmas holidays, and after a delay because of issues 
surrounding the expulsion of Wilkes from Parliament, the Committee on American affairs 
again met on 26 January 1769.  This debate is notable because all of the primary experts on 
America – Burke, Barré, Pownall, Trecothick, Rose Fuller, Governor George Johnstone, 
William Beckford – attacked the ministry over America.  Burke spoke at length against the 
proposal to bring American criminals to England for trial stating that ‘if you have not one 
party among two millions people [who could be trusted to form a jury], you must change 
your plan of government, or renounce the colonies forever’.  Pownall spoke at length about 
the issue of quartering – reiterating his maiden speech – and focused heavily on the legal 
and constitutional history of the issue of quartering troops and the powers of 
commissioners in the colonies.
113
   
Barré’s speech focused on the issue of taxation again.  ‘All that country,’ he warned, ‘is ripe 
for a revolt’.  The reason for this revolt was the ‘Act of Parliament [which] imposes a duty 
upon them, which every man in this House allows to be contrary to all commercial 
principles’.  He again insisted that the only way to effectively and fairly tax America would 
be to ‘take their money from them in the manner which is most agreeable to themselves, by 
the mode of requisition’.  On the Grafton Ministry’s half-measure – a ‘wait-and-see’ 
measure – Barré pleaded that government take action one way or the other: ‘let us come as 
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men; let us enforce the Stamp Act, or let us take the other system.  This is neither the one 
nor the other […] I say without repealing this law, you run the risk of losing America’.  
Nevertheless, again, although most of the speakers in the House had been against the 
ministry’s motion, it passed with a significant majority.  The experts on America had 
assembled themselves here into one group, had railed and rallied against the government, 
but had ultimately failed to convince most of the Members. 
American affairs were again discussed on 8 February, where Trecothick and Pownall both 
gave lengthy speeches.  Trecothick announced here that he ‘quit the cause of America’, 
presumably realising that further discussion of colonial rights would fall on deaf ears in the 
House.  Instead, he sought to ‘rise up in the cause of the manufactures of Great Britain!’ and 
hereby attempted to again work for repeal – as he had done during the Stamp Act Crisis – by 
focusing on the impact on Britain and on British merchants.  A tax on America, he noted, 
‘directly strikes at the root of your manufactures and commerce.  It is a solecism in 
commerce.  Even an author, though a Spaniard, lays it down as the first principle that every 
nation is to send its manufactures to market as cheap as they can.  But how can we do this 
without the raw materials [that would come from America]?’  Speaking of the proverbial 
‘interested trader’, Trecothick continued to say: ‘I know no class which is attended with 
more advantages to his country […] if his trade declines, the profit of the most useful 
members of society declines also […] I see such disadvantages arising to this nation which I 
am afraid to mention’.  After a long discussion on Commissioners and the attacks on the 
rights of the colonial assemblies, Trecothick concluded his speech stating ‘these people have 
been mortified and chastised.  They have been deprived of their government.  I do think we 
stand upon the best ground to relax we ever shall stand upon, that phantom we called 
honour.  I hope we shall be wise enough to get back again to our former ground’.
114
 
Pownall’s speech during this debate was arguably one of his finest: he discussed at length 
the growing concern in the colonies, the impact of ministerial policy on the Americans, and 
forewarned Parliament that any attempts to subdue the colonists by force would arouse 
their ‘temper’ and ‘spirit’ and would break the union between Britain and America 
forever.
115
  Pownall maintained, however, that Americans still believed in the distinction 
between external and internal tax: 
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The colonies have been used to this distinction by the course and practice of government, having 
in their reasoning marked an essential difference in the nature of the thing.   
Whatever tax or duty is imposed upon external property imported into their country – is indeed 
annexed to the property, but not upon them either in their rights or persons; until they choose, by 
purchasing that property with the tax annexed to it, to annex that tax also to themselves; but this 
is an act of their own consent.   
Whatever tax is imposed on any property immediately and intimately united with their persons or 
rights, must be paid without any interposition of their own will, unless they quit that property, to 
forego that right.  The first is external; and annexed or not, at their own will – the second is 
internal, and absolutely annexed to what is inseparable from them.  
Seeing this essential difference in the nature of the thing, established by invariable prescription 
from the first establishment as a government – they reason (and justly too) from this distinction 
and this prescription, That whatever right of taxing themselves within the precincts and limits of 
their own jurisdictions they enjoy by the principles of the British Government and their own 
constitutions. 
Pownall ended by almost pleading with the House to see sense and return to ‘the safe old 
ground on which this matter hath always stood’ and the ‘spirit of your old policy’.  This, he 
noted, ‘would restore again peace, order and government’ and, to prove this point and his 
American connexions, he further stated ‘I have letters in my pocket from some of the 
principal, some of the leading men of that country – who say we do not call upon Great 
Britain to give up her rights and claims – we only desire to be returned back and set again 
upon our old safe ground, which we understood, and that in the exercise of your power you 
would return to your old policy’.
116
 
This speech formed part of Pownall’s attempts to destroy the Grafton’s ministry’s plans for 
America.  Even with Pownall’s warnings above, the ministry carried the vote – on the issue 
of carrying Americans to Britain for trial – by a staggering majority.  Pownall was disgusted 
at the outcome and wrote: ‘We have neither knowledge nor system nor principle, we have 
but one word… that is our sovereignty – and it is like some word to a mad-man which 
whenever mentioned, throws him into his ravings’.
117
  The ministry, thought Pownall, was 
full of ‘blockheads’ and he worked tirelessly to try to restore again amicable relations 
between Americans and Britons.  Pownall became well known at this time as a ‘Friend of 
Liberty’ and was praised by several leading Americans, including Franklin and Francis 
Bernard.  He believed also, however, that his letters to the Americans were being opened 
and read by those in the ministry – he claimed his letters had ‘gone through bad hands’ and 
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that the Ministry ‘have told the King, that I correspond with the Sons of Liberty’ - but all his 
correspondence at this time shows a moderate man determined to maintain the British 
Empire and desperate to return to some kind of normality in imperial relations.
 118
 
Similarly, Trecothick was working outside of Parliament to try to build support for repeal of 
the Townshend Duties.  He sought to organise a mass submission of petitions – crucially 
from British towns and cities, as opposed to the numerous ones rejected by Parliament from 
the Americas – in order to show widespread distaste at the duties.  This plan eventually 
came to nothing by the first months of 1769.
119
  However, Trecothick did enjoy one success.  
A matter of days after his speech of 8 February, the members of the London livery company 
– all 6,000 of them – submitted instructions to their MPs (Trecothick being one of them) in 
favour of repeal of the duties and the promotion of colonial trade.
120
 
On 15 March, Pownall proposed two changes to the Mutiny Bill to make it less odious to 
Americans by allowing them to quarter troops ‘in their own way’ and that local commanders 
should have power to make local decisions, based on local circumstances, which would 
benefit and best fit the circumstances.  During discussion of the proposals, changes were 
made to the wording of the first amendment as it ‘seemed to derogate from the authority 
and competency of Parliament’ and the second was accepted without any alteration.  The 
change – suggested by Garth – stated that any colony should ‘make its own provisions for 
quartering soldiers’ was supported by Trecothick, Conway and Barré.
121
   
On 19 April, Pownall again proposed a motion in the House.  This motion was to have much 
more wide-spread consequences and was the first time the American Revenue Act was 
directly discussed in Parliamentary debate.  Pownall began the debate by asserting that he 
was ‘inconsiderable, unconnected, independent and that he belonged to neither one side of 
the House nor the other’.  The past troubles over ‘war taxes,’ he said, had been ‘taken up 
with party views only, instead of being established by any system of policy; they have been 
taken up, and applied to add to the momentum of this and that party’.  He stressed that he 
was ‘unconnected’; that he had ‘no party to serve, nor myself to serve by any party’ and 
that it was ‘no attack upon ministers, nor meant to revive the dispute of different parties, 
but [was] for the interest of the public, as that is connected with the colonies’.  The Duties 
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were, he said, being paid; he stressed, furthermore, that it was only Boston which was 
under any type of military law, while the rest of the continent remained ‘humbled’.   
The very nature of the law was unjust as it lay ‘duties upon the obedient colonies’ and 
provided a ‘net produce [of] £295 per year’ but meant that the ‘colonies will not purchase 
our goods’.  The Act itself was acting as a ‘prohibition’ and would destroy the basis of union.   
The Act lays a duty upon painted colours.  Is there no red, or yellow one in that country?  If they 
had but one colour, they were to call that the colour of liberty.  Every house, carriage, and ship 
would be painted with it.  A duty upon glass.  It is a premium, and encouragement to other 
countries.  Philadelphia supplies Boston with window glass.  They get paper from Holland, or St. 
Eustatia or the Virgin Islands.  Tea.  I could show by a letter from Boston which tells me, that that 
duty has had no effect at all. 
Pownall thereby proposed a motion that a Committee should meet on 24 April to discuss 
the Act and submitted that it was ‘the opinion of this Committee, that the said Act hath not 
answered the purport, and intent thereof, of raising a revenue in his Majesty’s dominions in 
America’ and that ‘this House be moved to bring in a Bill for the repealing so much of an act 
made in the 7
th
 year of the reign of his present Majesty intituled “An Act, etc., as imposes 
certain duties on goods therein mentioned, imported into the British colonies and 
plantations in America”’.
122
 
The debate that followed saw Trecothick speak first.  He seconded the motion and spoke of 
the ‘national concern’ and of having ‘nothing to gain, [but] much to lose’.  ‘We have,’ he said, 
‘enacted laws diametrically opposite to the interests of our colonies.  We are driving them 
to a necessity of furnishing themselves with their own manufactures’.  All the policies 
adopted by the British government had ‘recoil[ed] upon ourselves’ and ‘sound policy 
respecting America seems to have forsaken our council’.  Trecothick was, however, one of 
only a few MPs – even from amongst the Opposition benches and his fellow American MPs – 
to support the motion.  
Barré proposed that Parliament ‘come into a resolution that it may be proper in the next 
session [after the summer recess] to make a general revision of all the laws relating to 
America that have been made in his present Majesty’s reign’ and refused to support 
Pownall’s motion.  Jeremiah Dyson replied to Barré: ‘are they to be left no bounds but their 
own wishes, and inclinations?  Even if the next year we should be inclined to make such an 
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alteration, under such a motion we should pass a general censure upon all the laws’.  Barré 
replied asking: ‘are we to go on from hour to hour, from day to day patching up this 
wretched system?  It is not a system’. 
Burke’s reply was even cooler.  He took particular umbrage at Pownall’s attack on party – ‘I 
never thought America should be beat backwards and forwards as the tennis ball of faction’ 
– but urged for restraint and calm from both sides.  ‘We know not how to advance, they 
know not how to retreat.  This is my opinion of our situation with regard to America.  He is a 
bold man who can say what measures we can take.’  Nevertheless, Burke remained set on 
repeal stating that ‘if the question stood repeal, or enforce, I have no doubt to repeal’ but 
he thought Pownall’s motion too extreme and stated: ‘I never wished to agitate, or stir the 
question, nor now support it […] A man of cool, and moderate temper, it is a thousand to 
one he would be a wise proposer’.
123
  William Beckford supported Pownall and his ‘middle 
way’ but noted that it was not a promise to repeal the Act, but a promise ‘that we will look 
into the grievances of America’.  Jackson meanwhile supported repeal in general, but made 
no comment on Pownall’s specific motion: ‘the preservation of America depends upon the 
repeal of this law’.
124
 
Ultimately, receiving no support from either the Ministry or the Opposition, Pownall’s 
motion failed.  Pownall wrote to Cooper the following week that ‘while you are labouring to 
relieve yourselves from one burden, you must of course become second and subordinate to 
such parties, instead of the whole’.
125
  Pownall’s motion was effective in showing that there 
was considerable support for repeal of the Townshend Duties, but his unfortunate timing at 
the end of the Parliamentary session alienated many of the potential supporters.  Moreover, 
his attacks on ‘party’ further pushed Burke from any agreement with him on the issue.  
Nevertheless, the ministry realised that repeal was popular in the House and worked 
towards this end. 
‘Like that Emperor Staying at Home Catching Flies’ 
The Christmas holidays and the start of 1770 saw another change in leadership.  Lord North 
became Prime Minister in January of that year, but American issues were not to take the 
centre stage until March.  This debate, on 5 March, was well attended but was apparently 
                                                 
123
 Ibid., III. 148-51. See also, Langford, Writing and Speeches of Burke, II. 231-2. 
124
 Simmons, Proceedings and Debates, III. 152-3. 
125
 Griffin, Junius Discovered, p. 223. 
  
71 
 
‘not edifying nor animated, and the subject has been worn so threadbare, that patience is 
tired, and modes have been so often varied, that there is scarce a choice left’.
126
  North put 
forward the plan agreed by the Cabinet – to repeal all of the Townshend Duties, except that 
on tea – and began the debate by defending his position.  During this debate, Pownall, Barré 
and Trecothick all participated; Burke was absent for some reason.
 127
 
Pownall proposed removing the tax on tea along with all the other duties: ‘solely upon 
commercial grounds I rise to state, what this goes to show, that every argument that goes to 
those manufactures, goes to the tea also’.  The Act, Pownall complained, had ‘thrown them 
[the Americans] into a spirit of industry.  It has made them look into the supplies they have 
within themselves.  It has taught them to retrench the surplus.  It has taught them the spirit 
of manufacturing’.  Pownall went further than ever before, however, and sent this warning 
to the House: 
I pledge myself to bring forward the state of his Majesty’s government in America.  I will show you, 
that they are under unlawful authority.  As officers, as servants of the Crown, they are every day 
liable to be indicted of high treason.  If indicted, they must be convicted.  There is no appeal from 
it, as in Ireland.  Whoever will avow that state of the military command in that country, will be 
liable to be impeached in this House.  That question has already been decided in the Court of 
Common Pleas.  I will further pledge myself to impeach any minister that shall dare to avow it 
after that decision […] I believe there is no minister weak or wicked enough to dare to avow it.  If 
he should, I pledge myself to impeach him.   
Before finishing, Pownall attacked North’s suggestion that the ‘associations at Boston’ – 
associations which North had gone out of his way to insist were illegal – were at an end was 
false.  He stated that he had more letters which informed him that the Bostonians had 
‘come to a further agreement, if the duties in the Act of Parliament are not repealed’.  In 
other words, the non-importation agreement would continue without repeal.  Pownall 
finished by asking ‘after the word “paper”, you insert those words “and also tea”’.
128
 
A ‘very ill’ Trecothick again followed Pownall’s charge and attacked the duty on tea as 
‘uncommercial’.  The object of the American grievances, he said, was primarily tea.  He 
worried also that, by taxing tea, the British government would force the Americans into the 
arms of smugglers, thereby harming the British economy further.  Barré’s primary focus 
during his attack was on the failure to repeal the tax before 1770.  He attacked the 
government for a decade of mismanagement and mishandling of colonial affairs: ‘a few 
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years ago, the genius of a minister [William Pitt], supported by your fleets and armies, set 
you at the head of the world.  The East and West Indies were in your hands.  Your infant 
hands were not able to grasp the world.  Instead of that, you have been confining yourself 
to the lowest business, that of pursuing little, low criminals, instead of giving laws to the 
world.  Like that emperor staying at home catching flies’.  Forewarning of future issues, 
Barré completed his attack by noting that ‘this partial repeal is felt as a grievance.  It is 
acknowledged by all to be absurd.  We shall see whether it will fester, and make worse 
those grievances they complain of, and totally alienate their affection from you’.
129
 
Pownall’s contribution to this debate was seen to be ‘very sensible’ and ‘demonstrated the 
ruinous, alarming situation of the trade’.  Barré’s efforts were praised as having been done 
‘extremely well’ with some ‘fine strokes’.  His image of the emperor playing with flies was 
particularly noted: ‘instead of directing their attention to national objects, they had [Barré 
said], like the tyrant Domitian, when they had done mischief everywhere, even amused 
themselves at home in catching and tormenting flies’.  Yet again, however, the American 
MPs were to be beaten.  Pownall’s motion to add the words ‘and also tea’ was defeated by 
142 in favour; 204 against.
130
  A similar motion submitted by Trecothick on 9 April to repeal 
the duties laid upon tea – by adding ‘and on tea’ – was defeated with 80 voting for the 
ministry and 52 with Trecothick.  This final defeat ended attempts in Parliament to remove 
the tax on tea.
131
 
The Boston Massacre of 5 March 1770 was not known to Britons during the great debates 
on the repeal of the Townshend Duties.  It was not until the end of April that reports started 
to filter through in the British press and official reports.  On 26 April, Trecothick moved that 
all accounts of disputes between soldiers and colonists since June 1769 be laid before the 
House.  North approved, but asked that an amendment be made to prevent the private 
accounts of colonial officials being made public in the interest of their safety. 
Burke used this opportunity to mount a wide-ranging and bitter attack on imperial policy.  
Attacking the use of troops, he stated ‘The troops […] were left at the mercy of the 
inhabitants.  Governor Bernard [Governor of Massachusetts] told you all civil government 
ceased in America.  He said, his authority ceased […] The troops looked upon the people as 
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rebels.  The people looked upon the soldiers as enemies.  They quarrelled and fought’.  He 
challenged North to govern America effectively telling the House that Britain ought to 
‘conquer it [America] by your policy.  Conquer it by your strong government.  Conquer it by 
your laws’.  Of most significance here, however, was Burke’s announcement that he would 
‘open a more ample review of the government of America for three years past’.  Barré 
similarly attacked the use of troops – although he praised Hutchinson for his tact in dealing 
with the troops on their arrival – stating that British policy had ‘made soldiers politicians’.  
He warned of military governance, however: ‘if a soldier hears, it is better to kill twenty 
today, than a hundred tomorrow, he will go beyond his duty, he will quit his ranks, kill many, 
and secure to himself a pension for life.  His way of managing the military is spread to 
America’.  Viscount Barrington then rose to defend the troops and effectively ended the 
debate. 
The following day, Burke continued his attack with a ‘two hours and a quarter’ long speech 
criticising the government.
132
  After an apology for bringing the measure so late in the 
session – ‘when gentlemen wish to retire to their recreation’ – Burke established that the 
past three years had seen a dearth of meaningful policy from him or the Rockinghams: ‘no 
vexatious measures, no inquiry to distract them in their plan of operations has been 
mentioned from this side of the House’.
133
  There followed a very long and detailed attack 
on imperial policy from the Stamp Act through to the use of troops in Boston.  The 
government, Burke claimed, had no solid, no coherent, policy on America.  Acts were passed, 
then repealed; Acts were passed, then partially repealed; ‘America is ill-governed’.  Burke 
put forward eight motions – including one stating ‘that a principal Cause of the Disorders 
which have lately prevailed in North America, hath arisen from the ill-judged and 
inconsistent instructions given, from Time to Time, by Persons in Administration, to the 
Governors of some of the Provinces in North America’.   
None of Burke’s motions passed.
134
  Burke, however, spoke on this: ‘You may negative my 
resolution.  You can’t negative the recommendation of the Crown to take the affairs of 
America into consideration.  You can negative your own Address.  You can’t negative the 
sense of the Parliament upon the general impropriety of the conduct upon ministers on 
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resolutions miserable as they are.  You may deal as you please’.
135
  This was the last great 
salvo in the Commons before the summer recess.  During the summer recess, and until the 
end of 1770, the North Ministry worked to secure its position in Parliament.  More than that, 
however, it established that the tax on tea would remain.   
American politics for the next three years became rather quiet by comparison.  There was, 
as Thomas put it, a ‘pause in politics’ which would be split asunder by the events of 1773.  
The American MPs remained active in politics during this time, but spoke on affairs of less 
significance.
136
  The great Parliamentary battles of the mid-1770s were to follow, and these 
were to provide a significant testing ground of the American MPs and their connexions to 
the colonies.  
Conclusion 
The 1760s saw some of the great Parliamentary battles over the rights and responsibilities 
of the North American colonies.  The House of Commons, contrary to contemporary and 
current thought, was relatively well versed on the nature of the American colonies and 
colonists.  A number of MPs had personal experience, and knowledge, of the Americas from 
an array of sources and the conclusion that the Commons was ignorant of colonial issues 
simply cannot stand. 
What we have found is that a core group of American MPs sought throughout the decade to 
enforce their view of the empire onto the whole but were faced with an unresponsive 
chamber unwilling to agree with their points of discussion.  We must not, however, over-
emphasise the defeats suffered by these politicians: the repeal of the Stamp Act and the 
partial repeal of the Townshend Duties are testament to the fact that the men did have 
influence over imperial policy. 
The problems lay, however, in trying to convince an otherwise uninterested House that 
American issues were important in the House.  The Stamp Act’s repeal focused largely on 
the impact on British merchants, as opposed to any American concerns.  All protestations of 
American assemblies’ rights were seen as direct challenges and threats to the power of 
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Parliament.  In this discussion, even the most well connected of the MPs failed to support 
their American brethren.  Barré stands out as the most vocal opponent of imperial designs 
at this time, but even he continued to mark the distinction between internal and external 
taxes and he refused to accept any kind of actual representation at Westminster. 
Throughout the debates, all of the MPs involved discussed the glory days of the Empire 
before 1763.  Rather than producing a coherent, an attractive, or a workable alternative to 
the problems being faced by Britons and Americans, these men simply harked back to times-
gone-by in a desperate attempt to try to fix the issues at hand.  Pownall in particular failed 
to articulate his grand plans for empire in the House during this time: his speeches contain 
so many references to seeking to ‘restore order’, ‘keep with the past’ and ‘maintain that 
which worked so effectively’.  These arguments would have been unattractive to politicians 
who sought to reorder, restore and reorganise the empire.  If the problems had came from 
attempting to improve that which they thought to be broken, attempts by the American 
MPs to reclaim and return to that which had been lost would ultimately be unsuccessful.  
All of the MPs discussed their connexions with, and knowledge of, the Americas.  All of the 
MPs sought to carve out a place for themselves in the House of Commons as ‘American 
experts’.  These men fought variously for the American cause, but failed to unite in order to 
provide a more coherent opposition.  Instead, differences in personalities and outlooks, and 
differences in the political connexions made by the men in Britain, soured some relations 
and kept others cool.  It is unlikely that any united ‘American front’ in Parliament would 
have made any difference – American politics only really captured leading British politicians’ 
attention for short bursts of time – as the various administrations tended to have workable 
majorities at this time.  Nevertheless, as events unfolded throughout the early-to-mid 1770s, 
America would again rise as a central – as the central – issue in British politics, and the 
American MPs would again find themselves at the forefront of the battle for empire.  
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CHAPTER II  
L O S I N G  A N  E M P I R E :  T H E  H O U S E  O F  C O M M O N S  A N D  
A M E R I C A  
‘But, BEHOLD what followed!,’ reported the Boston Gazette in December 1773, ‘A number 
of brave & resolute men, determined to do all in their power to save their country from the 
ruin which their enemies had plotted, in less than four hours, emptied every chest of tea on 
board the three ships commanded by the captains Hall, Bruce, and Coffin, amounting to 342 
chests, into the sea!! without the least damage done to the ships or any other property. The 
matters and owners are well pleas'd that their ships are thus clear'd; and the people are 
almost universally congratulating each other on this happy event’.
1
  This ‘happy event’ – the 
Boston Tea Party – marked the end of the constitutional lull which had characterised 
relations between Britain and America since the early 1770s.
2
   
News of the events in Boston reached London throughout January and February 1774.  On 
30 January, Lord Rockingham wrote to Burke to explain his desires of ‘being in the House of 
Lords, when this subject [discussion of the papers received by the government relating to 
the Tea Party] comes on’.  He also mentioned Trecothick’s illness, stating: ‘I am most 
exceedingly grieved for poor Trecothick, I thought him ill in Health when I last saw him in 
London, and his spirits were much sunk, but the appearances of friendship and affection 
towards me, were too warm for me to forget so soon’.
3
  Burke replied, warning Rockingham 
that ‘your Lordships [sic] friends in the House of Peers ought to absent themselves, and not 
to countenance the interested Petulance of those Paltry discontented People, who without 
embracing your principles, or giving you any sort of support, think to make use of your 
Weight to give consequence to every occasional spurt of opposition they think proper to 
make’.  With regards to American affairs, Burke’s only comment was to remark dryly that 
‘any Remarkable Highway Robbery at Hounslow Heath would make more conversation than 
all the disturbances of America’.
4
  The significance of events had not yet reached Burke or 
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the Rockinghams, and events were being treated simply as another matter of ‘party politics’ 
in London.  The Rockingham point on the issue was clear, however: ‘I can never,’ wrote 
Rockingham, ‘give my assent to proceeding to actual force against the Colonies’.
5 
The discussion in Parliament took place on 7 March 1774 when Lord North laid before the 
Commons 109 papers relating to the ‘unwarrantable Practices which have been lately 
concerted and carried on in North America, and particularly the violent and outrageous 
Proceedings at the Town and Port of Boston’.
6
  The debate started with a plea from the 
Ministry to ensure Parliamentary unanimity on such a divisive subject in order to show the 
Americans how seriously it was being taken by Britons and as George Rice stated, to ‘keep 
up the sovereign authority of this country’.
7
  Pownall replied stating that the Address did not 
challenge any of the opinions he had held regarding America and that it was his ‘opinion 
that the dependence of the colonies must be held as part of the constitution, [but that] the 
question is what that dependence is’.  As the Address did not ‘preclude me from that 
consideration,’ Pownall thought it should pass without division and that he hoped ‘for the 
sake of this country, for the sake of America, for the sake of general liberty, that this 
Address will go with an unanimous vote’.
8
 
Burke spoke next and brought in an attack on the fact that MPs were being asked to support 
an Address before bearing witness to the various documents.  ‘Deliberation without 
information’ was, in Burke’s view, a pointless endeavour and an insult to Parliament.  
Moving on from this issue, he attacked the history of American governance, focusing 
particularly on the Stamp Act and its repeal.  ‘The honourable gentleman asked a question, 
should America belong to this country?  Yes, it should.  Please God, this kingdom belongs to 
itself.  If we have equity, wisdom, judgement, it will belong to this country.  If not, it will not 
belong to this country.  It is not agreeable to the law of nature it should belong to this 
country.’  He continued, 
If I thought [I could] stop a wicked measure by vexatious opposition, I would do it.  If guided by 
the opinion of people abroad, [I would] certainly do it.  First, I declare myself against the use of all 
those measures, or any of them in the spirit of what you have hitherto found by experience to be 
ineffectual.  I declare myself against that maxim of violence and levity.  I declare you ought to 
proceed wisely against America.  You ought to make war against them if in a state of rebellion, but 
know and be sure that is the case.  If [they are] in a state of dissatisfaction arising from a relaxity … 
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then remove those discontents, appoint a wiser man.  Do not suppose them in rebellion … If [   ] 
war, you have power to reduce the Americans to nothing … Do not use a military proportion for a 
civil grievance.  Support the civil magistrates.  
Civil government, the government that subsists in every English colony, is a popular government … 
grand jury … popular assembly … If such a government as that is universally discontented, no 
troops under heaven [can] bring them to obedience.  Suppose all the common people were of 
opinion the execution of any law [was wrong, the] constable [would] not go in pursuit of the man.  
That government fails in the policy.  There is no military remedy … The magistrate is the man that 
will be obeyed, the magistrate must be agreeable […] I say that government, popular government, 
cannot be enforced by an army.  It is absolutely impossible.
9
 
Barré similarly rose on this point.  ‘We are to consider,’ he stated, ‘a no less important 
question, [than] whether America is to be ours of not.  Depend on these circumstances the 
mode, the form, the limits.  These are not light questions.  A plan is to be offered.  America 
is to be brought before us.  Let her come with all her sins upon her head.  Let her come with 
all her merits upon her head.  Let her come with all her services.  Let her be allowed to state 
the blessings she has procured to this country.  I am ready to receive her…’.  Barré asked 
that the debate on a policy for America be postponed until 14 March, but warned that 
Members must seriously consider whether they wished to continue the governance of 
America and whether they knew the ‘true footing’ on which the empire – and, importantly, 
its costs to Britain – stood.  He asked: ‘Look at the disturbances, and reflect upon the use 
and application of the army.  Has that America reason to look upon the soldiers as 
protectors, as defenders?  Has that America reason to look upon the soldiers as instruments 
of oppression?  Look at the arrangement of the troops it has made for their defence … 
Government of our empire: can you afford [it]?’.
10
  
Government policy for dealing with America remained highly confidential during this time.  
While the cabinet discussed their plan of action – a plan now known specifically as the 
Coercive Acts or Intolerable Acts – the rest of Britain, including the American MPs, remained 
in the dark.  This first foray into American issues however marked a change in the ways in 
which the American MPs were to act over the coming year: Barré, Burke and Pownall 
propelled themselves to the very forefront of Parliamentary debate on all things American.  
Bacon and Jackson both remained largely quiet and spoke only a few times in debate.  
Trecothick had been ‘touched by the palsy’, was suffering from considerable ill health, and 
barely attended any sessions of the House.   
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The debates which were to follow involved the American MPs in various guises.  Moving 
from half-hearted supporters of punishment of Boston to vocal opposition to the Coercive 
Acts, the MPs were crucial and influential members of a small minority.  What they lacked in 
voting numbers – for North’s American policy was to attract the backing of most 
independent MPs throughout this session, and longer – the MPs made up for in debating 
prowess and skill.  They remained incapable, however, of shifting the British disapproval of 
the colonies or of softening the attitude towards America.  Barré and Burke featured heavily 
throughout and were undoubtedly amongst the leading champions of America and of a 
liberal empire.  Bacon, interested only in his business ventures and ensuring maximum profit, 
contributes only on one matter relating to the mercantile impact of the Boston Port Bill.  
Pownall’s journey was perhaps the most important: he moved from opposition to the 
Ministry, and support of the repeal of the tax on tea, to supporting North’s proposals. 
‘Boston, Bloody Boston!’ 
On 14 March, Lord North presented to the House his proposal to punish Boston by closing 
the port.  North was sombre and serious throughout.  He sought three main aims: firstly, to 
secure Boston Port and ensure that British goods could be landed safely; secondly, to secure 
some form of reparation for the tea destroyed; and, thirdly, to punish Boston and the 
Bostonians by stopping all merchandise from being landed there.  North’s speech was 
crafted in such a way to attract as little debate as possible: notably, he established that even 
though the punishment of Boston would cause upset to the guilty and innocent alike this 
policy – of ‘collective punishment’ – had been ‘the principle very much of our laws in very 
early times, but a principle in all countries where any tumults and riots’.  ‘The authority of 
the town,’ he continued, ‘has seemed to sleep where the bulk of any corporation and 
society has been influenced from machinations against the public peace […] upon that 
principle the counties are answerable this day for injuries committed within that district’.
11
 
Rose Fuller – one of the prominent Rockinghamite MPs with West Indian connexions - gave 
half-hearted support to the Bill.  He approved of the punishment of Boston, stating that they 
‘ought to make good their losses’ but whether the proposal would ‘be or not be safe’ and 
whether it be the right method he had ‘great doubt’.  Barré astounded the House by stating 
that he ‘having weighed it in [his] own mind’ could not help ‘giving it [his] hearty and 
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determinate affirmative’.
12
  Knowing that of conduct would strike the House as unusual 
given Barré’s record on colonial affairs, he continued with a justification of his position: ‘my 
reason for so doing, I believe, will not be found to impeach or contradict any former part of 
my conduct when subjects of this nature were under our consideration.  I like it, rash as it 
may appear in the eyes of some very intelligent persons in this House’.   He continued 
I like it, adopt and embrace it, as cheerfully for its moderation, though this is the first [occasion] 
the noble lord’s conduct in this business will bear the same respect.  I am sensible how defective it 
is in the present circumstances either to defend or punish Boston.  I think she ought to be 
punished.  Sir, at the same time I can’t help expressing some sentiments that seem to mitigate and 
I hope will mitigate the offence of that colony.  […] If she [Massachusetts] had not at least ended 
that [spirit of independence for] forty years, [she would] never have arrived to that pitch of 
commerce and greatness.
13
 
Barré went on to discuss his views of how the empire ought to work, in the vaguest terms.  
As the colonists were three thousand miles away from Britain ‘some sort of connection to 
keep the people at peace, to prevent anarchy and confusion’ must be kept in that colony.  
‘You must have,’ he established, ‘some sort of people to look up to, who are the Assembly.  
Take [it away], the executive power will trample upon them.  Ask any man, if man of spirit.  I 
will pledge myself, saying, I oppose that tyrannical system of government’.  Barré still 
believed at this point – keeping to the Chathamite policy of the Declaratory Act – that the 
Americans only objected to taxation and not to British authority, and that it was best to 
maintain Parliamentary supremacy but not to enact any laws which taxed the colonies: ‘in 
1764 [we] made one revenue act, in 1765, made another revenue. 1766 repealed. In 1767, 
made another.  You have been taxing and scratching ever since […] If you mean the money, 
take it.  If not mean the money, don’t insist upon this foolish tax.  By liberality and 
generosity mark your generosity’.
14
 
Charles James Fox followed Barré, making his first speech on American affairs and moving 
slowly towards opposition to North.  Pownall followed Fox and, like Barré, supported the Bill.  
He expressed his desire to speak at some other time on the propriety of taxing the 
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Americans and noted – to jeering noises from the Members – that he had ‘twice moved for 
the repeal’ of the tax on tea.  Pownall spoke ‘from the situation in which [he had] stood to 
those people [Governor of Massachusetts], from the connections [he had] had with them’.  
They had, Pownall insisted, ‘the warmest affection for this country; animated by an 
animated zeal [sic] for its service; the most zealous loyalty for the King of Great Britain upon 
every occasion of government’.  Elaborating on points made earlier in the debate by 
Dowdeswell, Pownall put forth the belief that the problems in Boston lay in issues arising 
from the constitution of Massachusetts.  ‘The defect in their Charter, left unremedied in the 
Charter of King William.  They have no regular corporations, as other towns.  The only 
meetings are these town meetings.  It is a kind of state of nature … They have nothing to 
restrain, and withhold them, for want of this very constitution.’
15
  
Pownall proposed that, were there to be any preventative measures in addition to the 
punitive ones being then proposed, that ‘they should consider the state of those town 
meetings while government is at peace, or under the rule and government of wise and 
prudent men.  But the moment anything comes to agitate them … it is not from the 
disposition of the people, it is not from their maintaining more violent principles than others, 
it is not from their being determined to destroy the tea’.  The Tea Party, Pownall insisted, 
was ‘committed by a lower mob’ and he noted that ‘if Boston had the same Charter, [as] 
New York or Philadelphia, there would have been in Boston much less violence, than in 
either of the two towns’.  Pownall continued by listing his reasons for supporting the Bill: 
other ports in Massachusetts allowed for the continuation of trade and the town meetings 
were ‘empowered to raise money for the purpose of the town only’ meaning that the East 
India Company could be reimbursed with ‘no impracticability’.  Pownall finished his speech 
by summing up again his view of the empire as a Grand Marine Dominion: 
I am clear this country has the supreme authority over all appendages of the dominion of Great 
Britain, and all the parts necessary to maintain [and] animate the empire of the whole.  All 
consistent with the very liberty that the colonies require, demand, claim.  Which a set of freemen 
ought to have.  Upon that very ground I will undertake to mend every liberty they have claimed 
consistent with [the sovereignty of] Great Britain.
16
 
When North brought back a revised version of the Bill on 18 March, Fuller asked whether it 
was ‘part of a great plan’ to which North replied that it was an ‘animadversion upon Boston 
for this particular insult’.  Pownall seconded North’s outlook here, stating that ‘I do conceive 
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it stands simply by itself as a distinct measure’ and that it was ‘necessary regulation for the 
protection of the British trade’.  He suggested here also that further imperial legislation was 
required: ‘till you make some regulations in the Act of [Parliament], no means at present by 
which you can punish them’.
17
 
Upon the first great constitutional battle of the American Revolution, the American MPs had 
failed to grasp the true nature of American resistance.  There is no record of Burke having 
attended or spoken after the Bill was brought forward, and even the most vocal of American 
supporters – the father of the Sons of Liberty, Barré – supported the North Ministry’s 
measure.  The lasting impression from these speeches, and others from those with 
American connexions such as Rose Fuller, appears to be that either the men thought the 
current Bill sufficient and warrantable given the circumstances, or that it was still too early 
to commit themselves irrevocably to any course of action (this in particular appears to be 
the case with Burke and his Rockinghamite friends).  Although the American MPs might have 
supported this one proposal, however, they remained cautious and aware of the wider 
implications of colonial taxation and the impact it could have on Anglo-American relations.  
They all appear, however, to have failed to grasp the shifting situation in the Americas at 
this point; and, crucially, to have failed to anticipate the American reaction to the 
punishment of Boston. 
In the Committee debate on 23 March, the Bill received its harshest criticisms.  Fuller again 
opposed the main thrust of the Bill, and sought to remove the closure of Boston Port and 
replace it with a £25,000 fine to be paid by the end of 1774.  Fuller stated that such a harsh 
reaction was uncalled for after the first offence, to which North replied ‘Would to God it was 
the first offence!  It is the first time they have destroyed cargoes of tea; but during the 
whole seven years past there has been a series of offences breathing throughout defiance to 
the authority of this House and a total independence to the laws of this country; for this is 
not the first, nor in that light has it any claim to any particular tenderness and lenity’.
18
  
After what became an infamous speech by Charles Van – a man known for his vocal anti-
American sentiment – wherein he demanded that ‘the English army should not trespass 
over that rebel town.  Make it a mark that shall never be restored […] Impress the 
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Americans.  “That was the town.”  Now destroy them if ever you fear a single ball against it.  
Demolish it, that is my opinion.  Delenda est Carthago’.
19
 
This crazed attack on the Americans brought Barré to his feet in animated response.  He 
quickly refuted the claims of Van – ‘the honourable gentleman who spoke last had not made 
a very great impression upon me’ – and moved swiftly back to the topic of the Bill.  Here 
Barré showed himself to be hesitant over the precise nature of action required: ‘I wish the 
Bill to go through,’ he said, but he noted that he was ‘left in that awkward situation’.  Barré 
worried that the proposed Bill placed too much power in the hands of the ministers as it let 
them decide when and how full reparation had been made to the East India Company (and 
therefore when Boston Port could be legally reopened). 
He continued with an attack on the ‘odious tax’ on tea, and of American taxation in general.  
‘Keep your hands out of their pockets,’ he said, ‘[and] they will be obedient subjects.  Take it 
from them if you will.  Do not put your hands in.  Let them put their hands in and pay you’.
20
  
Echoing Benjamin Franklin’s report of the previous day that ‘we never had since we were a 
people so few friends in Britain’,
21
 Barré told of his belief that ‘the country in general are 
against America’.  It was, he noted, ‘bad ground for ministers to take, to go in that temper.  
It is giving way to the current of the stream.  It is his business.  An able and a great minister 
would check that strong passion.  We have too much of it … Take care not to mix this 
proposal, these rights, these rights in theory which you never can reduce to practice’.  He 
also remarked that, while he gave his support to the Boston Port Bill, he worried that ‘the 
next measure will be of a great inconsistency and even a darker complexion than this.  My 
carrying it [the Boston Port Bill] to government will have no sort of effect this moment’.
22
  
Thereafter the House refused to hear a petition from William Bolan on behalf of the 
Massachusetts Council (which was rejected by Pownall as he believed that the Council could 
not act independently of the Assembly or Governor, and that all petitions should come only 
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from Franklin) and its ignoring the Thatched House petition.  The House moved quickly on to 
the Bill’s third reading and Burke rose to provide his first statement on the nature of the Bill 
itself.  Unlike Barré and Pownall, however, Burke opposed the Bill.
23
  He acknowledged that 
his words would do little and that he did not ‘attempt to interrupt the unanimity which was 
through the course of business attempted to be forced upon men by menaces and threats, 
in order, I suppose, to convey to America that this was [    ] British people’.  He got up to give 
his ‘total dissent to this Bill’ and was sure that his ‘opinion, overruled by a great majority, 
can do no harm’.  Burke showed here a greater appreciation for the nature of events in 
America than any of the other MPs had done.  Attacking the policy of punishing Boston, and 
Boston alone, Burke stated: ‘Revolt and resistance in America to the taxing power of this 
country, and accordingly they have resisted the import duties … But the evil is this.  That 
there is a combination not of Boston but of all America against it’.  ‘Observe,’ he said, ‘that 
the disturbances are universal, that the people are almost unanimous.  That is one view not 
of the mob but of all the Assembly of America’.
24
  Burke ended this heart-felt and passionate 
speech by appealing for the removal of the tax on tea: ‘the measures this day will ever do it.  
You will keep alive a running sore … Repeal this tax.  Then there will run through all this 
country a true unanimity.  America should be subjected to the old laws of Britain’.
25
 
Bacon spoke only to discuss a practical matter on the issue of storing goods and products 
from Britain in other storehouses and warehouses throughout Massachusetts; he believed 
that trade would not be harmed by the Bill and that its passing would mean that ‘we are 
very safe’.  Pownall followed Bacon and showed a greater awareness of the American 
situation: 
Have I either of these grounds to stand on? … Is it not in opposition to the British law this is 
claimed?  Though I hope to see the law repealed, these two grounds taken from me.  The people 
concerned no longer make that distinction, internal and external … They themselves have 
destroyed the distinction.  Therefore none of the ground I have hitherto acted remain for me to 
stand on.  I remain on the same principle, on the very same principle. 
Pownall continued to support the Bill, and again reiterated that the ‘people of America have 
a love for and veneration for government.  I found them to have it.  I will bear testimony to 
it’.  In total during this debate, eight MPs spoke in favour of the Bill; six spoke against it.
26
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The Bill eventually passed the Commons without a division, was successful in the House of 
Lords within a matter of days, and received the Royal Assent on 31 March. 
The Boston Port Bill passed through the Commons mostly with the tacit approval of even 
the staunchest supporters of American liberty.  Only Burke at this time appears to have 
been aware of the wider implications of the punishment of Boston and Massachusetts, and 
the impact it would have on forcing the Americans to work together.  Moving from a swift 
reaction towards supporting the Ministry, and attacking the American outrages, there 
appears to have been a shift in the sentiments of Burke, Pownall and Barré.  While they 
initially agreed with the punishment of Boston for the Tea Party, as the debates developed 
and more details of the exact nature of the punishment became available, the MPs became 
cooler in their support.  Thomas has, quite rightly, put this down to the fact that Pownall 
and Barré believed that, as in the previous arguments with the Americans through the 1760s, 
the North Ministry would apply a salve of concession to sooth American outcries.
27
  Burke 
did not believe this to be the case;
28
 Barré and Pownall were to be somewhat surprised 
when Burke was eventually proved correct.  By this point, however, Pownall had fully 
switched sides, became an Administration man and no longer would support repeal of the 
tax on tea.
29
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‘A Universal Prescription’: Controlling Massachusetts 
On 28 March, North announced the Massachusetts Government Bill to the House of 
Commons; knowing that the House would soon break for the Easter recess, he stated that 
he only wished ‘to move to bring in a Bill before the holidays that it may be more fully 
considered’.
30
  The proposal aimed to remove some of what had been discussed during the 
Boston Port Bill debates regarding the apparent defects in the constitution of Massachusetts.  
The elected council would be replaced by one chosen by the Crown; town meetings 
required prior approval of the Governor; the Governor would appoint and remove all law 
officers; and the freeholder system would be abolished.  The full details and extent of the 
proposal were not to be known until after the Easter break, but Pownall nevertheless voiced 
his support of the Bill.  Pownall declared that he would not ‘have any alteration made in the 
legislative capacity of the Council’ but supported the notion that ‘the Governor should 
appoint and suspend Council.  He should suspend the judges, for all the mischief a judge 
could do might be done before a Sign Manual could be obtained’.  With regards to town 
meetings, Pownall believed that ‘prudent people’ were incapable of action because of the 
rule of the ‘lowest and most violent mob’.  Importantly, however, his shift towards the 
Administration’s position became tellingly obvious: ‘I would not wish to bring on the 
consideration of the tax now.  It must be negatived and that would be mischievous’.  Fuller, 
the West Indian, and George Dempster,
31
 maintaining his consistent opposition to the 
Coercive Acts, both spoke against the continuation of the tax.
32
   
The American Committee met on 15 April to discuss the proposals put forward by North.  
The two proposals, the Massachusetts Government Bill and the Massachusetts Justice Bill, 
were discussed at length and it was here that Barré reconfirmed his position in the 
opposition.  Pownall rose only to provide support to the Bill and to describe briefly the 
situation of laws and justice in Massachusetts.  The Justice Bill – which provided for a ‘fair 
trial’ by allowing for the accused to be tried in a different colony or, if needs be, in Britain – 
was what sparked the most heated debate.  Barré reminded the House that he had ‘been in 
something like that duty’ – that he had served as a soldier in America – before continuing to 
attack the premise on which North’s Bill stood.  Barré asked if there was ‘any precedent of a 
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trial of that sort in which a man did meet with injustice or justice was denied?’.  He similarly 
reminded the Members of the events following the Boston Massacre: 
If the noble lord [North] had looked a little back in the history, the unfortunate gloomy history of 
that country, he would have found an instance, a precedent directly in its teeth.  In the riots in 
which the troops were sent to Boston, I believe by the advice of the Governor.  These troops being 
sent tither, great destruction happened in the town upon some alarm, whether just, or not.  Not 
make a long story of it […] Contrary to his own orders Captain Preston’s men fired upon the 
neighbourhood of the town, without the direction or order of the civil magistrate.  Six or seven 
killed, besides some others wounded.  Captain Preston next day [was] arrested, put in the prison 
[…] In the course of these proceedings Captain Preston from his gaol wrote to the neighbourhood 
of the town a letter which he published in the Boston Gazette signed by himself, thanking the 
neighbourhood for the humanity, the justice, the tenderness to his innocence that had been 
attracted, and there laying aside upon that occasion every popular prejudice he gave them thanks 
for their kindness, lenity, justice, that [he was] afterwards tried at Boston and acquitted.
33
 
Barré wondered, in addition, whether the law was practical: he doubted that any other 
colony would be more suitable as a place in which to hold fair trials than Massachusetts 
(‘will the honest smugglers of Rhode Island do much more justice?’) and thought it placed 
undue stress on the governors to decide when to remove people for trial.   
Barré reminded the House again that he had served a considerable period of time in 
America, ‘studying the constitution and temper of the people’.  He warned the government 
that the ‘kind of insulting and taunting language, that no man descended from the lines of 
an Englishman can possibly bear’ was being used to refer to the Americans.  He implored 
that the government might ‘put an olive branch in one hand and [a] sword in the other’: 
Barré continued to believe (even though North had stated that the two Bills proposed would 
be the only ones put forward to deal with the American situation) that it might be possible 
to repeal the tea tax, and that this alone would solve many of the problems being faced at 
this juncture.  Later in the speech – after Van demanded that the British use a ‘naval force 
entirely’ and that they ‘set the woods [of Massachusetts] on fire’ to stop any effectual 
resistance – Barré again reiterated this belief that removal of the tax would cure all the 
wounds: ‘that is the olive branch,’ he said, ‘that will save you the expense of fleets and 
armies you cannot afford […] If he [Van] would go to that country and look at it, he would be 
the last man to set fire to so beautiful a country’.
34
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On 19 April, Rose Fuller brought the House into a Committee on the issue of the tea tax.  
Perhaps somewhat ironically, it was Fuller who at this time was most acutely aware of the 
American situation.  His West Indian connexions, and his support for the American cause, 
caused Fuller some significant problems: the Gentleman’s Magazine in 1774 ‘recommended 
electors not to vote for the West Indians, since they denied British sovereignty over 
America’.
35
  The West Indian voice, however, was not to unite behind their American 
brethren through this period.  Stephen Fuller consulted ‘most of the Jamaica Gentlemen 
upon the subject, and also the West India Merchant, who, are altho of various opinions in 
regard to several causes of the Bill, did not chuse to step forth in opposition to it, as a 
matter of not immediately affecting them’.
36
  Therefore, even when the West Indian group 
in Parliament had somewhere between twenty and fifty Members, there were, for example, 
only twenty-four votes against the third reading of the Boston Port Bill.  Burke in particular 
voiced his concern that the failure of the West Indians to unite to form a coherent grouping 
on this issue – and their failure to provide support to the mainland colonists – allowed the 
North Ministry to adopt a firm line and abandon any more conciliatory policies, thereby 
perhaps bringing the crisis to a head.
37
 
Fuller stated that ‘something like the olive branch should show that there is a disposition in 
the House to do what is just [and] reasonable by the North Americans’ and that the British 
needed to ‘gild the bitter pill and to alleviate [discontent]’.  He foreshadowed what was to 
follow, stating:  
I am convinced it will be resisted, [in] in two ways.  First, an open violence, force of arms.  Another 
by a confederacy.  It is my opinion they will resist […] It may be fatal to you … Sir, I may be a false 
prophet.  I hope I shall.  I take it for granted the Bill on the Table or the great part of it will pass.  
That law will be resisted [and] I protest myself, I think that when you have to do with a united 
people, as they are all united upon this point, you will find a difficult matter to get the better.
38
 
The debate that followed contains one of the most famous speeches in Parliamentary 
history.  Burke rose and spoke for over two hours on the various issues surrounding 
American taxation and the formation and foundation of the empire as he thought it ought 
to be.
39
  Before this, however, Barré raised again the Chathamite view of empire: ‘I have 
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repeatedly said [we have] no right to tax America.  Those who think we have a right to tax 
America by the Declaratory Act certainly cannot find fault and say this takes away our right.  
We have it still if we give up this… The repealing of this law does not impeach that power.  It 
remains entire in our hands’.  He compared here the struggle of the North Americans with 
that of the Dutch against the Spanish, and emphasised that that expensive and destructive 
civil war caused the Spanish and the Dutch to ‘struggle for sixty years!’.
40
   
Burke’s speech combines a striking use of imagery and metaphor with erudite political 
debate, clever characterisation of various politicians, and a clear description of how he 
thought the empire ought to work.  Burke’s intention was not to try to enforce a different 
plan of action but, rather, to point out the various follies under which American 
management had suffered for the previous decade (with the exception of the repeal of the 
Stamp Act under the Rockingham Administration).  He sought to place the Rockinghams as 
the misunderstood saviours of America, while the various other ministries had ‘shaken the 
solid structure of this Empire to its deepest foundations’ and had ‘shaken the pillars of a 
Commercial Empire that circled the whole globe’.
41
   
Burke’s speech, however, set out no real working alternatives.  Knowing full well that a 
return to the situation before 1763 was impossible, yet unable to produce any workable 
alternatives, he pleaded simply that men of valour would take the ‘right path’ and console 
the Americans.  He argued that the Navigation Acts were all that were necessary to maintain 
the British presence in America, and that any other attempts to tax the colonists was 
unfounded and dangerous.  His most vivid and telling passage, however, remained his idea 
of the make-up of the imperial constitution: 
The Parliament of Great Britain sits at the head of her extensive empire in two capacities: one as 
the local legislators of this island, providing for all things at home, immediately, and by no other 
instrument than executive power.  The other, and I think her nobler capacity, is what I call her 
imperial character; in which, as from the throne of heaven, she superintends all the several 
inferior legislatures, and guides and controls them all, without annihilating any.  As all these 
provincial legislatures are only co-ordinate to each other, they ought all to be subordinate to her 
[…] She is never to intrude into the place of the others, whilst they are equal to the common ends 
of their institution.  I consider the power of taxing in Parliament as an instrument of empire, and 
not as a means of supply.  Such, Sir, is my idea of the constitution of the British Empire, as 
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distinguished from the constitution of Britain; and on these grounds I think subordination and 
liberty may be sufficiently reconciled through the whole.
42
 
Were this type of imperial view to be taken on, as it had been in the past, the British would 
be able to draw ‘more from the Colonies than all the impotent violence of despotism ever 
could extort from them’.  He stated that the ‘new and unfortunate system’ caused ‘the loss 
not only of peace, of union, and of commerce, but even of revenue, which its friends are 
contending for’.  He worried, however, that ‘we have lost a great deal more; and that those 
who look for a revenue from the Provinces, never could have pursued, even in that light, a 
course more directly repugnant to their purposes’.
43
   
As Burke sat down, Solicitor-General Wedderburn rose in anger to defend his old patron, 
Grenville, from what he saw as a character assassination by Burke.  Burke intervened to 
clarify that he meant no harm.  Barré resumed by contending that there was ‘no power to 
tax America, but [that] the repeal of this law does not take away the power if we have it’ 
and that ‘as we are about to punish we should heal also’.  He warned that ‘you will have all 
the blood to answer for to God and man.  Do what we will, we must come at last to 
requisition’.
44
  It was Lord North, however, that was to win the day.  His calm, mild and 
reasoned speech – mostly in reply to Burke’s oratory masterpiece – asserted simply that the 
Americans would continue to take further liberties unless the line was drawn by Parliament: 
‘every concession on our side has created more resistance from America’.  Fuller’s motion 
was rejected by 182 to 49.  Barré’s pleas and wish for some form of conciliatory measure – 
an olive branch of peace and hope – were to be denied by a Parliament set on punishing the 
‘rebellious children’ of America.
45
 
The second reading of the Massachusetts Government Bill, on 22 April, involved only 
Pownall from the American MPs.  He noted that he had told the House ‘three years ago the 
Americans will be impracticable’.  He warned also that the Americans would resist, and that 
resistance would be effective.  ‘By various ways they are prepared.  The very first act will be 
a meeting of this Committee of Correspondence.  They will find it inconvenient to conduct 
business by couriers […] They will have a good Congress.  They will agree on several matters 
[…] You may make yourselves odious, or you may make yourselves less odious’.
46
  America, 
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Pownall insisted, would resist, although ‘not immediately by arms, though they are 
preparing for that’.  Rigby then followed, apparently shocked at what Pownall had to say: ‘I 
now understand by Pownall who has the best intelligence from America that the people are 
in rebellion’.
47
  This forced Pownall to retreat on his earlier statement: ‘I apprehend,’ he said, 
‘I have been totally misunderstood.  I did not assert the Americans were now in rebellion, 
but that they are going to rebel; when that comes to pass, the question will be who was the 
occasion of it’.
48
   
The Massachusetts Justice Bill received even less attention at its second reading; 
Dowdeswell announced, however, that the opposition were rallying to fight both measures 
at their third reading.  The second reading of the Massachusetts Government Bill added 
little to the debate, but displayed how well versed the North Ministry was on American 
affairs and that they were not operating under any system of ignorance of the colonies or 
their condition.  Pownall shone throughout the debate as the man with the greatest depths 
and wealth of knowledge on America and American affairs: he rose repeatedly to correct 
those who were misinformed and to provide a narrative and a description of the situation of 
America.  So widespread and impressive was his knowledge at this point that the London 
Evening Post on 30 April commented that he was ‘the mouth of information to the 
Committee’.  This compliment would probably have greatly pleased Pownall as he sought, 
and had been seeking for twenty years, to place himself at the forefront of British politics 
regarding America.  The Quartering Bill received even less debate after its proposal: 
Viscount Barrington proposed the Bill and was seconded by Pownall who provided a very 
brief description of the troubles troops and their commanders had in landing soldiers in 
Boston itself, owing to the fact that Castle William Island – three miles into the bay – had 
previously allowed for magistrates to avoid any issues of quartering in that town.   
By the third reading of the Massachusetts Government Bill on 2 May, the opposition had 
begun to rally, even if the Chathamite and Rockinghamite groupings refused to join forces in 
opposition.  The ten hour debate which followed featured both Barré and Burke.  John 
Dunning, speaking as the leading Rockinghamite in the Commons, gave a two-hour speech 
and stated that ‘the two Bills formed a sinister system: the Government Bill would drive the 
colonists into rebellion, and the Justice Bill authorise “people with impunity to cut their 
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throats”’.
49
  Barré similarly opposed the Bill with his full might.  ‘The question before us,’ he 
stated ‘was a very capital one, much greater than has been agitated in this House for half a 
century, perhaps more’.  The fundamental issue was whether Britain would ‘reconcile [the] 
colonies to [the] government by sober, temperate and wise measures, or whether by the 
most tyrannical conduct force the unfortunate inhabitants of those provinces into rebellion’.  
Barré, like Pownall, believed that rebellion was the likely – if not inevitable – outcome from 
the Coercive Acts, but Barré continued to believe that repeal of the tax on tea would help to 
fix the problem. 
Barré continued, stating that Britain was the aggressor, was in the wrong, and that ‘like all 
other aggressors we shall never forgive the injuries we have done them’.  Returning to the 
issue of the Stamp Act, Barré reasserted his belief that Parliament had no right to tax the 
Americans and that the colonists were justified in their refusal to pay.  From the very first 
attempt to impose a tax on the colonies there had been, Barré stated, ‘nothing in that 
country, but either riots, or riotous risings, at one time from the seizing of ships, at another 
time from an alarm given to them from the Army, at another time from [the] imprudent 
strange conduct of the Assembly to rescind resolutions.  They communicated all over the 
country.  From that moment, they became united, they became determined to resist you as 
far as possible’.  Barré continued by reading sections from famous American pamphlets, 
including John Dickinson’s letters and quotations by James Otis.   
The language of both Houses is far from being the language of this country.  Too hostile.  In one 
House [it was] said [we have] passed the Rubicon.  In the other delenda est Carthago.  He that first 
made use of delenda est Carthago, I mean the great Lord Shaftesbury, was at the close of his life 
forced to solicit the protection and support of that very republic whose ruin he [had intended].  
He that passed the Rubicon drew his sword against his country and expired at last upon the hand 
of his own friend.  You are committed, the die is thrown, and your language in another House is 
the sword is drawn, you must throw away the scabbard.  If [    ] this body of troops, you must set 
your shoulders too, and press your whole weight against your colonies, if resistance.  I had rather 
there were resistance, than [they] disgrace themselves.
50
 
Barré finished by warning against taking actions against the Americans which would lead to 
a diminished force protecting the British Isles: ‘You will have upon the arrival of those troops 
[…] half of our own infantry fighting against our own subjects.  Give me leave to ask the 
noble lord how he finds the condition of this country?  How he finds the condition of its 
neighbours?  Is the court of France pacific?  Is Spain so too?  Have they given you assurances, 
that, if you cut one another’s throats, upon all occasions [they will remain so]?’.  Barré 
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attacked Pownall here, stating ‘he flips from side to side of the House’, and challenged his 
position as the sole and right authority in the Commons on American affairs: Barré 
established that, while many of Pownall’s points had been true, he had forgotten some and 
been misled in others.  He concluded with a sombre warning to MPs stating that ‘the voice 
of reason, humanity, law, and justice’ had left the courts of Great Britain throughout this 
‘wicked proceeding’ and that he feared that ‘the hand of heaven will take the same 
direction’.
51
  
Burke stood to speak at 23.45 and was interrupted several times by a House unwilling to 
listen any longer.
52
  Burke spoke, chastising Members for their putting ‘provinces, and cities, 
and nations, upon their trial’ and that ‘except when the saints of God are to judge the world’ 
he knew of nothing of ‘greater importance’.  He pleaded with the Members to ‘think a little 
more’ on the issue, attacked the Ministry for not providing the country with ‘sufficient time 
[…] to know what you are about’ and begged that ‘the act which gave rise to this 
disturbance’ be repealed in order that it might ‘be the remedy to bring peace and quietness, 
and to restore authority’.  Having been interrupted with ‘the House being noisy, several 
Members going out’, Burke responded to their shouting and jeering by announcing: ‘I find, 
Sir, I have got my voice, and I shall beat down the noise of the House’.  He finished his 
speech by concluding that ‘a great black book and a great many red coats, will never be able 
to govern America’.  Even though the Americans, Burke thought, ‘cannot resist the force of 
this country’, the measures being proposed by the Ministry would lead to ‘wranglings, 
scuffling, and discontent’.  North stood to reply to Burke and summed up the mood of the 
Commons, and the nation, when he said: ‘we are now to establish our authority, or give it 
up entirely; when they are quiet, and return to their duty, we shall be kind, whether by 
repealing this tax or not […] when they are quiet, and have a respect for their mother 
country, the mother country will be good-natured to them’.
53
  The House divided with 239 in 
favour and 64 opposed.  The Justice Bill passed two days later with very little opposition and 
in much quieter Chamber, with 127 votes to 24. 
‘As From the Throne of Heaven’: The Quebec Act 
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With the issue of governing the American colonies apparently settled, the North Ministry 
turned its attention to what had been a much longer-term thorn in the empire’s side: the 
effective government of Canada.  Victory over the French in the Seven Years War had 
secured the presence of the British throughout North America and, in 1763, the king was 
congratulated ‘particularly upon the defeat of the French army in Canada, and the taking of 
Quebec; an acquisition not less honourable to your majesty’s forces, than destructive of the 
trade and commerce and power of France in North America’.  By 1774, however, the 
Canadians were not quite as popular: ‘the conquest of Canada everyone now sees was like 
the Irishman’s prize, gaining a loss’.
54
  The Quebec Bill was proposed in order better to 
regulate the interior of America and to give a workable and feasible system of government 
to the mainly Catholic French settlers in the north.  While many Americans, and some 
historians since then, saw the Quebec Act as part of the Coercive Acts, this is simply not the 
case.
55
  The issue of Quebec, and the governance of Canada, had long been considered by 
successive British ministries and the Bill was never intended to be part of the Coercive 
Acts.
56
  The fact that British politicians did not see the connexions which would be formed in 
the minds of the colonists between this Act and the Coercive Acts does prove quite 
substantially the gap in understanding by this point between the mother country and the 
colonies. 
The Act had six main provisions: the revocation of the Proclamation of 1763; creation of a 
bi-racial (French and British) council which, along with the governor, held legislative power; 
tolerance of Roman Catholicism, subject to the supremacy of the Crown; maintenance of 
the old, French, system of civil law; implementation of English criminal law (with the 
exception, importantly, of Habeas Corpus); and an extension of the boundaries of Quebec.
57
  
The Bill was first introduced in the House of Lords (which was seen as an insult to Parliament 
and particularly to the Commons) and received little debate during its first reading.  The 
second reading in the Commons, on 26 May, attracted considerable attention. 
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Barré spoke after long debate had already occupied in the House.  He objected to ‘the part 
of the Bill […] which relates to the King’s Proclamation; the establishing the law of France; 
the establishing the religion of France, lastly, Sir, the establishing this legislative body, that is 
to be formed in the colony’.  He attacked the ‘very imperfect’ and ‘very incorrect history of 
this Proclamation’, the ways in which the Ministry had decided to rearrange the colonial 
boundaries and to stop settlement past the ‘Endless Mountains’, and the ‘poor bankrupts’, 
the ‘English subjects’, who had travelled to, and settled in, Canada in the belief that they 
would continue to live under a British constitution.  With regards to the French, Barré stated 
that ‘I never knew it was found a grievance to any nation to give them English laws, the 
English constitution.  So far from it, that country [France] admired and revered those laws, 
as far as they could be made acquainted with them’.   
Instead of providing a French system of government, Barré insisted that the ‘superior’ 
British constitutional settlement would serve the colonists far better: ‘if any customs, or any 
particular laws are applicable to the people of the country, take those, and graft them upon 
that law you give them’.   
In short, if you had led them with any address, by degrees they would have received great part of 
the English law; they would have hugged it to their breasts; they would from time to time have 
stated customs.  By this time you would have assimilated them to your constitution, and not left 
them standing single under and arbitrary power, standing Catholics [sic].
58
 
He continued by asking the government whether its intentional removal of an assembly in 
Quebec was to avoid them ‘quarrelling with the King’ as had the assemblies in the thirteen 
colonies.  To answer this, Barré suggested that, owing to their French nature and thereby 
their innate loyalty to a sovereign, ‘a quarrel with the King to the Canadians is reckoned 
worse than any vengeance that can be poured upon them’.  On the issue of the toleration of 
Catholicism, Barré pointed out plainly that ‘in Maryland, it [Roman Catholicism] has been 
tolerated, in Ireland persecuted, in Canada you choose to give it an establishment’.  This 
legislative madness regarding the issue of Catholics struck at the heart of a coherent 
imperium, thought Barré, and so while he did not mean that he thought government should 
‘strike at their religion’, it needed to be given ‘within certain bounds’ and had to make sense 
throughout the empire. 
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Barré concluded by warning the government that the Bill would subject the Canadians to 
‘arbitrary power’ and would make them ‘slaves to the end of time’.  He worried, similarly, 
that the Ministry had grander and more evil plans for the empire as a whole and that this 
proposal was just the second stage (after the Massachusetts legislation) in a system of 
complete colonial readjustment and a new type of imperial control.  ‘I look upon this 
measure as bad in itself, as leading to something else to come from it,’ he said, ‘it carries in 
its breast something that squints, and looks dangerous to the other inhabitants of that 
country, our own colonies.  Forseeing [sic] this, looking upon the measure in itself as a very 
dangerous one, I give my hearty negative to it at this stage’.
59
 
When the subject was again raised on 31 May, Burke came to the defence of New York and 
gained an agreement from North to deal with individual boundary lines case by case and on 
an individual basis.  North eventually approved of, and accepted, Burke’s exceptionally 
detailed plans for the boundary lines between New York and Quebec, and Burke transmitted 
these plans to the New York Assembly in August of that year.
60
  Barré repeated many of the 
points from his previous speech and concluded with a dark warning that he would not ‘like 
to see an English Parliament disgrace itself by establishing despotism by an Act of its own.  I 
don’t want to see monsters introduced’.
61
  Both Barré and Burke attacked the Ministry for 
its lack of detailed information at this state.  Burke stated that he had never ‘since [he] had 
the honour of sitting in Parliament’ had ‘so little information to decide upon a question of 
this degree of magnitude’.
62
  These sentiments were in response to the House’s continual 
rejection of motions to provide various points of French law, tithes, and boundary changes. 
The Committee stages of the Bill took place during the first days of June.  A number of 
witnesses were called forth to discuss the various aspects of the Canadian constitution.  One 
witness who had claimed that the French Canadians wished for an assembly, Mr Le Brun, 
was subject to a particularly nasty form of character assassination by Guy Carleton and Lord 
North: 
‘Lord North: Does the general know anything of a Mons. Le Brun? 
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Gen. Carleton: I know him very well.  He was a blackguard at Paris, and sent as a lawyer to Canada: 
there he gained an extreme bad character in many respects; he was taken up and imprisoned for a 
very filthy crime with children of eight or nine years old; for this he was fined, I think, £20, but 
being unable to pay it ---‘  
The line of questioning was then interrupted by an ‘independent member of parliament’, 
Thomas Townshend, who demanded that Carleton withdraw the statement and chastised 
him for ‘criminating a man unheard – not before you – and with whom you seem to have 
nothing to do’.
 63
   Le Brun was never called as a witness.  The questioning of various 
witnesses was largely unproductive and difficult.  So difficult was the questioning of a 
soldier that, after over one hundred questions, Barré announced that they had failed to 
produce one clear answer. These intricate questions and answers, much of which involved 
settling minor disputes over boundaries, continued until 7 June. 
On 10 June, Burke was allowed an opportunity to attack the principles inherent in the Bill, 
instead of focusing on the minutiae of boundaries and territorial claims.
64
  He started by 
claiming that as the House had filled ‘all of a sudden’ with people who had not been present 
at the earlier debates on the concepts behind the Bill, and that as they ‘had now come with 
good English dinners in their bellies, which would, he trusted, make them good humoured, 
and by being full of English meat, would undoubtedly be for English laws’.
65
  There were, 
Burke claimed, three types of people in Canada:  firstly, ‘the English merchants, the second 
the English subjects, and thirdly the [French] Canadians’.  As the ‘old vulgar saying’ went, 
‘one Englishman was always worth two Frenchmen,’ Burke claimed that ‘in this case, he 
thought them [one Englishman] preferable to fifty Frenchmen’.  Burke asked whether the 
proposals allowed for any form of civil liberty and protection to these British subjects who 
were, Burke thought, going to be forced to live under a French tyranny.  He would, he 
claimed, be ‘willing to give a Canadian every indulgence in his power, but not grant that 
indulgence at the expense of the English’. 
With regards to trial by jury, Burke proclaimed that it was not an inherently anti-French 
system or that the French despised the ideas behind it.  On the contrary, Burke could 
‘produce mountains of books wrote by Frenchmen on the justness and excellency [sic] of 
our laws, where they approved of the trial by Jury as one of the greatest excellencies our 
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constitution produced’.  To conclude, Burke stated that he was amazed that a nation who 
had ‘such powerful arms should have such weak heads’, that the ‘French were in awe of us’ 
and that North must focus his first attention on the British subjects in Canada and on 
securing their rights and liberties under a British constitution, even at the expense of the 
French settlers therein.
66
  The final reading of the Bill passed through the Commons on 13 
June after a very brief debate in a thin House and was voted by a majority of 56 to 20. 
Conclusion 
The passage of the Coercive Acts confirmed the dominant British attitude towards the 
Americans at this time.  Britons felt that Americans – the ‘rebellious children,’ as termed by 
George III – were being selfish and illogical.  They wanted to receive all the benefits of 
partaking in the British Empire, but refused to support and maintain it.  The American MPs 
found this situation particularly difficult: Burke and Barré knew that their position would not, 
and could not, win in the Commons, and yet they felt honour-bound to protest against the 
proposals.   
Pownall’s shift in allegiance to the North Ministry certainly aided in the passage of the Acts.  
He was a well known figure on colonial affairs and his contributions to the debates mark him 
out as one perceived to be knowledgeable about all things American.  His support, therefore, 
for the Bills gave further legitimacy to North’s proposals in the Commons and weakened the 
position of the other American MPs.  This sentiment is shown particularly obviously by Barré 
when he attacked Pownall for ‘flipping’ from side to side of the House, being inconsistent in 
his approach to the colonies, and of providing some misinformation regarding America.  
While we must not over-state Pownall’s impact on the House of Commons at this time – he 
remained only a secondary figure in British politics – it was nevertheless a critical blow 
against any attempts which might have, or could have, been made by opposition MPs to 
mount a truly effective counter-attack. 
It appears, in the first months after the Tea Party, and as information continued to trickle 
through to the metropolitan centre, that the American MPs were caught unawares and 
without any real response to the situation.  Their initial support for the punishment of 
Boston can be seen somewhat in this light.  On the other hand, the MPs remained loyal 
Britons, and would not have supported the outrages of the Americans at this time.  There 
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was a belief that the North Ministry would, as in the previous crises of empire, repeal the 
tax on tea and thereby cool the American response.  What the American MPs failed to 
realise was that the mood on both sides of the Atlantic had changed and hardened: Britons 
were no longer willing to see the Americans apparently trample on the authority of 
Parliament, and have Parliament back down and surrender bit-by-bit its legitimacy; 
Americans were no longer willing to continue to live under what they viewed as a tyrannical 
Parliament bent on the eradication of English liberties throughout the empire.   
As the precise nature of the Coercive Acts became known to politicians, Barré and Burke 
increased their attacks on the Ministry and its proposals.  They appear throughout to have 
been too acutely aware of the outcome of events both in Britain and America.  At numerous 
points throughout the debates, both of these men pleaded that they be heard and that, 
although their opinions were unpopular in a House intent on dishing out retribution and 
trying to regain lost control, their ideas of empire and their views of how it ought to be run 
needed to be said and heard. 
The Quebec Bill allowed for more widespread discussion of the nature of the empire the 
MPs wished to govern.  There was never any doubt over the legitimacy or authority of 
Parliament over the entire dominion at this point from any of the MPs whom we are 
discussing.  These types of ‘federal’ government would not be discussed truly until after the 
outbreak of war, and even then would remain largely on the fringes of the political spectrum.  
The Quebec Bill, however, showed that Barré and Burke remained passionate about 
protecting British liberties for the settlers across the Atlantic.  While they might not have 
viewed the French Canadians yet as true subjects, they both fully believed that assimilation 
and acclimatisation would allow for these foreigners to become part of the empire.  While 
they were aliens inasmuch as they were Catholic and were to be given French civil law, the 
fact that they lived under British protection and in part of the British Empire – even the 
furthest-flung corner of it – meant that they ought to be protected by the ‘blessed 
constitution’, be party to English civil and criminal law (including trial by jury), and be 
allowed to take part in, and be governed by, an assembly.  The American MPs were 
unwilling to have anything other than a Westminster-in-the-Wilderness and to impose any 
other system on the settlers – British and French alike – was akin to tyranny. 
The view that the British Parliament was ‘either very ignorant, or very corrupt, or very sinful, 
or all three’ simply does not stand the test.  The Parliament was well versed in, 
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knowledgeable about, and subject to expert advice from many persons familiar with 
American affairs.  The North Ministry did not walk blindly into conflict with the colonists.  On 
repeated occasions, Burke, Barré, Rose Fuller and even Pownall warned the Commons that 
rebellion, and open, organised, effective and dangerous rebellion at that, would be the 
outcome of the Coercive Acts and British punishment of Boston and Massachusetts.  While 
the opinions of the American MPs were perhaps not always in line with the majority of the 
House, they were respected for their knowledge and experience of the colonies.  They 
provided throughout the debates detailed and specific information on the nature of America 
and the Americans and went to great lengths to impress upon their fellow Members of 
Parliament the reasons behind, and for, colonial resistance. 
On the other hand, however, part of the problem for the American MPs at this time was the 
ways in which the Americas and Americans had changed over time.  The MPs here discussed 
were well versed in the Americas of the 1750s and early 1760s.  The speed of change 
throughout the 1760s and early 1770s took even these MPs by surprise and left them in the 
dark regarding the extent to which the American position had changed.  As a result, the MPs 
were wrong in their belief that the Americans would take the punishment of Boston and 
Massachusetts. 
The MPs moreover failed to provide any true challenges to North’s proposals throughout 
1774.  There was a failure of coherence amongst the MPs due to British political issues.  
Rockingham and Chatham, and their various followers, though largely aligned on American 
issues, refused to work together – and the two peers only started to communicate again late 
in the session – or to form any meaningful plan of attack.  Similarly, the West Indians 
showed a cold lack of interest in the plight of their American brethren and only Rose Fuller 
stands out as a West Indian with the American interests at heart.  While the impact any 
larger grouping in Parliament opposed to North’s Ministry might have achieved can only 
ever be guess-work, it remains an interesting question as to the impact these men – men 
who had and could continue to have the upper hand in all debates in the Commons – might 
have had on the outcome of votes had they joined forces and mounted a consistent, a 
connected, and a prolonged attack on the American proposals. 
Ultimately, the House remained convinced by the North Ministry’s attitude to the Americans.  
Perhaps nothing the MPs here could have said would have made any difference (and there 
is certainly no reason to suggest that either Chatham or Rockingham would ever have been 
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able to form anything other than small groupings, even though Barré suggested that 
Chatham was being invited into the Ministry in March of 1774)
67
 but the House was well 
versed in all things American and, when the revolution started in 1775, no MP present 
during the debates over the Coercive Acts and Quebec Act ought to have been shocked by 
events. 
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CHAPTER III  
T R U T H S  W H I C H  S H O U L D  B E  K N O W N :  T H E  P O L I T I C A L  T E X T S  
O F  B A C O N  A N D  P O W N A L L  
Outside of the Houses of Parliament Burke, Bacon and Pownall were also actively involved in 
the publication of tracts and theses on the American crises during the 1760s, 1770s and 
early 1780s.  Burke’s works are undoubtedly the most famous of the three, and have 
received significant attention from contemporaries and historians alike.  As a result of this, 
Burke’s works have been purposefully omitted from this chapter to allow greater focus on, 
and emphasis of, the works of Bacon and Pownall.
1
  Bacon’s publications were limited to a 
publication run of as few as twenty copies, were distributed amongst select groups of MPs 
and merchants, and have received almost no historical attention or debate.  Lastly, Pownall 
– certainly the most prolific writer of the three, although the most difficult to read – 
published several tracts, and several editions of these tracts, throughout the period of the 
American Revolution which were of some significance to contemporaries, but have been 
given only passing consideration by most  historians.  The major purpose of this chapter, 
therefore, is to examine and analyse the works of these men.  The chapter will include: 
discussion of the main threads and arguments in each tract; analysis of the major themes 
and importance of the texts to contemporaries, including information on publication details; 
and the levels of agreement, and disagreement, between the men. 
When discussing political tracts such as these, it is nonetheless important to remember the 
milieu in which they were circulated.  As Stephen Conway has pointed out, the majority of 
ordinary people in the British Isles were unaware of the great constitutional battles of the 
American Revolutionary War, and oftentimes seemed uninterested in the war itself.
2
  
Nonetheless, as Conway goes on to establish, the war was of central importance to the 
shaping of the culture, communities and politics of Britain, and these political tracts played a 
significant role in the development of a British understanding of the North American 
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colonies.  The works seem to have further enhanced the men’s reputation as American 
experts: Pownall in particular makes reference to his own understanding of, and 
appreciation for, the Americas in his tracts, and lays out his plan for the colonies with the 
hopes of furthering his position as the British government’s de facto American expert. 
‘Bringing the Contending Parties to Reason’: The Works of Anthony 
Bacon 
During the 1760s and 1770s, Bacon published three pamphlets on the issue of trade and 
commerce within the British Empire.  As a well-connected merchant, his primary concern 
was in maintaining the status quo and ensuring continued trade between Great Britain and 
the Americas.  The first pamphlet, The True Interest of Great Britain, with Respect to her 
American Colonies, Stated and Impartially Considered by a Merchant of London, was 
published in 1766 and, although the authorship is not definite, the style and substance of 
the work indicates that Bacon is the most likely author.  The second, Considerations on the 
Present State of the North American Colonies, was published in 1769; and the third, A Short 
Address to the Government, the Merchants, the Manufacturers, and the Colonists in America, 
and the Sugar Islands, on the Present State of Affairs, was published at the height of pre-war 
Anglo-American tensions in 1775.
3
   
Most of the attention devoted to Bacon’s publications thus far by historians has been 
somewhat cursory: more often than not, his works are mentioned as an aside or in a 
footnote, with no great attempts to explain or understand his positions and reasons for 
writing.
4
  On occasion, historians offer some more in-depth analysis into Bacon’s 
perceptions of the American crises and of the nature of the relationship between Great 
Britain and the colonies.  For example, Christopher Leslie Brown, in his book Moral Capital: 
Foundations of British Abolitionism, explains some of Bacon’s positions when discussing the 
British attitude towards legal and natural rights: ‘”Natural rights” had no practical meaning, 
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insisted Anthony Bacon, since “men are born members of society, and consequently can 
have no rights, but such as are given by the laws of that society to which they belong”’.
5
 
This lack of historical interest so far can be somewhat forgiven due to the nature of Bacon’s 
publications: his writing is not particularly skilful or eloquent; his appeal is, and was, limited; 
and he restricted the number of prints produced to very small numbers (for example, 
Considerations on the Present State was limited to only twenty copies) with the aim of 
passing them amongst friends and colleagues in government circles.  In other words, Bacon 
intended not to influence the population of Great Britain or the colonies on the whole, but 
sought to work behind the scenes by influencing key policy makers.  Nonetheless, Bacon’s 
position as an influential merchant, an Atlantic trader, a government supporter, and his 
connexions throughout the Empire means that his works are of historical interest and 
deserve scholarly attention. 
‘Their Late Misbehaviour’: The True Interest of Great Britain, with Respect to her 
American Colonies, States and Impartially Considered by a Merchant of London 
The first of Bacon’s pamphlets, published in 1766, was a direct response to the issues raised 
in the colonies over the Stamp Act.  The pamphlet is short, numbering thirty-one pages, and 
cost 1s 6d.
6
  Unsurprisingly, considering Bacon’s commercial connexions, the pamphlet 
opposed the Stamp Act.  More than that, however, Bacon opposed most forms of taxation 
in the American colonies and made some effort to show the Americans as poor and under 
great financial strains.  He, in addition, supported the removal of all taxation on trade 
carried out between colonists and foreign powers, particularly the French and Spanish, in 
order to promote American trade.  This sentiment shows an unusual attack on the 
mercantilist policies normally adopted and promoted by eighteenth-century merchants at 
this time.  Importantly, however, Bacon never attacked any ministers or the government: he 
instead goes to some length to establish that he is attacking the general ‘system’ of colonial 
management and that it is this ‘system’ which should be altered to improve political 
conditions and trade. 
The pamphlet started by demonstrating Bacon’s understanding and experience of North 
America.  He establishes that ‘the importance of the American colonies to Great Britain, 
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seems to be so well understood, that it would be misspending time to endeavour to 
continue any body of a truth which is universally acknowledged’ before starting discussion 
on the commercial importance of the colonies to Great Britain.
7
  He further states quite 
unequivocally that the disturbances in the Americas as a result of the Stamp Act should 
occasion ‘the most immediate and attentive consideration of the legislature’ and that he 
hopes the pamphlet would be ‘found useful’ to both members of the government and the 
public in general.
8
  Bacon then proceeded to explain the main ways in which the American 
colonies were of, in his opinion, great benefit to the United Kingdom.   
To demonstrate this, Bacon split North America into three parts: the north (comprising ‘all 
the country north of the Jerseys’); the midlands (made up from ‘the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina’); and the south (‘consisting of South Carolina and all 
those countries which we are in possession of to the southward’).
9
  The north, Bacon 
explained, produced ‘excellent masts, and other timber [and] the animals furnish us with 
plenty of rich furs, and the seas and rivers abound with procligious quantities of fish, both of 
the greater and lesser kinds’.  The midlands ‘produce tobacco, all kinds of corn, grain and 
pulse; live cattle of all sorts, both for burthen and provision; the country abounds in iron and 
copper mines; and, if the inhabitants can be induced to make the attempt, there is not the 
least doubt but the best wines may be produced in a country, where most delicious grapes 
grow wild on vines of a size hardly to be credited by those who have not been eye-
witnessed of the fact’. Lastly, as Bacon points out, the south would be ‘capable of providing 
silk, coffee, cocoa, indigo, cotton, rice, olives, fruit, and wine’ while there were also some 
articles common to all three parts, such as hemp, flax, naval stores, pelt, pot-ash and 
lumber.
10
   
Bacon also shows the many great benefits the British Isles get from the Americas.  He states 
that the Americans ‘receive from Great Britain not only every necessary (except provisions) 
but almost every luxury of life’ and that ‘in order to pay for which, they send the whole 
produce of their land, which will find a sale with us; but as that is much insufficient for that 
purpose, they also send every thing else, which is the production of their country, to every 
place we will permit them to traffick in order, thereby, to enable them to make up the 
deficiency’.  The colonies, Bacon established in a nutshell, would ‘be a continual source of 
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wealth to these kingdoms, as it insures us a constant supply of raw materials, and an 
increasing market to return them to, when wrought up’.
11
 
The reason for this rather long and detailed description of the commercial relationship 
between Great Britain and the Americas was to establish the footing on which any form of 
effectual taxation could in Bacon’s opinion take place.  Bacon emphasised that there was a 
need to tax the Americans, but that the method of taxation ought to be different:  
This short view of the nature of our trade with the North American colonies sufficiently points out 
from whence we are enabled to support that burthen of taxes which our very existence, as a free 
people, obliges us to raise, in order to put ourselves upon a respectable footing in Europe, and to 
impower [sic] us to afford our colonies that protection and liberty they have so lately experienced, 
and still continue to enjoy.  But, while we are straining every sinew in order to make that 
protection effectual, and that liberty permanent, it is not to be wondered at that we call upon 
them to sustain a part of that weight with which we are oppressed.  The chief question is, whether 
the share laid upon them be too great, or whether it is not rather injudiciously placed?
12
 
Bacon further established that Britain owed a debt of gratitude to the Americans as ‘they 
have not endeavoured to enter into any kind of cultivation which will be prejudicial to the 
produce or manufactures of Great Britain’.  That they had not yet done so, however, should 
not mean that competing with Britain was not ‘in their power’.  On the contrary, Bacon 
points out, that ‘any person who is the least acquainted with North America, but must be 
sensible that the wool of their sheep [for example] is as well adapted for all the uses to 
which it is applied in England, as any in the world’ and, as a result, Britain must make sure 
that ‘they turn their force to other objects, which we cannot so properly attend to, and 
making it as much their interest as ours, to see a different employment from that of their 
fellow subjects in England’.
13
 
Having established the basis of the mercantile ties between America and Great Britain and, 
interestingly, making several references to his own knowledge and experience of the 
colonies, Bacon moved onto discussing his proposals for improving the system of trade with, 
and taxation of, America in the hope that doing so would resolve the issues behind the 
Stamp Act crisis.  Firstly, Britain must ensure, Bacon thought, that ‘every thing demanded by 
them from Great Britain [should] come to their hands as cheap as possible’ as ‘thereby 
every temptation will be removed to their endeavouring to produce, or make it themselves’.  
Secondly, Britain must ensure that ‘every facility ought also to be given to their exports, in 
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order to enable them to pay for what they receive from us’.
14
  In other words, Bacon 
proposed managing the American economy to ensure that goods and products 
manufactured in Britain were not duplicated in the colonies, in order to limit, or remove, 
competition in these fields.  He further suggested ensuring that British goods be sold in the 
American market as cheaply as was possible, in order to avoid the Americans either being 
able to purchase the goods, often through smugglers, from foreign powers or – perhaps 
more dangerously, in Bacon’s view – producing the goods themselves.  Lastly, Bacon 
recommended increasing the amount of money available in the Americas in order to 
facilitate the payment of British goods by Americans.
15
 
Much of what followed in the pamphlet was an attack on the system of taxation: Bacon 
believed that the laying of ‘such a tax upon them [the Americans] amounts to a 
prohibition’.
16
  More significantly, however, Bacon showed an acute awareness of the 
situation in much of British America (including, importantly, the West Indies).  Concerning 
trade, at least, he showed himself to be a true ‘man of the Empire’ and wanted to maximise 
the benefits to each constituent part through careful management of trade and production.  
Bacon stated, 
I am well aware, I shall be told, that such tax upon the importation of the articles above–
mentioned, from the foreign American Islands to our settlements in North America, has been 
imposed in order to the advantage and emolument of our own islands, and not with any view to 
raise money upon the North Americans 
I have too great a regard for the islanders, as fellow subjects, to wish North America any 
advantages at their expense; but I have also the same regard for the inhabitants of North America; 
and cannot without concern, see laws made to the prejudice of the latter, which are not only of 
no advantage to the islands, but manifestly prejudicial to the interest, both of North America and 
Great Britain: such must every law be, which prevents the export of those commodities from N. 
America to strangers, which cannot be exported by them to [the] advantage of G. Britain, or the 
British American Islands, or of which they have more than either, or both the last-mentioned 
countries can purchase from them; except the goods received in payment, should be such as 
manifestly tend to destroy the trade of some other part of the British Empire; the contrary of 
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which, I hope to be able to prove, will be the case with respect to the articles above-mentioned, 
of sugar, coffee and indigo.
17
 
These telling paragraphs show a man interested in, and passionate about, the Empire as a 
whole.  Undoubtedly his vast commercial ties – in the Americas, in Africa and in the British 
Isles – gave an extra impetus to these sentiments, but Bacon here typifies a member of the 
‘Atlantic community’ as discussed by Gould.
18
  There is no doubt that, at least in the mid-
1760s, Bacon saw in the British Empire a connected, coherent and single body, united 
primarily by trade and commerce, spread throughout the Atlantic world. 
Moreover, Bacon supported a greater amount of liberalisation in the American markets.  He 
believed that, as the resources of America appeared to be boundless, that the Americans 
would be ‘able to supply not only our islands, but the whole world’ and that, therefore, ‘a 
freedom of exportation ought to be permitted, not only to the American, French and 
Spanish Islands, but also to Europe’.  In addition, he believed that the Americans should be 
able to trade and barter with the European powers, contrary to the opinions of ‘some 
people’ who believed that the colonists ‘ought not to be permitted to receive any thing, in 
payments, but cash’.
19
  Bacon argued that by allowing the Americans to exchange the 
‘superfluous part of the produce of their country for sugar, cotton, coffee, indigo &c.’, 
Britain would be providing ‘the North Americans with a means of paying for those goods 
which they purchase from us, for which they have no other way of making remittances’.
20
   
Bacon’s final argument in the pamphlet involved the practicality of taxation in the Americas.  
He stated that, in the British Isles, it was an ‘absolute impossibility totally to prevent 
smuggling, although the number of supervisors, tide and land waiters, riding officers &c. are 
almost as numerous as the traders’ and so, in the vastness of the American seaboard ‘where 
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not more than a dozen officers are appointed to superintend and guard the commerce of 
that coast, from Cape Charles to Rhode Island’, there could be no method of patrolling and 
controlling contraband goods from entering the colonies.  Bacon believed, therefore, that 
the only solution was to reduce the tax levels on the imports so as to remove any 
‘temptation to engage in clandestine commerce’ which would, Bacon foretells, ‘produce a 
much more considerable sum, than what has been collected under the present duty’.
21
 
Although entirely focused on the issues of trade, commerce and taxation, and paying little 
heed to any cultural, social or political factors at play, Bacon’s pamphlet provides an 
interesting and valuable insight into the nature of the Anglo-American relationship in the 
1760s.  Bacon’s ideas and ideals were, without a doubt, moulded by his own experience as a 
trader, and his proposals were, to some degree, designed to enable him to make a great 
profit in trade.  This does not, however, detract from the importance of the text in the 
context of this thesis: Bacon repeatedly makes reference to a knowledge of the colonies 
throughout the pamphlet, placing himself as a learned and experienced trader with an 
understanding of the New World and, perhaps more significantly, showing a real 
appreciation for what we now call the Atlantic Community.  His main aims were to foster a 
spirit of wellbeing amongst the various parts of the British Empire and to increase, as much 
as possible, the levels of trade between them.  He finished the pamphlet by blaming the 
Stamp Act crisis on the pressures put on the Americans by unfair and unreasonable taxation: 
‘I am apt to believe the difficulties we have put them to, have produced no one advantage, 
either to Great Britain or its revenues, while the inconvenience they have felt, has ill 
disposed their minds towards us, and […] been the source of their late misbehaviour’.
22
 
‘No Intention but to do Good’: Considerations on the Present State of the North 
American Colonies 
Bacon’s second pamphlet, Considerations on the Present State of the North American 
Colonies, is his most intricate and detailed.  In the form of a latter to the Duke of Grafton, 
and never originally intended for publication, this piece of work goes into more detail on 
Bacon’s thoughts on the nature of the British Empire than his other two works.
23
  Published 
in 1769, the pamphlet is 39 pages long, details Bacon’s personal history relating to the 
Stamp Act and lays out a format for resolving the issues between the colonies and Britain. 
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Bacon began by stating that he was writing to Grafton – who was the then Prime Minister – 
in the hope that there might be some form of ‘reconciliation’ between America and Britain.  
‘The subject,’ he said, ‘now before me is one in which I have been conversant all my Days’.  
He further established that he was ‘bred up in the Places I am to speak of; have been 
engaged in extensive Commerce with them ever since; and by Experience, as well as 
Observation, acquired an accurate and distinct Knowledge of every Branch and 
Circumstance of their Trade’.  He further stressed to note at the start of the letter that ‘the 
North American Colonies, in the present State of Improvement, are an increasing Source of 
Wealth to us, a growing Nursery of Strength; and the Measures your Lordship shall be 
pleased to adopt at this Time, in your Conduct towards them, will, in all probability, be 
decisive to the commercial Interest of the Nation’. He lastly stated in his introduction that 
he had written the letter for those reasons – the ‘Interest of the Nation’ – and sought to 
submit in the ‘honest Language of a plain man’ his ‘real Sentiments’ with ‘no Intention but 
to do good’.
 24
 
Moving on, Bacon attempted to exonerate any guilt he may have had over the passing of 
the Stamp Act.  He stated that while he had ‘the Honour of a Seat in Parliament at the Time 
of the Stamp-Act’ and while it ‘was natural for my Friends, both at home and abroad, who 
judged me to be experienced in American Affairs, to apply to me for all the Assistance it 
might be in my Power to give them’ and ‘being perfectly acquainted with the Case, and 
knowing the Interest of Government therein to be one and the same with theirs, I readily 
undertook it for the Service of both’.  Instead of becoming involved in the heated debates in 
Parliament, Bacon reasoned ‘after mature Consideration of the best Means that could be 
employed’ that the ‘most respectful, as well as the most likely to succeed, seemed to be, a 
private Representation of the Affair’.  He therefore, he claimed, ‘repeatedly addressed 
myself to the Right Honourable Gentleman who then presided at the Board of Treasury 
[George Grenville]’ but was ‘never able to obtain from him the Favour I had requested’.
25
 
Bacon followed this by summarising his own beliefs and opinions on the Stamp Act.  It would 
have been, he claimed, ‘severely felt by all’ resulting in ‘an universal Dissatisfaction’ and 
would ‘produce an Advantage to the Revenue, in no Measure proportionate to the Loss that 
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would be sustained by it’.
26
  He put forth the following two points regarding the ways in 
which America did contribute to the empire, without direct taxation: 
I., That, as Great Britain, in Return for its Manufactures, actually receives from its Colonies the 
whole Produce of their Labour, without paying them even a single Shilling in Specie for it – And is, 
moreover, itself the Carrier out and in of the Produce of both – It has already from the Colonies all 
it possibly can have, and on the most advantageous Terms likewise to itself, that can, I think, be 
conceived. 
II. That as the Demands of the Colonies for our Manufactures are to full Amount of their whole 
Produce, and more (which must always be the case while they are improving) every Tax laid upon 
the Colonies must, by a necessary and unavoidable Consequence, in Proportion to the Degree of it, 
continually lessen the Demand for our Manufactures, and instead of operating to our Advantage 
where it was intended, return with it increasing Detriment upon ourselves.  For it will appear to 
any one, who will be at the Trouble of examining the Entries at the Custom-House, that the 
greater Part by far of the Exports to North America are the very Necessaries of Life, which, as they 
cannot do without them, must be had somewhere or other.  If they have them from us, we have 
all the Advantage of it.  If you take a Part of the Produce of their Labour from them in Taxes, you, 
by depriving them so far of the Means of paying for such Necessaries from hence, compel them, in 
the Proportion you tax them, to make for themselves; in which Case, the Hands they will be 
obliged to set to work in their own Manufactories, for this Purpose, will be taken off from the only 
Employment that brings Advantage to us, the Cultivation of their Lands, and engaged in another, 
on the contrary, the most detrimental to use that can be imagined; which would deprive our 
Manufactories, in a great Measure, of Employment, our shipping of the Profits of its usual Freight, 
our Strength by Land and Sea of its main Support, and the Revenue itself of a considerable 
Resource of Supply by the Decrease of Taxes here at Home.
27
 
Bacon expanded further that he was ‘persuaded it was as contrary to the Interest of Great 
Britain as of the Colonies, and, on the Principle of Duty and Affection for both, by which I 
had been guided all along, most heartily concurred in the Repeal of an Act which I had done 
my utmost to prevent’.  He reminded his reader, however, that while he had not supported 
the Stamp Act the claim – ‘as new as it is dangerous’ – which he ‘almost shudder[ed] to 
repeat’ that ‘the Legislative Power of Great Britain has not a Right to tax the Colonies’ was 
not one which found any sympathy with him and was ‘fundamentally destructive of the very 
Being of Government, and subversive to the Constitution!’.
28
 
In order to ensure that the British Government dealt fairly with the Americans, Bacon 
established the main benefits brought to them by the Americans: firstly, ‘that the Exports 
from this Country to the North American Colonies arise to the yearly Amount of no less than 
Five or Six Millions’; secondly, that the imports from America – mainly of raw goods and 
‘bulky Commodities’ – which can be wrought up and then ‘exported again by us for the Use 
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of Foreigners’ significantly ‘turns the Balance of Trade much in our Favour’. Thirdly, ‘the vast 
Number of Hands’ necessary for maintaining all aspects of the Atlantic trading networks and 
the experience these seamen gain in that trade ‘which must increase as our Trade increases’ 
would add ‘continual Strength to our Naval Power, which is the Defence and Ornament of 
the British nation’; and, fourthly, the growth of the American colonies and their demand for 
British goods and trade would ‘raise the Trade Navigation and Manufactures of this Kingdom 
above the Want of any foreign Aid’ and would ‘secure to it the Balance of Trade, against all 
the rest of the Powers of Europe, and leave it in an unrivalled Possession of the Sovereignty 
of the Sea’.
29
  Bacon similarly here touched on the ‘African trade’ and believed that, with 
‘some prudent Regulation’ the connexions between the British, North American and African 
trades– or, in other words, the Atlantic trade – could be brought ‘to Perfection’.
30
 
While the colonies, Bacon thought, were ‘undoubtedly in a State of Disobedience to the 
Mother-Country’, the ‘very Term of the Mother-Country will remind your Lordships, that 
(however disobedient) they are her Children’.  Instead of treating them ‘as Enemies’ and 
‘before you proceed to Extremities’ ‘every Expedient [must] be tried, every Argument 
offered to convince their Reason, every Effort of Love exerted to the utmost to recover their 
Affection’.
31
  To achieve this, Bacon established six maxims that he thought ought to be 
obeyed when governing the Anglo-American relationship: 
1. First Maxim is – That Great Britain has an absolute and undoubted Right of Legislation over her 
Colonies; and whenever she judges it expedient to enact any Law relative to them, they are 
indisputably bound to receive such Law, and pay unreserved Obedience to it… 
2. The Colonists have, on the other Hand, a Right to the Protection of Government, in the full 
Meaning and Extent of the Word, the same Right that ourselves have, as Fellow-Citizens and 
Fellow-Subjects… 
3. They have a Right likewise to represent their Wants, to prefer Matter of just Complaints, and 
apply for Redress of real injuries – in a constitutional Way.  The Mode in which this is to be done is 
not yet determined, but the sooner it is, it will be the better… 
4. They are intitled to every proper Indulgence from the Mother-Country, in Return for their 
exclusive Trade… 
5. The Mother-Country should, in Consideration of her Emolument as well as their’s [sic] receive 
every Article of Produce they are able to raise from them, instead of Foreigners; and every 
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Encouragement should with this View be given, particularly to engage them in the Cultivation of 
such things as we have most Occasion for… 
6. No Tax can be laid upon the Colonists in their present State, with a View to draw Money from 
them, without the Alienation of their Affection from the Mother-Country.
32
 
The maxims, thought Bacon, would provide a solid ground on which to base the relationship 
between Britain and America.  He realised that a large part of the problems faced by the 
empire at this time resulted in a misunderstanding – on both sides of the Atlantic – of the 
ways in which the imperial authority worked. 
Not content to simply discuss the imperial make-up in the abstract, Bacon proposed several 
suggestions to improve and cement the relationship between the colonies and Great Britain.  
He proposed first that a ‘general Review be made of all the Laws that relate to them [the 
colonies]; and if any shall, on Examination, be found to be detrimental, either in Whole or in 
Part, to their Trade or Improvement, and of no real Benefit to those of the Mother-Country, 
let such Laws be amended or repealed’.
33
  Secondly, Bacon wanted to promote a stronger 
sense of ‘belonging’ to Britain amongst the colonists.  ‘I would beg Leave,’ he said, ‘to 
propose some Encouragements, for the Benefit of the rising Generation among them, which 
would, I think, under proper Management, greatly redound, in the End, to the Interest of 
the Mother-Country’.   His suggestion here was that British universities should be provided 
with funds to provide ‘assistance of such as were inclined to educate their Sons for any of 
the learned Professions here in England’ in order to enjoy ‘the Benefit [of such] Connections 
and Friendships here (which are generally the most lasting) [and] would retain and 
undoubted Affection for the Place where he received such Advantages, and for those to 
whose Liberality he was indebted for them’.
34
 
Thirdly, Bacon suggested extending ‘some Titles or Dignities’ to the colonists ‘as peculiar 
Marks of the Royal Favour and Approbation’.  This, he thought, would ‘exert the true 
patriotic Spirit of public Improvement, by bringing any new Article of Culture, that was 
wanted here, to Perfection’.  This, Bacon thought, would enable a ‘loyal and steady 
Attachment to the King’s Person and a ready and well-tempered Zeal for the Honour, Peace 
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and Prosperity of his Government’.
35
  Fourthly, Bacon proposed that Americans should be 
given a greater choice over their governors.  Unpopular governors were the source of many 
of the problems faced in America and by allowing the colonists to pick their own governors – 
or, at least, have more of a sway over the choices made by government – even if Americans 
picked ‘an indifferent person, with less Ability’, their support for the governor’s position 
would mean that things would ‘oftentimes succeed better’.
36
  
Fifthly, and perhaps most interestingly considering the focus of this thesis, Bacon proposed 
that ‘some honest Persons, of plain Understanding, and of tolerable Judgement and 
Experience, could be engaged, at the Government’s Expence, to make the general Tour of 
North America’.  He continued: 
…with a view to the public Service, they might, by introducing themselves into all Companies, to 
whom the Design of their Appointment should not be known, have many Opportunities of 
explaining and representing Things to great Advantage, and of procuring even a favourable 
Reception of some Points, which, from a total or partial Ignorance of the Reasons and Utility of 
them, might, without such a preparatory Introduction, be contested.  An Acknowledgement of the 
Legislative Power of Great Britain over her Colonies might, I think, by these Means be at length 
obtained; and if only one of the Assemblies of any of the Provinces could be induced to address 
the King with a Recognisance of this Sort, all the rest, I am confident, would soon follow the 
Example: For the Fact itself is to common Sense indisputable, however unhappily, because 
injudiciously, as I think, the Power may have been exerted. 
The person appointed, Bacon further established, would serve a further purpose of being 
‘able to procure for you a more accurate Knowledge of the Countries, and of the Temper 
and Sentiments of the People, than could possibly be obtained any other Way; as their real 
Opinions would, in the Freedom of Conversation, be declared to them without Reserve’.
37
 
Bacon’s final proposal was to attempt to bind together Britain and the American colonies 
legally and constitutionally.  ‘The heads of LAW,’ he said, ‘which would be of Force sufficient 
to collect and unite the whole Power and Strength of Great Britain and North America 
together, in a Bond that would (humanly speaking) be, I think, indissoluble; a LAW, which at 
the same Time, that it most amply provides for the Protection and Employment of the 
Colonies, would effectually secure to the Mother-Country the Dominion over them’.  This 
law, he pleaded, would be able to be ‘carried into Execution without much Difficulty’ but he 
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stressed ‘the longer it is deferred, it will be more difficult to do, as the Evil itself is every Day 
increasing, which it is intended to remedy’.
38
 
Bacon’s letter ends with a very unexpected and out-of-character plea to Grafton.  As the 
letter was not originally intended for publication, Bacon asks that the Ministry start ‘an 
Enquiry […] into the State of Religion there, and an Attention to that first Principle of Unity 
on which all the rest depends’.  He believed that ‘a Neglect of this, in the Days of our 
Ancestors, has been, I fear, the fruitful Source of every Inconvenience we now sustain.  The 
Ecclesiastical Form of Government by Bishops, established by Law in this Kingdom, is, I verily 
believe, the true and apostolic one, and entirely conformable to the Word of God’.  
Therefore, he urged for ‘the first Establishment of a Protestant Episcopacy in America’.  The 
establishing of the Church of England over the entirety of America would allow the 
Americans, thought Bacon, to participate fully in the rights and practices of the United 
Kingdom and would encourage a due loyalty to Britain, the Crown and God.
39
 
This pamphlet is by far the most illustrative of the three published by Bacon and provides us 
with the greatest insight into his views on empire and the colonies.  It is perhaps striking 
that Bacon is capable of being both erudite and engaged with his American brethren – by 
asking, for example, that they be given more say in the appointment of their governors and 
by attempting to promote a greater understanding of the other part on both sides of the 
Atlantic – while also failing to grasp the significance and importance of other suggestions 
(notably the establishment of a working and practicing Church of England throughout the 
colonies).  The pamphlet shows, nevertheless, that Bacon was a well connected man with a 
strong appreciation for what would, and what would not, make the empire function in its 
best capacities, and this shines through in this pamphlet perhaps more than anywhere else. 
‘Bringing Contending Parties to Reason’: A Short Address to the Government, 
the Merchants, the Manufacturers, and the Colonists in America, and the Sugar 
Islands, on the Present State of Affairs 
A Short Address to the Government, the Merchants, the Manufacturers, and the Colonists in 
America, and the Sugar Islands, on the Present State of Affairs, published in 1775, was 
Bacon’s final pamphlet on the American crises of the 1760s and 1770s, and is his longest 
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tract.  Costing 2s, the 40 page long piece focused on the issues of taxation in the colonies, 
the rights of Parliament, and discussion of the politics of the crisis.
40
  This pamphlet is the 
most vociferous attack on the Americans for their conduct and on the government for its 
short-sightedness regarding taxation.  In comparison to The True Interest, Bacon resolutely 
attacked the Americans – or, the American patriots specifically – for their actions regarding 
taxation.  He, moreover, flatly denied that the Americans should be granted any form of 
independence.  As before, Bacon’s primary motivation and point-of-reference is trade: he 
was concerned primarily with the effects any disagreement between Great Britain and the 
American colonies might have had on commerce.  The pamphlet, however, does shed some 
interesting light on Bacon’s political and constitutional opinions regarding the Americas and, 
although perhaps not a groundbreaking piece of political debate with unexpected or new 
solutions to the problem, it is nonetheless a valuable and worthwhile insight into an Atlantic 
merchant’s view on the crisis. 
Bacon began the pamphlet by addressing the general issue of the American problem, and 
pleaded that some reason might be brought to the argument, stating that ‘he that wishes to 
bring the contending parties to reason and [that] moderation has a right to be heard’.
41
  
Bacon was also very quick to establish his own credentials as an American expert.  He 
claimed: ‘I am not altogether unqualified to judge of the merits of the question before us, 
having passed many years of my life in one of the colonies, and traded very extensively in 
them all’.
42
  As in his earlier tracts, Bacon was keen to quickly point out his own expertise 
with regards to the American colonies to enable him to discuss, with some authority, the 
key issues in the Anglo-American relationship. 
The pamphlet then swiftly moves onto attacking the politics of the Stamp Act.  Bacon, as his 
earlier texts established, was never in favour of the Stamp Act but, in A Short Address, we 
find a very strongly worded attack on it and its instigators.  These attacks are quite different 
from the slights of ‘the system’ in The True Interest.  Bacon states ‘the author of these 
papers was favoured with a long, though unsuccessful, conference with the ministers then 
in being, on the subject of the American stamp-act; in the course of which all that has since 
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happened, in consequence of that ill-concerted measures, was very nearly predicted’.
43
  In 
addition to this, Bacon attacked the ministers involved in drafting the problematic American 
taxes, stating 
‘Though the power of taxing the Americans is undeniable, that mode of taxation was proposed by 
persons who in this respect misunderstood the real interest both of Great Britain and America.  It 
was an idea too hastily conceived, too firmly maintained, and too peremptorily insisted on, even 
to the end.  The friends however to both countries have now the satisfaction of reflecting, that 
they did not fail to assure the author of that tax, that it had every thing in it, which must render it 
hateful to the Americans: that it must needs be very oppressive in many instances; since whatever 
was laid by parliament would have been trebly increased in many parts of the colonies, when it 
come to be levied.  That it would be attended with unsurmountable difficulties, and, after all, 
would be unprofitable to this country.’
44
 
The attack on the Stamp Act, and its authors, continues for another two pages in the 
pamphlet.  Bacon’s belief, here, is that there ought to be no ‘general tax in the colonies’ and 
that the colonies ‘had great reason to complain, not because they were taxed, but because 
they were so taxed’.
45
 
Moving on from the Stamp Act, Bacon also railed against the Townshend duties.  This 
attempt of the ‘British Parliament to assert its right of taxing the colonies’ through placing a 
‘tax on paper, glass and painter’s [sic] colours’ was, according to Bacon, ‘another very 
exceptionable mode of taxation, taken up too inconsiderately by another very ingenious 
minister’.
46
  ‘Notwithstanding the allowed great abilities of this minister,’ Bacon states, ‘a 
more absurd or insufficient tax was never conceived, both with respect to the Americans 
and ourselves.  They indeed complained; but we had no less cause: for the act was 
absolutely felo de se [suicide]’.  The reason for Bacon’s disapproval of the Townshend duties 
is quite simple: he opposed the taxing of trading goods amongst the single entity of the 
British Empire as, in his view, nobody could benefit from such an action.  Bacon asked ‘if we 
lay a tax upon our own manufactures exported to our colonies, what is this, but to injure 
ourselves in a double capacity?’ and points out that ‘it serves both to discourage the 
Americans from trading with us in those commodities [glass, paper and so on]; and also (as 
its necessary consequence) to tie up the hands of our own manufacturers’.
47
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Given the nature of Bacon’s attacks on British methods of taxation, it would be quite easy to 
brand him as an American sympathiser only interested in maintaining his American 
connexions and promoting his own trade.  This is, however, not the case at all: Bacon 
reserved most of his anger for the methods of protest used by the Americans.  Bacon had no 
doubts that the King-in-Parliament ought to be supreme over the colonies: he claimed, for 
example, that ‘the legislative authority of Great Britain extends itself to all its dominions 
without reserve’ and in response to the colonists’ complains of ‘a want of representation’ 
and belief that ‘it is an act of tyranny to propose taxes which so nearly affect themselves 
while they have no voice in our public councils,’ he plainly (and somewhat unimaginatively) 
says that ‘in answer […] I must beg them to observe, that as they are colonies, and not 
kingdoms, they can be no more than virtually represented: and this they now are, being 
included in the commons as members of the kingdom of Great Britain’.
48
  Bacon’s main 
complaint, however, was not with constitutional or theoretical issues of sovereignty, but to 
do with the realpolitik of protest and dissent in the colonies. 
Bacon pondered also the American position and asked why the Americans chose to submit 
to some taxes (such as those on wine and molasses), but refused any form of tax on other 
goods.  He states that ‘if they now insist that themselves are to be the only judges, when 
and in what respects this instance of legislative authority [the power of Parliament to tax] is, 
or is not to be exerted, we must needs confess, that they are the most capricious subjects 
upon earth’.
49
  Throughout the text, Bacon asserts that Americans and Britons must be 
aware of the nature of the disagreement between the colonies and the mother country; he 
believes that ‘there is a Demetrius with his craftmen in every country, and in every age; who 
when they find their interest at stake, will soon grow clamorous, and encourage even 
idolatry itself, rather than suffer their craft to be brought to nought’ and that people need 
to be aware of the distinction between ‘the outcries of faction, and complaints of real 
grievances’.
50
  
Somewhat spectacularly, Bacon compares the American issue over taxation to the English 
Civil Wars of the previous century and claims that the Americans appear to want to destroy 
the basis of society.  He states that 
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‘Then it is argued, in language which is pretty sure to captivate, that such grievances are not to be 
born by a free people; who, when they feel themselves oppressed, have a right to take up arms, 
and, like their ancestors, of famous memory, by every method to take care ne quid detrimenti 
republica capiat.  The truth is, confusion and its consequence (a general scramble) is the object of 
their hope; to those who have nothing to lose, every prospect of gain is welcome.  But what have 
men of property to expect?  What about a sequestration of their estates; which may be disposed 
over, as they were heretofore, to serjeants [sic], drummers and all the instruments of republican 
usurpation?
51
 
And that ‘it is the act of ill-designing men to take advantage of the present dissatisfaction, 
and magnify every little incident into a mischievous design of government to oppress and 
enslave; to violate all laws, and abuse authority to the ruin of dependent provinces’.
52
   
There appeared to be no doubt, then, in Bacon’s mind as to who in the colonies were 
causing the troubles for Britain.  He believed, as did the majority of British politicians and 
military commanders, that the Americans were subject to the whim of a small group – a 
faction – who were determined to oppose British authority for their own, selfish, gains.  
Bacon remained convinced that most of the colonists were loyal subjects, who were rightly 
outraged at the various constraints and pressures put upon them by short-sighted ministries 
in Britain, and the ‘outrages’ had been carried on by a small, limited group.
53
 
The pamphlet finishes by explaining why some Americans want independence and what the 
results of that would be.  The reason for some taxation of the Americans (Bacon is always 
careful to ensure that he is clear with regards to this point: he believes Americans ought to 
be taxed, but opposed the methods by which they had been carried out) was to remove 
Great Britain from ‘labouring under a most grievous burthen of debts and taxes’ and, as 
Americans were ‘in the full enjoyment of British liberty, without partaking with her in any of 
her difficulties or distresses’ to ensure their fair share to the Empire.  With regards to 
American motivations for their opposition, Bacon suggested that they wished to remove 
themselves from any debt owed to Britons and free themselves, economically, from any ties: 
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‘this [is a] deeply concerted plan, to put off the duty of payment, or eventually perhaps wipe 
out all the debt’.
54
 
As Colley and Breen have done in the past few decades, Bacon also stated that the basis of 
the British nation, and of the British Empire, lay in the carrying of trade and commerce.
55
  He 
states that if the Americans refuse to accept British authority to tax them ‘such a resolution 
strikes at the root of all our trade: the consequence [of which] will be a virtual repeal of the 
act of navigation; the colonies will become independent separate states, and they will trade 
with Great Britain just as far as they find it convenient to themselves, and no farther.’
56
  He, 
further, believed that American independence would destroy the West Indian colonies and 
ruin most of the Atlantic trade.
57
   
The pamphlet finishes with a warning to Bacon’s fellow merchants: they must, he insists, not 
fall victim to American demands in the hope of short-term gains.  He tried to persuade 
merchants to brave any on-going American embargoes in the knowledge that, in doing so, 
they would be on the right side.  More importantly, however, he emphasises the fact that, 
should the merchants and traders give in to American demands, the Americans will 
eventually become independent and all trade will be ruined.  It is in this vein that Bacon 
finishes his text, asking the rest of Britain to prevent the Americans from falling ‘a prey to 
themselves’.
58
  
 ‘All the Right of Freedom’: The Works of Thomas Pownall 
Unlike Bacon, who wrote only short pamphlets on issues directly relating to his personal 
experience and interest, Pownall was a prolific writer on a great many subjects.  Although 
much of his later life was spent writing, and rewriting, Pownall had no flair for language: his 
texts are complicated, verbose, abstract and often difficult to follow.  His writings sadly are 
often very dry; the language is colourless and lacking in any imaginative or emotive 
connexions for the reader.  His long, complex paragraphs often jump about with little or no 
structure and, as a result, it can be challenging to follow the flow of his arguments.  Indeed, 
the very well informed former Governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson, complained 
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after having read the fifth edition of The Administration of the Colonies that he had ‘just 
looked into it, [to] find it above [his] capacity’.
59
 
Nevertheless, Pownall’s list of publications is quite astounding in its breadth and grasp.  He 
wrote on topics as varied as: American geography; Sepulchral monuments in Ireland; the 
archaeologies of various churchyards and abbeys; East Indian affairs and trade; economics 
and trade relations in general; vases found on the Mosquito shore in South America; stone 
formations in Sussex; Roman earthen-ware; Irish antiquities; European ancient history; and 
the relationship, and rivalry, between the industrial and the agrarian sections of society.
60
  It 
is, however, Pownall’s works on the American colonies which are relevant to this work.  In 
that vein, Pownall published several works: The Administration of the Colonies; A Memorial 
Most Humbly Addressed to the Sovereigns of Europe, on the Present State of Affairs between 
the Old and New World; A Memorial Addressed to the Sovereigns of America; and Two 
Memorials, Not Originally Intended for Publication, Now Published; with an Explanatory 
Preface.
61
  Pownall also wrote, in 1752, Principles of Polity, Being the Grounds and Reasons 
of Civil Empire but this was written before any real disagreements between the Americans 
and the British surfaced, and is outwith the scope of this work.  The Principles of Polity 
provides the reader with a very embryonic view of Pownall’s opinions and ideas of empire, 
which are much more deeply analysed in his later works.  
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‘Factions, Parties, Independent Interests, and Such Stuff’: The Administration of 
the Colonies 
The Administration of the Colonies was undoubtedly Pownall’s greatest work.  First 
published as a pamphlet in 1764 and costing 4s 6d, it contained the detailed analysis of 
Pownall’s impressions of, and opinions on, the governance of the American colonies.  Much 
of the significance of the work, however, lies in the fact that Pownall republished several 
editions throughout the 1760s and 1770s.  These editions effectively provide a narrative of 
Pownall’s reaction to, and thoughts on, the growing crisis of empire.  New editions were 
released in 1765 (containing 262 pages and costing 7s 6d), in 1766 (containing 314 pages 
and costing 9s), in 1768 (with 391 pages and a price of 10s 6d), and in 1774 (in two volumes 
with a total of 767 pages and a cost of 15s).
62
  A subsequent, and unchanged, edition was 
released in 1777.   
The first edition of 1764 lays out Pownall’s ideas on the British Empire and has, at least, ‘the 
merit of brevity’.
63
  This first edition establishes the basis on which Pownall’s later treatises 
on government and empire would be built.  Pownall – having attended Newton’s college, 
Trinity College, Cambridge – was greatly influenced by Newton’s ideas of gravity and 
believed that politics was dominated by the force of commerce.  He explained that ‘the spirit 
of commerce will become that predominant power, which will form the general policy, and 
rule the powers of Europe: and hence a grand commercial interest, the basis of a great 
commercial dominion, under the present site and circumstances of the world, will be 
formed and arise’.
64
  Moreover, Pownall explained, Britain was precisely the right power to 
attempt this transformation of colonial politics.  He stated,  
it is therefore the duty of those who govern us, to carry forward this state of things to the weaving 
of this lead into our system, that Great Britain may be no more considered as the kingdom of this 
Isle only, with many appendages of provinces, colonies, settlements, and other extraneous parts, 
but as a grand-marine dominion consisting of our possessions in the Atlantic and in America 
united into a one Empire, in a one centre, where the seat of government is.
65
 
These grand goals were based on Pownall’s belief that the British Empire needed to be 
radically reformed in order to continue: the problems he faced while Governor of 
Massachusetts Bay, and his determination to avoid any further governorships unless ‘the 
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King’s positive commands’ directed him to do so, convinced him of the need for reform.
66
  
With very broad brushstrokes, Pownall was establishing the basis of his treatise on empire.  
The basis of Pownall’s plan was quite simple: the empire should have a natural flow of trade, 
in accordance with Pownall’s idea of ‘political gravity’, with a benevolent mother country at 
the centre.  The mother country’s duty would be to protect and foster the colonies, while 
the colonies should send all produce in return and be the ‘sole and special’ customers.  This 
system, thought Pownall, removed the dangers inherent in foreign trade and would be, 
moreover, buoyed by the shared language, culture, religion and constitution of the empire. 
The first point Pownall discussed in his plans to renovate the empire focused on London.  
Any chance of there being a dutiful, compassionate and understanding mother country as in 
Pownall’s Grand Marine Dominion was, he thought, being destroyed by the incompetence, 
jealousies and apathy of the various Secretaries of State responsible for the colonies.  There 
should, Pownall explained, be a strong and effective ‘Home Office’ which 
…ought from this centre, to be able fully, uniformly, and efficiently, to distribute its directions and 
orders.  Wherever the wisdom of state shall determine that this centre of information shall be 
fixed; from whatever department all appointments, orders and executive administration shall 
issue, it ought somewhere to be fixed, known, of record, and undivided; that it may not be partial, 
it ought to extend to all times and all cases. 
Further, Pownall established that ‘whether this [position] be a Secretary of State, or the 
Board of Trade and Plantations, is of no consequence; but it ought to be intirely [sic] in 
either the one or the other’ and that  
Whenever, therefore, it is thought proper (as most certainly it will, some time or other, tho’ 
perhaps too late) to form such [a] department, it must (if I may so express myself) be sovereign 
and supreme, as to everything relating to it; or to speak plainly out, must be a Secretary of State’s 
office in itself.
67
 
Pownall then explained why the situation could not be made to work.  Should the 
administration of the colonies be given to the Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department, Pownall asked, ‘how will the Southern Department act, when any matter of 
commerce arises in the plantations, that has special connections or interferings with the 
Dutch, Hamborough, Danish or Russian trade?’.  Moreover, according to him, ‘it [the 
administration of the colonies] cannot lie in the board of trade, properly so called, until it be 
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found proper, and comes a measure of government, to erect that board into a secretary of 
state’s office for this department’.
68
  Without such measures taken, and taken effectually, 
Pownall believed that ‘the people of the colonies […] will never believe government is 
earnest about them, or their intent, or even about governing them’.
69
 
It is interesting to note that Pownall was not alone in these sentiments.  The position of the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies was established in 1768, with Wills Hill, the Earl of 
Hillsborough, the first to hold the office.  Nevertheless, the idea of a single authority, in 
London, over the colonies was not a new idea, nor one unique to Pownall.  Lord Halifax as 
early as 1751 had publicly stated that he believed in reform.  Halifax no doubt played a large 
part in influencing Pownall’s opinions on empire while Pownall spent time as his confidant 
during the Seven Years’ War.  There was also constant discussion amongst high-ranking 
politicians about the need for an American Secretary and Lord Chesterfield, in 1766, wrote 
‘if we have no secretary of state with full and undisputed powers for America, in a few years 
we may as well have no America’.
70
  Spector further explains that ‘Hillsborough, an adherent 
of the Court faction, and Dartmouth seem to have heeded his [Pownall’s] warning that 
America would never take England seriously until an efficient system of administration was 
adopted’ and that, in 1765, ‘when some change in the status of the Board of Trade was 
under consideration, Hillsborough assured Dartmouth that the acceptance of anything short 
of the authority wielded by the Treasury and Admiralty in their respective departments 
would bring him continual disappointment and perhaps undeserved disgrace’.  Pownall’s 
ideas, then, seem to have travelled far and been widely accepted amongst high-ranking 
politicians.
71
 
Having assuredly discussed, and put forward solutions for, the problems in the United 
Kingdom, Pownall then turned his attention to the colonies themselves.  It should be noted 
here that although Pownall believed that the Americans might move toward independence, 
he dismissed any notion of revolt out of hand.
72
  Pownall believed strongly in the ideal of 
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mercantilism and in the subordination of the colonies, in matters of trade, to Great Britain.  
He said, 
It becomes the duty of the mother country to nourish and cultivate, to protect and govern the 
colonies – which nurture and government should precisely direct its care and influence to two 
essential points.  1
st
, That all the profits of the produce and manufactures of these colonies centre 
in the mother country: and 2dly, That the colonies continue to be the sole and special proper 
customers of the mother country.  It is on this valuable consideration [that] they have a right to 
the grants, charters, privileges and protection which they receive; and also on the other hand, it is 
from these grants, charters and privileges and protection given to them, that the mother country 
has an exclusive right to the external profits of their labour, and to their custom: To these two 
points, collateral with the interests, right and welfare of the colonies, every measure of 
administration, every law of trade should tend.
73
 
In order to avoid any ideas of American independence, Pownall proposed the idea of self-
governing, privileged corporation-colonies as part of the British Empire, and ‘connected in 
their various orbs and subordination of orders, as to be capable of receiving and 
communicating, from the first mover (the government of Great Britain) any political motion, 
in the direction it is given.  Great Britain, as the centre of this system, must be the centre of 
attraction, to which these colonies, in the administration of every power of their 
government, in the exercise of the judicial powers, and the execution of their laws, and in 
every operation of their trade, must tend’.
74
   
In addition, contrary to his later reputation as a ‘Friend of the American Revolution’,
75
 
Pownall’s view of the colonists was on occasion quite patronising.  In order to maintain 
British control at the centre of the dominion, Pownall believed that ‘they [the Americans] 
must be guarded against having, or forming, any principle coherence with each other above 
that, whereby they cohere in this centre: having no other principle of intercommunication 
between each other, than that by which they are in joint communion with Great Britain as 
the common centre of all’.  Furthermore, he pointed out, Americans ‘should always remain 
incapable of any coherence, or of so conspiring amongst themselves, as to create any other 
equal force which much recoil back on this first mover [Great Britain].  It is essential to the 
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preservation of the empire to keep them disconnected and independent of each other’.
76
  
How possible and practical Pownall thought this plan was cannot now be ascertained, but 
the fact remains that, at least in the earlier editions, Pownall had no interest in American 
independence and was a strong advocate against any growth in American power. 
The first edition paid little attention to issues over revenue or Native American issues as 
both were, at that time, under official consideration.  Pownall did believe, however, that the 
best way to tax the colonists was through a levy on trade and other customs duties, and 
perhaps through some form of land tax.  He did point out, however, that there might be a 
problem in ‘how far even the supreme government of the mother country can, consistently 
with general liberty, proceed in laying taxes on its colonies, where the consent of the people 
cannot be, in any constitutional way taken’.
77
  Pownall mostly skips this controversial issue, 
but affirmed that, however revenue was raised, it should primarily be made to free the 
various governors and officials of their dependence on the local assemblies. 
Finally, with regards to trade amongst the ‘colonies, as corporations united to the realm’ 
and Great Britain, it must, Pownall established, be allowed to flourish ‘so as to form not a 
dependant appendix to the demesnes of the crown, but a subordinate united part of a 
whole one, this great commercial dominion of Great Britain’.
78
  Pownall, here, regarded the 
Navigation Acts as basically sound in theory, but wanted to expand the reach of ‘British 
markets’ in foreign countries.  Pownall said, 
An occasion of establishing British markets even in other countries, the true use would be derived 
to the general interest from these advantageous circumstances, while in particular the colonies 
and the mother country would be mutually accommodated […]  If, under certain restrictions, 
securing also those duties which the produce of the colonies, carried to market, ought to pay to 
the mother country, the colonies were permitted to export their produce directly to foreign 
countries, if so be they sold it to any British house established in such place, and were also 
permitted, if they bought their supplies from a British house established in those parts, to supply 
themselves with the natural fruits and produce of that country (all manufactures that in any way 
interfere with the British manufactories excepted) paying there to some British officer, or upon 
their arrival in the colonies, the same duties as they would have paid by purchasing the same 
commodities in England.
79
 
In other words, Pownall believed that the colonists should have the right to trade directly 
into, and out of, foreign powers – provided the trades were carried out by British merchants 
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in those countries.  Moreover, the trade of the East and West Indies, Pownall thought, 
should be brought into line with Anglo-American trade in order to improve the benefit to all 
and restore harmony amongst the merchants of the empire.  Importantly, Pownall 
emphasised, there should be no economic diversification: Americans should not therefore 
be allowed to make products currently made by Britain as this would lead eventually to a 
destruction of the ‘natural’ systems of trade and colonial independence. 
The Administration of the Colonies appears to have been generally well received by its 
contemporaries.  It received warm praise in both The Monthly Review and The Gentleman’s 
Magazine and was widely read by those interested in the colonies and their administration.  
The Gentleman’s Magazine commented that the work ‘seems to be written with great 
knowledge of the subject, and upon the most enlarged and comprehensive principles’.
80
  
Moreover, as Schutz points out, ‘the wide publicity given his essay attracted the attention of 
Benjamin Franklin, who renewed his partnership with Pownall’.
81
  Franklin’s correspondence, 
however, shows us that he thought the first edition – which was published anonymously – 
was not drafted by Pownall at all, but by Richard Jackson: ‘I saw in the Chronicle a Line of 
Notice, that after the Christmas Hollidays would be published The Administration of the 
Colonies. I imagin’d it might be the Title of your intended Work, and hop’d to have had it 
here by this time’.
82
  Nonetheless, Pownall’s decision to republish the tract in 1765, in a 
second edition, means that he must have felt the text a worthwhile contribution to the 
debate on the British Empire at this time. 
‘Begun Upon my Revisions’: The Editions of the Administration of the Colonies 
The second edition of the Administration of the Colonies was published merely a year after 
the first.  This edition, unlike the first, was not published anonymously and contained a 
more detailed analysis of the colonial situation.  Moreover, it took account of George 
Grenville’s American programme and dealt with the proposed Stamp Act and the beginnings 
of the American crisis.  It contains, in addition, a several page dedication to ‘the Right 
Honourable George Grenville, First Lord Commission of His Majesty’s Treasury, Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, etc, etc, etc’.
83
  The dedication, further, states that ‘while such is the temper 
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of the great minister, there cannot be too much caution and prudence exercised in 
preventing the inferior members or officers of government from acting under any sense of 
resentment or prejudice, against a people improperly supposed to be under disfavour’.
84
   
Perhaps most importantly, however, Pownall went to some length to emphasise his own 
expertise on the colonies in the dedication.  He says that ‘the experience I have had in the 
affairs of the colonies must at least have given me a practical knowledge of them: and the 
relation I have borne to the people has given me an affection for them’ and that he has ‘a 
right to say this [that the colonists will always remain loyal to Britain] because experience 
has given me this impression of them.  I do not say it to flatter them […] but I speak it as a 
truth which I think should be known, lest the intemperance and imprudence of their false 
and mistaken patriots should give any undue impression of their disadvantages, and cause 
any alienation of that natural affection which at present subsists […] between the people of 
Great Britain and those of the colonies’.
85
 
The second edition itself contains much more detail on the issue of taxation.  While the first 
edition contained only a brief glance at the topic, the second edition goes into some depth 
on the matter.  Pownall stated that he does ‘not suppose that it will not bear a doubt but 
that the supreme legislature of Great Britain is the true and perfect representative of Great 
Britain, and all its dependencies’ and that ‘as it is not in the power of the House of Lords or 
Commons to exempt any community from the jurisdiction of the King, as supreme 
magistrate, so that it is not, nor ever was, or could be in the power of the crown, to exempt 
any persons or communities within the dominions of Great Britain from being subject and 
liable to be taxed by parliament’.
86
  As a result, Pownall pointed out, the various charters 
and grants given to the colonies – either by the Crown or by Parliament – could not exempt 
them from imperial taxation.   
However, that said, Pownall then qualifies his position.  Should the various colonial 
legislatures and assemblies, he pointed out, already levy a tax on a specific item or source, 
then Great Britain must not double-tax the same resource.  Similarly, as the land of the 
colonies was best known and understood by the local bodies, any form of land tax should be 
left to the American assemblies.  With regards to taxation in general, Pownall emphasises 
                                                 
84
 Ibid., p. v. 
85
 Ibid., p. iii and pp. vi-vii. 
86
 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
  
129 
 
that Britain must act ‘with the utmost delicacy and regard to the colonies’ power of taxing 
themselves’.
87
  This lenity should be allowed as the colonial bodies contributed towards the 
Crown in general and were therefore active members of the British Empire.   
Regarding the stamp duty in particular, Pownall believed that it ‘ought to be much lower 
than those laid here in England’.  The reason for this, he established, was ‘because the same 
kind of transactions, acts, and deeds, passed and done in America, as those here in England, 
are done for concerns of much less value’.
88
  Again, however, Pownall tried to sit on the 
middle ground between Britain and America.  He pointed out a few pages later that it seems 
obvious how ‘little reason the Colonists have to complain of these moderate duties and 
imposts, which the mother country expects them to bear in aid to her, whilst government 
leaves to them untouched those internal funds, so fully adequate to all the internal services 
of each province’.
89
  Pownall further explained that ‘the provinces under-mentioned could 
annually raise, by one shilling in the pound on the produce of the rateable property, estates 
real and personal in each province: 
Province £ s d 
Massachusett’s 
Bay 
13172 7 11 
New York 8000 0 0 
New Jersey 5289 17 0 
Pennsylvania 15761 10 0 
South-Carolina 6971 1 11 
Sterling 49395 16 10
90
 
  
With this figure doubled to include all the other colonies’ contributions, Pownall points out 
that a yearly sum of £98791 13s 8d could be collected.  He, thereafter, went to some length 
to establish to readers on both sides of the Atlantic that these figures were from his own 
‘private collections’ and that they were also a few years out of date.  Nevertheless, he 
pointed out, the information was unlikely to be seriously wrong and served as a worthwhile 
example of how easily, and profitably, Americans could be taxed.
91
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Similarly, Pownall touched on the issue of Indian affairs in this second edition.  Pontiac’s 
Rebellion,
92
 which had raged in the Americas since 1763 and ended – officially – in July 1765, 
had caused some considerable problems for the British and British-Americans in America.  
Pownall shows in his discussion of the Indian problem some compassion for their situation.  
He says that, while ‘the European power may finally extirpate them’ it can never conquer 
them.  Moreover, although the increasing numbers of Europeans in the Americas would, 
Pownall thought, eventually destroy any form of Native American culture, the cost would be 
dear ‘both in blood and treasure […] for our horrid injustice’.
93
  On a more practical note, 
Pownall further established that, due to the cost of maintaining an army capable of 
defeating any Indian uprising – and he estimates the number of Indian ‘fighting men’ at 
23,105 – the best fiscal policy, and the best way to ensure the safety of Americans, would be 
to base the relationship between the two peoples ‘in faith and justice, toward the remnant 
of these much injured native of the country’.
94
 
The final main change to the second edition was the addition of an attack on the position of 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in America.  The Commander-in-Chief was 
based in New York and had general control over, and responsibility for, all the troops in 
North America.  From 1763, the position was held by Major-General Thomas Gage.  Pownall 
believed that the precedent set by a single authority over the whole Americas, in the 
position of the Commander-in-Chief, was a dangerous one as it alluded to a possible 
American unity.  Pownall stated 
If it should upon consideration and advice, of which I am no judge, be found that the dictatorial 
power and command of a military commander in chief, superior to the provincial governors 
(however necessity, in time of war, might justify it, ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat) is not 
agreeable and conformable to law, and to the constitution either of Great Britain or of the 
colonies in time of peace; it may be supposed that such will no be continued in time of peace, and 
that as soon as the hostile state of Indian affairs ceases, this power will be made to cease also.
95
 
The example of a single Commander-in-Chief, therefore, set the example of an American 
Empire and was, Pownall thought, the beginning of the end for any form of British 
sovereignty in the New World.
96
  Pownall, instead, proposed that the American army be 
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divided, the position of Commander-in-Chief be removed, and that ‘the several 
commandants of the troops appointed, each to their respective districts, having every 
power necessary for the discipline and government of the regular forces under their 
command’ and that they will remain in ‘subordination to the civil power of that government, 
within which their command lies, as commander in chief in Ireland stands to the supreme 
civil power of Ireland’.
97
 
News of Pownall’s thesis on the Commander-in-Chief took some time to reach the Americas.  
When it did, however, it proved rather irksome to Thomas Gage.  He wrote to the Secretary 
at War, Viscount Barrington, in July 1770 that: 
According to Governor Pownall’s Interpretation of Law, no Army in America can be under the 
Command of one Chief, unless brought together in one Province; and a Day’s March carrys them 
under a second Commander: so that an Army in less than a Month, might be under the Direction 
of three or four different Commanders; for if every Governor has a Right to command by Law, I 
know of no Power that can limit or controll his Command, whether he is a King’s Governor a 
Proprietary, or Charter Governor, and if he commands in the highest Instance, he must also in all 
others.  To draw Lines, and make nice Distinctions, between the Powers of Civil and Military 
Officers over Troops, may tend to create Disputes, but will never serve any good Purpose.  Troops 
may be stationed in different Places, under so many Chiefs, but they cannot be moved from the 
Stations, or assembled on any Emergency, unless there is one Chief Commander, who acts as 
superior to, & independent of all others.  We are told that most Laws are founded upon Sense and 
Reason, but I can’t say so much of Mr. Pownall’s.
98
 
The third edition, released in 1766, appeared after the disturbances following the Stamp Act 
and after the Rockingham ministry had replaced that of Grenville.  Pownall kept the 
dedication to Grenville and made almost no changes to the main body of the text.  He did, 
however, add a substantial appendix – which he also published separately as Considerations 
on the Points Lately Brought into Question as to the Parliament’s Right of Taxing the 
Colonies, and of the Measures Necessary to Be Taken at this Crisis.
99
  The third edition goes 
into greater detail and depth on the main points, and fills them out with more examples and 
information.  The appendix also tried to make sense of the fast pace of changes in the 
Americas, but this is somewhat clumsily done and difficult to follow.   
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Nonetheless, Pownall again reaffirmed that the colonies remained attached to Great Britain 
and thought of it as ‘home’.  With regards to American administration, Pownall went into 
much more depth on the history of the Board of Trade and, again, restated his belief that a 
new Secretary of State needed to be created to deal with, and only with, the American 
colonies.  He further believed that the British government must unite in order to ward off 
any American advances and attacks and that, only when Britain understands its position vis-
à-vis the colonies will the Americans see the true light.
100
  Pownall, further, believed that a 
‘considerable person’ should be sent to the colonies to establish the nature of the basis of 
the Anglo-American relationship.  Schutz believed that Pownall envisaged this man to be 
Lord Chatham, but Guttridge has proven that the person Pownall believed should be sent 
was Edward, Duke of York (George III’s brother).
101
  This great man, who would be respected 
and show Britain’s true regard for, and interest in, the colonies, was to treat with the 
leading Americans (including governors, lawyers, officers, and officials) to establish a 
‘general bill of rights, and establishment of government and commerce on a great plan of 
union’.
102
  Pownall also stated that Great Britain needed to work to ensure the continuation 
of the union between the two sides of the Atlantic and that the natural centre to that union 
would be, for now, Great Britain.  He accepted that, at some point in the future, the natural 
centre point would likely shift to the Americas, but believed that Britain had to do 
everything possible to maintain the link between the colonies and the mother country. 
The fourth edition was entirely redrafted to take account of the ever-shifting nature of 
Anglo-American relations and British politics.  By this time, Pownall had abandoned the brief 
hope that the Chatham administration would set right colonial governance and had entered 
Parliament to further his American cause.  Published in 1768, the fourth edition uses much 
of the same text and phrasing of the earlier editions, but it was substantially reorganised.  
The dedication to Grenville was kept, but entirely rewritten.  The new dedication laid out 
Pownall’s belief that Grenville, now called only a respected Member of Parliament, shared 
his basic principles – ‘those of peace and government, established on political liberty’ – with 
regard to the American colonists.
103
  He also established that he felt it his duty to attest to 
‘the affection which the Colonists ever bore to the mother country, to their zeal for its 
welfare, to their sense of government and their loyalty to their sovereign’ and expressed his 
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regret at the situation existing between the Americans and the British regarding taxation 
and the constitutional positions.
104
 
Before publishing the fourth edition, Pownall wrote to Grenville asking him permission to 
use his name in the tract and to further his own ambitions.  The somewhat pleading letter, 
written in July 1768, asked Grenville to bring ‘forward the proposal referred to [in the 
Administration of the Colonies], in Parliament’ and stated that Grenville was the only 
minister with the capability of taking the action necessary to solve the problems between 
Great Britain and America.
105
  Grenville’s reply, on 17 July, was somewhat less enthusiastic.  
He thanked Pownall for his consideration but emphasised that Pownall needed to make it 
plainly obvious that the sentiments, thoughts and suggestions raised in the tract were 
nothing to do with him: ‘I do not see,’ said Grenville, ‘how I can be affected by it, if it is fully 
understood and explained in your Introduction, that you speak your own sentiments and 
not mine’.
106
 
The fourth edition itself focuses much more on the issue of sovereignty and the problems of 
the clashing constitutions in Britain and America.  Pownall provides the reader with a brief 
constitutional history of the colonies from the time of James VI and I, and establishes that 
the colonies ought to be subject to the King-in-Parliament.  Pownall further stated that the 
various American colonies ought to make payment to the Crown for ‘support’.  He 
established, however, that ‘this order of the crown is generally, if not universally rejected, 
by the legislatures of the colonies’ because ‘the executive power is immediately 
administered by the King’s Majesty’ but that ‘under the circumstances in which they [the 
Americans] find themselves, there is no other measure left to them to prevent the 
misapplications of public money, than by voting and appropriation of the salaries of the 
governor and other civil officers, issuing from monies lodged in the hands of the a provincial 
treasurer appointed by the assemblies’.
107
  Pownall’s opinion on this matter was quite clear.  
                                                 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 W.J. Smith, The Grenville Papers: Being the Correspondence of Richard Grenville, Earl Temple, K.G., and 
the Right Hon: George Grenville, their Friends and Contemporaries (London:  John Murray, 1852), IV. 
312-314: Pownall to Grenville, Marlow, 14 July 1768. 
106
 Ibid., IV. 318: Grenville to Pownall, Wotton, 17 July 1768.  See Appendix V for the full versions of each 
of these letters. 
107
 Pownall, Administration of the Colonies, 4
th
 ed., pp. 77-8. 
  
134 
 
He believed that the executive arm of government must be independent of the ‘popular 
branch of government’ in order to avoid corruption.
108
 
Much of the work in this edition involves an attempt to quantify the colonies’ position 
within the Empire.  In that theme, Pownall explained their constitutional evolution and 
predicament.  He said: 
Let us review the state of this matter as it seems actually to have stood.  If the state of it which we 
shall represent, cannot and must not be supposed right in law; may we be permitted to state it, at 
least, as an hypothesis. 
The Colonies, from their remote distance, and local circumstances, could not have been 
incorporated into any country, city or borough; at least, so it is said: and yet, at the same time, 
they are supposed to be, and considered as, within the diocese of London.  The Colonists were 
considered as having gone forth from, and having quitted the realm; as having settled on lands 
without the realm. 
The Colonies thus remote and separate from the realm, were formed and incorporated into 
distinct communities; were erected into provinces; had the jura regalia granted to them; were, in 
consequence thereof, to all intents and purposes, counties palatine, in like and as ample manner 
as the county palatine of Durham was, some matters of form excepted.  They were dominions of 
the King of England; although, according to the language of those times, “not yet annexed to the 
crown”.  They were under the jurisdiction of the King, upon the principle of federal sovereignty: 
although considered “as out of the jurisdiction of the kingdom”.  The parliament itself doubting, at 
that time, whether it had jurisdiction to meddle with those matters, did not think proper to pass 
bills concerning America.  The Colonies had therefore legislatures peculiar to their own separate 
communities; subordinate to England, in that they could make no laws contrary to the laws of the 
mother country; but in all other matters and things, free uncontrouled and compleat [sic] 
legislatures, in conjunction with the King or his deputy as part thereof. 
When the King, at the restoration, participated this sovereignty over these his foreign dominions, 
with the lords and commons, the Colonies became in fact, the dominions of the realm – because 
subjects of the kingdom.  They came, in fact, and by actual constitutional exercise of power, under 
the authority and jurisdiction of parliament.  They became connected and annexed to the state: 
By coming as parts of the British realm, not as a separate kingdom (which is the case of Ireland) 
under subjection to the parliament, they became participants of the rights and liberties on which 
the power of parliament is founded.
109
 
In other words, Pownall has here somewhat pre-empted later historians’ discussion on the 
nature of the American Revolution.  The reasons now stated, and stated by Pownall, revolve 
around a clash of sovereignty.  This clash came, in effect, from a misunderstanding of the 
nature of politics and the constitution on each side of the Atlantic: the events of the English 
Civil Wars, the Glorious Revolution and the Hanoverian succession in Britain had instilled a 
sense of governance by the King-in-Parliament; while, in America, these events had not 
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caused the same seismic shift in constitutional theory and, so, the Americans failed to see 
themselves as subject to Whitehall.  Pownall’s own opinion was, however, perfectly clear: 
he believed that all parts of the British Empire – America included – were subject to the 
power and authority of Parliament, although he thought that there were perhaps certain 
limitations to this power given the nature of the American situation. 
Having concluded that Americans were part of the realm, and therefore under the authority 
and jurisdiction of Parliament, Pownall then moved on to discuss the issues of 
representation.  He believed, quite simply, that the Americans ought to be represented in 
Parliament.  The colonies, Pownall stated, ought ‘to have knights and burgesses in 
parliament, of their own election, to represent the condition of their country’.
110
  This right 
to representation was, he believed, both an established tenet of the British constitution and 
a natural right, and ought therefore to be given to the Americans.  Any idea of ‘virtual 
representation’ was dismissed by Pownall as unworkable and unconstitutional; there 
should, instead, be a union between America and Britain in the same manner as there was 
between Wales and England.
111
  This form of union would remove any American desires for 
independence and would secure the Anglo-American empire.  Without it, however, Pownall 
warned that the Americans would break away to form their own, American-only, union.  If 
this parliamentary union were to be secured, however, Pownall believed that his own goal 
could also be achieved: that of ‘A Grand Marine Dominion, consisting of our possessions in 
the Atlantic, and in America, united into a one Empire, in one centre, where there seat of 
Government is’.
112
 
The fourth edition was read, and partially commented upon, by Burke.  Burke appears to not 
have been a fan.
113
  The comments, which are confined to the first third of the book, show 
Burke’s attachment to the Rockingham Whigs.  Pownall’s choice of dedication to Grenville 
would have started the tract on a sour note for Burke, as the Rockingham Whig’s main 
American policy was that of opposition to Grenville.  More importantly, however, Pownall’s 
consistent attacks on party and faction, and his blaming them for all the troubles both in 
America and in Britain (Pownall states, for example, that, because of parties, ‘the mother 
country and her colonies will continue to live in perpetual jealousies, jarrings and disputes 
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[…] until some event shall happen that will totally break all union between us’)
114
 would 
significantly have alienated Burke, as he was one of the main proponents of party-politics.
115
  
Pownall’s mention of faction caused Burke to write: ‘has this paragraph [an attack on 
faction] any particular meaning?  It seems to squint at some particular set of men’ and he 
attacked Pownall’s discussion of party ‘in this loose manner’.
116
  Burke, also, probably 
believed that the ‘considerable person’ – discussed above – was Chatham and questioned 
whether this plan was the ‘key of this work’.  Burke further believed that this plan was 
inherently flawed as to ‘encourage complaints deliberately was against all sound principles 
of government, and would be simply a scheme for exciting universal ferment’.
117
 
The fifth edition, published in 1774, was released as two volumes.  The sixth, and last, 
edition, published in 1777, has almost no substantial changes from the fifth edition, and so 
both will be discussed in the following paragraphs together.  The title for these editions was 
altered to The Administration of the British Colonies.  The first volume was essentially the 
same as the previous, fourth, edition with the second volume containing an entirely new 
essay on the developing situation.  The dedication to Grenville remained at the start of the 
first volume and there was a somewhat bitter footnote added after Pownall’s discussion of 
the Secretary of State for America.  He stated: 
An office of Secretary of State for the plantations in America, was erected since the writing of the 
above, 1764.  But as it was sown in jealousy; so, in proportion as it arose to power, the resistance 
of cabinet faction obstructed it at home, and nursed up opposition to it abroad.  To this an 
impractical line of conduct, mistaken for system, and an unhappy tone of government 
misunderstood for firmness, gave ample scope; so that the last state of this unfortunate 
government became worse than the first.  1772.
118
 
The second volume contains Pownall’s appraisal of the situation and discussion of his earlier 
editions.  This volume is uncomfortable to read: Pownall’s disappointment, resentment and 
bitterness, at both the politicians in Britain and the radicals in America, pour off every page.  
Pownall said, for example: ‘I feel that I shall not be approved by many of my countrymen; 
and I am sure I shall be extremely disapproved by the Americans’ and makes no attempt to 
hide his disgust at the handling of colonial affairs by Britons.
119
  The second volume spent a 
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lot of time praising the course of action proposed in his earlier editions and attempted to 
quantify and qualify Pownall’s position regarding the governance of the colonies.   
Any attempts at promoting a Grand Marine Dominion are abandoned by Pownall here; he 
appears to have lost all hope in any kind of reasonable or appropriate – in his eyes – 
settlement.  He warns early on: ‘if we are to treat, there must be some line to which our 
negotiations have reference: if we are to fight, there must be some line which shall bound 
and be the end even of our victories’.
120
  Similarly, he warns that government must make 
sure not to give any concessions of the rights of Britons as it would be a ‘seducing and 
betraying spirit’ resulting in ‘nothing being gained [and] every thing [being] lost by such 
concessions’.
121
  The major thrust of this volume can be easily summed up from the 
following quote: ‘I wish,’ said Pownall, ‘the government of this country to define its own 
rights; and standing on that sure ground, to acknowledge those of others.  I wish the people 
of America, as they love liberty, so to honour true government, which is the only basis on 
which real liberty can stand: and in that line to see peace’.
122
 
Pownall again reiterated his belief that some form of parliamentary union should take place 
between Britain and the Americas.  He had, however, simplified the process and granted 
more powers to the Americans by 1774.  Any attempt at including the Americans in the 
business of Westminster was ruled out and, in their place, a ‘federal’ system of government 
should be established.  Pownall maintained that he did not believe the Americans wished to 
establish separate ‘national government’ and proposed that the colonial legislatures should 
be ‘free and sovereign […] within the limits of its own jurisdiction’.
123
  In all cases outside this 
jurisdiction, the Parliament of Great Britain was to be sovereign.  Pownall was aware that 
this continued form of subjugation, or subordination, would not sit well with many of the 
more radical Americans and so he tried to soothe the blow by adding that Parliament could 
only intervene if the constitution itself was under attack by the colonial legislatures.
124
   
In other words, Pownall’s Grand Marine Dominion had changed from a great union of the 
Anglophone peoples spread around the Atlantic sharing, through the British constitution, 
liberty, freedom and the right to elect representatives to a desperate attempt to return to 
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the pre-1763 situation of salutary neglect.  Realising that the Americans would be likely to 
break away in some fashion, Pownall pleaded that the British government should have the 
foresight and the determination to maintain the ties and links of old.  ‘If Great Britain and 
her Colonies,’ he says, ‘are come to that dreadful crisis, that they no longer remain on their 
old standing: if there cannot be a British union: may the Americans see and be convinced, 
that the safest and happiest form of an American union, is that whereof a British 
Stadtholder, a Lieutenant of the Crown […] and may Britain have the temper, the spirit, and 
the wisdom, to take such a lead!’.
125
 
The various editions of the Administration of the Colonies provides us with an insight both 
into Pownall’s deteriorating opinion of, and regard for, his fellow politicians and the political 
establishment, and also into his ideas of empire.  The changing nature of the editions – from 
a relatively short and vague treatise on the broad principles of colonial governance to 
multiple volumes of detailed information on the colonies and how to run them – shows us 
the growth in Pownall’s ambitions and in his goals for the British Empire.  The desperation in 
his final editions, and the pleas for peace and understanding, reveal a man frantically trying 
to hold his ideals together, and blaming politicians, political parties and the selfish nature of 
humankind for their failure.   
The editions are, nonetheless, an exceptionally valuable resource on the nature of empire in 
the eighteenth century.  It is hard not to draw parallels between Pownall’s latter discussion 
of federal sovereignty – of various assemblies connected throughout the British Empire by a 
common culture and all subordinate to the Imperial Crown – to the eventual settlement of 
the Commonwealth of Nations in the twentieth century.  That said, however, we must bear 
in mind that the eighteenth century provided a different set of circumstances and that, 
perhaps more than anything else, Pownall’s pleas in this regard with the utterances of a 
desperate, and despairing, man trying to secure in any way possible the continuing 
attachment of the American colonies to the United Kingdom. 
‘Honour of the Crown and Nation’: Three Memorials Most Humbly Addressed to 
the Sovereigns of Europe, Great Britain, and North America 
The three memorials in this pamphlet were also published separately as A Memorial Most 
Humbly Addressed to the Sovereigns of Europe, on the Present State of Affairs between the 
                                                 
125
 Ibid., II. 86-7. 
  
139 
 
Old and New World; A Memorial Addressed to the Sovereigns of America; and Two 
Memorials, Not Originally Intended for Publication, Now Published; with an Explanatory 
Preface.
 126
  The content of each was replicated in the Three Memorials Most Humbly 
Addressed to the Sovereigns of Europe, Great Britain, and North America with the addition 
of a new preface outlining Pownall’s own view of his publication and political history.
127
  
These pamphlets are quite a challenge to read and they suffer quite badly from Pownall’s 
usual lack of flair.  So bad are parts of it, in fact, that a ‘translation’ of the Memorial to the 
Sovereigns of Europe was written after its publication.
128
  The translation explains that as 
there ‘are so many quaint words, and dark expressions, intermixed with so many good 
thoughts and so much knowledge of America […] it seems worth translating [into intelligible 
English]’.
129
  The translation does exceptionally well to put Pownall’s ideas into a more 
coherent and easy to understand fashion.  It does, however, leave out much of Pownall’s 
discussion for a proposed European council of trade and commerce which was to deal with 
the ramifications of American independence and, therefore, somewhat misses the thrust of 
Pownall’s work.  Nonetheless, the translation opened up to the ordinary reader a more 
accessible alternative. 
Although the authorship of the first Memorial is not for certain, the similarity of ideas and 
the extensive quotes from the various editions of the Administration of the Colonies, along 
with the typical Pownall style, mean that the authorship is – and was – easy to pin down.  
The pamphlet began by stating that American independence was a foregone conclusion and 
that even the military might of Great Britain could not stop the eventual independence of 
the American peoples.  Pownall, here, used his faithful Newtonian principles of gravity to 
discuss politics and international relations: 
North America is become a new primary planet in the system of the world, which while it takes its 
own course, in its own orbit, must have effect on the orbit of every other planet, and shift the 
common centre of gravity of the whole system of the European world. 
North-America is de facto an INDEPENDENT POWER which has taken its equal station with other 
powers, and must be so de jure.  The politicians of the Governments of Europe may reason or 
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negociate [sic] upon this idea, as a matter sub lite.  The powers of those Governments may fight 
about it as a new Power coming into establishment; such negociations, and such wars, are of no 
consequence either of the right or the fact.  It would be just as wise, and effectual, if they were to 
go to war to decide, or set on foot negociations to settle, to whom the future sovereignty of the 
moon should belong.  The moon hath been long common to them all, and they may all in their 
turns profit of her reflected light.  The independence of America is fixed as fate; she is the mistress 
of her own fortune; knows that she is so, and will actuate that power which she feels she hath, so 
as to establish her own system and change the system of Europe.
130
 
Pownall’s opinions here are hardly hidden: he believes that America will, and ought, to be 
independent and, perhaps more significantly, shows a somewhat republican leaning.  His 
attacks on the ‘European system’ appear as a veiled attack on monarchy in general and he 
believed that the American Revolution would be the starting point for a much more 
widespread World Revolution, dramatically altering the systems of governance and trade, 
and the basis of society, in its wake. 
Pownall further urged European leaders to consider the economic situation of the Americas: 
the land seemed to supply almost boundless amounts of natural resources which would, 
Pownall suggested, make the Americans flourish and enable them to flood the European 
markets with cheap goods.  Perhaps more importantly, however, Pownall viewed Southern 
America as the greater resource to mankind.  Although held back by ‘political immaturity’, 
the resources of the southern continent would provide, Pownall thought, humanity with an 
even greater wealth of resources.  The eventual revolution of South America against Spain 
would not ‘be after the manner or in the form of that of North America’ which created a 
‘Democratick or Aristocratick Republick’.  Rather, Pownall established, ‘The falling off of 
South America will be conducted, in its natural progress, by the spirit of some enterprising 
Genius, taking the lead of a sense of alienation and a disposition of revolt, to the 
establishment of a great Monarchy’.
131
 
The American people, Pownall established, were also different from their European 
brethren.  Common Americans were, unlike Europeans, able to choose their occupation, to 
possess often large amounts of land, and to reap the benefits of their own hard work.  The 
Americans were, unlike Europeans, therefore naturally suited to the creation of a new 
nation.  The versatility of their abilities, and their keen interest in learning new ways and 
means to ease the difficulty of their frontier lives, meant that Americans would be able to 
create ‘an abundance of statesmen and philosophers, artisans and farmers, shipbuilders and 
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merchants, and other kind of occupations which the new nation would need’.
132
  Similarly, 
the American population had seen extraordinary growth while under British control and 
Pownall saw no reason for this to end.  As a result, while Europeans suffered under 
starvation, deprivation and poor living conditions, the American population would be able to 
expand, leading to a great pool of resources in the New World.   
The gist of Pownall’s message in this pamphlet was of trying to promote the idea of a new, 
and a powerful, American nation.  Pownall again used the planetary metaphor to describe 
the American situation but, this time, took it further, stating: 
If I were to address myself to a philosopher, upon a supposed adventitious state of the planetary 
system, and ask him, whether, if an accretion of matter should enlarge any satellite till it grew into 
magnitude, which balanced with its primary; whether that globe, so encreased, could any longer 
be held by any of the powers of nature in the orbit of a secondary planet; or whether any external 
force could hold it thus restrained, he will answer me directly, No.  If I ask the father of a family, 
after his son has grown up to a man’s estate, to full strength of body equal to the parent, to full 
power of mind and vigour of reason; whether he can be held in the same subordinate pupillage, 
and will suffer himself to be treated, under correction, as aforetime in his childhood?  The father 
will be sorry to be asked the question, and will wish to evade it; but he must answer, No.  Yet, if I 
ask an European politician, who learns by hearsay, and thinks by habit, and who supposes of 
course that things must go on, as they have always gone on; whether if North America, grown up, 
by a distinct and independent interest in their economy and commerce, to a magnitude in nature, 
policy, and power, will remain dependent upon, and be governed by, any of the metropolitan 
states on the other side of the globe; he will confidently say, Yes.  
Pownall’s message here is clear enough: contrary to the flawed opinions of unreasonable 
and out of touch politicians (note here that the attacks on politicians continued from the 
earlier editions of the Administration of the Colonies), the Americans had grown to full 
capacity and could no longer, under any circumstances, be controlled by any European 
power. 
Lastly, in order to promote a sense of cohesion and peace amongst the peoples of the Old 
and New World, Pownall suggested a complete reordering of the basis on which 
international trade and relations were carried out.  As in the first edition of the 
Administration of the Colonies, Pownall does not go into any details; instead, he set out a 
plan, in general terms, which would see Europeans – and all Europeans – and Americans 
trading peacefully to the benefit of all.  Pownall therefore proposed a general council to 
regulate and control the sinews of trade and power: although this council, in Pownall’s 
design, would be politically powerless (as he was apt to realise that, at least in the 
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eighteenth century, such a thing was impossible) he saw the value ‘of deliberation and 
advice, and a seat of judicial administration common to all’.
133
  This council would have the 
ability to establish a ‘Great and General Court of Admiralty’ which would be able to enforce 
the trade and commerce regulations of the Atlantic World.  Perhaps most importantly in 
Pownall’s view, however, was the fact that this general council would be able to prevent ‘a 
most dreadful general war’.
134
 
The memorials of the 1780s show us a desperate and disconnected man.  Pownall had lost 
all faith in the British political system and had mostly withdrawn to write his essays and 
tracts.  The memorials do not provide us with the same insight into the colonies, colonial 
management and the British political view of America as the earlier Administration of the 
Colonies did, mostly because of Pownall’s alienation from the real political world.  They are, 
as much as anything else, a flight of fancy and detail Pownall’s idealised hopes and 
ambitions for whatever could be salvaged from his Grand Marine Dominion.    
Conclusion 
The works of Bacon and Pownall provide the historian with a unique insight into the ways in 
which men with strong connexions to, and impressions of, the Americas sought to solve the 
imperial crises of the 1760s and 70s.  These men were not alone in this position – men such 
as James Abercromby, Francis Bernard and John Mitchell wrote on similarly from a position 
of experience and authority on Britain’s empire – but their attempts to reshape the empire 
along lines they thought more sensible provide us with a lens through which to view their 
ideas of empire.   
Pownall’s editions of the Administration of the Colonies, and the fact he updated them 
throughout the period leading up to the American Revolution, are an excellent account of 
the shifting grounds of understanding between Britons and Americans.  As was the situation 
in Parliament, Pownall’s first-hand experience of the colonies meant that his views were 
shaped very much by events in the 1750s and early 1760s.  By the time of the mid-1770s, 
Pownall could no longer claim to have direct and personal experience of the empire, and 
this lacking knowledge shone through. 
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More than that, the ways in which both Bacon and Pownall viewed North America’s past 
influenced their view of their situation.  Both these men believed that the reasons for the 
disagreement were because of a lacking central authority.  As Bacon put it, ‘the very Term of 
the Mother-Country will remind your Lordships that (however disobedient) they are her 
Children’ implied that something had been lost between America and Britain, and that 
Britain needed to regain and restore it in order to once more fully govern the Americas.  
What they failed to realise was that there was never a ‘golden age’ of imperial authority 
over the American colonies and that this very interpretation was partly what caused the 
breakdown in Anglo-American understanding. 
That said, however, we must not diminish the attempts made by both of these men to 
improve and regulate their empire.  Pownall’s dedication to his subject cannot be doubted, 
while Bacon’s attempts – notably in his letter to the Duke of Grafton – to restructure the 
politics and reinforce the societal make-up of the empire are noteworthy and praiseworthy.  
Perhaps with more men capable of such thought, and educated in the ways of the 
Americans, the Anglo-American relationship could have been a very different one in the 
later eighteenth century.  
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CHAPTER IV 
A N  E M P I R E  O F  L I B E R T Y ?   T H E  B R I T I S H  A T L A N T I C  W O R L D   
‘The rulers of Great Britain have,’ said Adam Smith, ‘for more than a century past, amused 
the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the 
Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only’.  The empire, he 
continued, had ‘hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an empire ; not a gold mine, 
but the project of a gold mine ; a project which has cost, which continues to cost, and which, 
if pursued in the same way as it has been hitherto, is likely to cost immense expence, 
without being likely to bring any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony trade, 
it has been shewn, are, to the great body of the people, mere loss instead of profit’.  In 
order to avoid such a loss of profit, Smith urged: ‘It is surely now time that our rulers should 
either realize this golden dream, in which they have been indulging themselves, perhaps, as 
well as the people; or that they should awake from it themselves, and endeavour to awaken 
the people. If the project cannot be completed, it ought to be given up. If any of the 
provinces of the British empire cannot be made to contribute towards the support of the 
whole empire, it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expence of 
defending those provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part of their civil or military 
establishments in time of peace, and endeavour to accommodate her future views and 
designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances’.
1
 
Smith wrote these words as the British Empire in North America started to crumble.  The 
basis on which Anglo-American relations had existed since the establishment of Virginia as 
the first successful English colony had by this point, in 1776, ceased to exist.  The division in 
the British Empire was not, however, a natural one or one which was the logical conclusion 
after the settlement of America.  Quite the opposite, in fact: the collapse of British 
legitimacy and authority over the thirteen colonies marked the ending point of a world 
which had existed for almost two hundred years.  As Bailyn succinctly phrased it: ‘the birth 
of the American nation-states in the independence movements of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries was not the goal toward[s] which Atlantic history had been 
inevitably trending, but the opposite: it marks not the fulfilment but the demise of the world 
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that had gone before’.
2
  The American Revolution, contrary to earlier nationalistic 
historiography on the topic, cannot be seen as simply the obvious outcome of an inherent 
American demand for liberty in response to British tyranny. 
The problems between Americans and Britons stemmed from a misunderstanding of the 
role of the central authority – Parliament – throughout the empire.  This lack of appreciation 
for the role of Parliament stemmed from the ways in which the colonies had been 
established throughout the seventeenth century.  The ‘coercive and centralised model of 
imperial organisation derived from late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century empires’ 
which had been the lens through which we had tried to view the First British Empire does 
not stand up to investigation.  Rather, the colonies and the colonial make-up were ‘very 
much reflections or logical extensions of the states to which they were symbolically 
attached.  Those states were not modern states’.  Therefore, while our understanding of the 
process of colonisation depicts a one-way extension of authority (of state-sanctioned 
colonisers extending the reach of the European metropolitan centre), the spread of 
authority, as Jack Greene shows, is characterised by two phases.  ‘The first,’ he established, 
‘involved the creation in America, through the activities of the participants in the colonising 
process, of new arenas of individual and local power’ while the second involved ‘the actual 
creation of authority through negotiation between those new arenas and the European 
centres that aspired to bring them under their jurisdiction and to which those arenas 
desired to be attached’.
3
 
This initial lack of metropolitan authority or involvement was due to four factors.  Firstly, 
early modern European states simply lacked the resources to colonise in this manner: 
colonisation was an expensive and resource-intensive process which the various European 
states could not afford.  Secondly, the distances involved between America and Europe 
made effective centralised control almost impossible.  ‘The European colonies in America,’ 
as Adam Smith noted, were vastly ‘more remote than the most distant provinces of the 
greatest empires which had ever been known before’.
4
  Thirdly, the ‘economic orientation’ 
of the colonising process remained popular in the metropolitan centres.  While there were 
some attempts to Christianise Native Americas and the idea of creating a ‘New Jerusalem in 
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America was a prominent aspiration for the settlers of the orthodox Puritan colonies’, the 
major incentive for those exploring and colonising the New World remained solely economic 
and mercantile.  Metropolitan centres were, therefore, only too happy to receive the 
benefits provided by the endeavours of those enterprising merchants.  Finally, ‘participants 
in colonial enterprises everywhere revealed a profound desire to retain a connection to 
their respective metropolitan heritages’ and were, as a result, no threat to the European 
powers.
5
 
As the colonies became increasingly wealthy and successful, European governments sought 
to standardise relations and improve and increase their control systems over the myriad 
colonies and settlements throughout the New World.  Iberian powers, having stumbled 
across vast stores of natural wealth in Southern America, had less difficultly in extending the 
central metropolitan authority.  British North America was quite different, however, with no 
quick-fixes of bullion; rather, the wealth of the British Empire came from the ability of the 
colonies to work as suppliers of natural resources (wood, tobacco, sugar, cotton and so on) 
and as avid collectors of manufactured goods.  As a result, before 1730 all of the British 
colonies in America and seven of the eight colonies in the West Indies (Jamaica had been 
conquered from the Spanish after the result of a government effort) were ‘the result of 
private initiatives or chartered companies or individuals or groups of landed proprietors’.
6
 
The British ministries throughout the 1760s and 70s were not the first to attempt to 
regulate and control American governance.  The latter part of the seventeenth century had 
seen a concerted, if unsuccessful, attempt to extend the political authority over the 
American colonies with, for example, the creation of the Dominion of New England, which 
was to be governed by no representative institutions.
7
  The basic premise was, quite simply, 
that ‘the colonies were not simply commercial enterprises in the service of the metropole 
but also adjuncts of royal power [and might therefore] be governed from London directly, 
not through local colonial institutions indirectly’.
8
  The policy was ultimately abandoned and 
only again taken up by ministers – asserting now that the King-in-Parliament had sole and 
                                                 
5
 Greene, ‘Transatlantic Colonization’, pp. 269-70. 
6
 Ibid., p. 272. 
7
 See, V. Barnes, The Dominion of New England: A Study in British Colonial Policy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1923); J. Conforti, Saints and Strangers: New England in British North America 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006); and, J. Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King: Indians, 
English and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2005). 
8
 Greene, ‘Transatlantic Colonization’, pp. 272-3.  His emphasis. 
  
147 
 
legitimate authority – after the end of the Seven Years War.  What is significant about this is 
that, rather than an extension of the metropolitan’s central control, imperial authority in the 
eighteenth century was based on negotiation between centre and periphery; between the 
colonies and the metropole. 
There were similar tension points about the precise nature of the British Empire at this 
time.
9
  Thomas Jefferson argued in 1774 that the colonists were right to resist Parliamentary 
legislation and taxation because Britain had no imperium over Americans, except for that 
which the dominion established by the colonists themselves.
10
  That is to say, while the 
colonies were part of the extended authority of the British state – and were thereby part of 
the dominion of Great Britain – the imperial authority was limited by the varying 
jurisdictions of King-in-Parliament and the colonial legislatures.  Parliament’s imperium 
extended ‘only to the shore of North America [and was articulated] as a constitutional 
principle the division between the territorial and oceanic peripheries, between the 
jurisdiction of the Crown-in-Parliament and the jurisdiction of colonial governments’.
11
 
This type of disagreement over how the empire should be composed – be it territorial or 
oceanic – formed part of a debate which had been central to British and English politics for a 
century.
12
  The events of the Seven Years War and colonial relations in India since the 1740s, 
however, proved to many in Britain the need for a greater territorial empire in North 
America and for increased central and imperial authority in the American continent (with, 
for example, the establishment of Native American superintendents, William Johnson and 
John Stuart; and the varying issues of authority and control between colonial governors and 
assemblies, and the Commander-in-Chief of the British Armed Forces in North America).   
The decision to maintain a significant proportion of the army in North America in 1763 
formed part of this more expansive and territorial British view of empire.  The expense of 
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the Seven Years War and the belief that the Treaty of Paris (1763) provided merely a short 
respite from colonial and inter-imperial warfare meant that the decision to protect the 
colonies was made easily by the British.  The intention was, as Grenville noted during the 
debates on the Stamp Bill, to place North America on as secure and stable a footing as was 
possible so that when the Catholic powers again attacked, Britain could rely on a blue water 
policy alone to defeat France and Spain.  One pamphleteer asked: ‘Should the Enemy 
presume, in future, to disturb our legal Possession in any Quarter of the Globe, with what 
Facility we may pour Vengeance upon them, when our American Continent [is] conveniently 
placed … to controul the Islands of the West-Indies?, and another stated that ‘the many new 
countries in America, added to what we formerly had, will in Time secure us from the future 
Insult of France or Spain’.
13
   
The establishing of a large army in North America, along with the British maritime control of 
the Atlantic, would mean that Britain would have the power to ‘wage another war with 
equal efficacy, and with infinitely less expence’.  Importantly, Grenville’s move to tax the 
colonists directly put an end to the ‘age of treaties and guarantees’ and the ‘subsidies, 
extras, quotas, and dedommagements [compensation]’ – the policy which had been 
adopted by the Whigs since the Glorious Revolution and which was seen to tie Britain 
unnaturally to the European continent, and especially Hanover – and replace it with ‘the 
resources of a strict oeconomy’.
14
  That the British constitution, British political norms and 
British systems might not apply as effectively to the American situation seems not to have 
crossed the minds of many British politicians at this time.  It was in this theme that Sir 
Francis Bernard reminded the Massachusetts Assembly in 1765: 
In an empire, extended and diversified as that of Great Britain, there must be a supreme 
legislature, to which all other powers must be subordinate.  It is our happiness that the supreme 
legislature, the parliament of Great Britain, is the sanctuary of liberty and justice; and that the 
prince, who presides over it, realises the idea of a patriot King.  Surely then, we should submit our 
opinions to the determinations of so august a body; and acquiesce in a perfect confidence, that 
the rights of the members of the British empire will ever be safe in the hands of the conservators 
of the liberty of the whole.
15
 
The Americans did not agree with these new interpretations of empire, however.  To the 
Americans, the control of trade through the Navigation Acts worked as both the symbol of 
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British authority (the imperium over the seas and over trade, and solely dominion over the 
colonies) and as sufficient payment to meet the empire’s needs.  James Otis proclaimed that 
his one wish was to ‘see Great-Britain at the head of the world, and to see my King, under 
God, the father of mankind’ and John Dickinson stated that ‘every drop of blood in my heart 
is British’.  Dickinson stated moreover that the Navigation Acts and monopoly of trade 
meant that ‘they [the colonies] eventually contribute very largely to all supplies granted 
there to the crown’.  Similarly, John Morgan wrote in 1766: 
The whole trade of America to all parts of the globe employs, one year with another, above two 
thousand sail of English ships, by which treasures of greater wealth are conveyed to Britain, than 
are derived [by Spain] from Mexico or Peru… From the commodities of America, chiefly 
manufactured in England, and conveyed through innumerable channels of trade to every quarter 
of the globe, Great-Britain acquires immense wealth, keeps up a spirit of industry among her 
inhabitants, and is enabled to support mighty fleets, great in peace and formidable in war.
16
 
The distinction remained, however, between maintaining British authority over the seas and 
not the colonies: ‘As long as this globe continues moving,’ wrote Dickinson in 1766, ‘may 
[Great Britain] reign over its navigable parts and may she resemble the ocean she 
commands, which recruits without wasting, and receives without exhausting’. 
‘The Rule of Conduct on this Occasion’ 
In this light, the varying interpretations of British North America put forth by the American 
MPs must be judged.  Jackson’s communications with Franklin provide the most illumination 
on his views of empire.  He believed that local colonial banks – with the same, or similar 
authority as the Bank of England – ought to be established in each colony as it would 
‘provide an Ample Fund not only for the Publick Services to which the Interest of your 
subsisting Loans are appropriated, but for the carrying into full execution all those 
Beneficent views, at this time entertained among you’.
17
  While Jackson opposed the idea of 
paper currency in the colonies under the system then in operation – because it could be 
‘liable to sudden Changes of value [and] must necessarily subject Buyers & Sells, Creditors & 
Debtors to Risques which if they be unnecessary out to be removed’ - he believed that a 
colonial bank, which used gold and silver to support the value of the currency, would enable 
the colonists to far better maintain their economy without involving the British government 
in ineffective micro-management.  To counter claims that establishing a bank would lead to 
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gold and silver being stored in the colonies and not providing any benefit to the empire as a 
whole, Jackson wrote: 
But it is said Gold & Silver will not stay in the Country, for that the Balance is against it & this Case 
is by no means inconsistent with the Condition of a Thriving Infant State, for Every State is Thrifty 
that Superlucrates [sic], but if the Increase of Stock, the Improvement of Lands & Efficiencies 
produces a much greater Income the whole Superlucration [profit] may be expended this way 
together with a Debt, that may augment every year & get the Country more able to support it; 
indeed where there is best Industry & Credit it must be so.
18
 
He similarly opposed any attempts to militarise the British Empire any further than was 
necessary, and thought that a ‘small army with ample means to support it, is of greater 
force than one more numerous, with less’.  In order to achieve this state of affairs, the 
British Empire must have ‘means of supporting armies, and, consequently, the power of 
exerting external strength’.  The best way to able to do this, and carry forth British strength, 
thought Jackson, was ‘in the industry and frugality of the body of a people living under a 
government and laws that encourage commerce, for commerce is at this day almost the 
only stimulus that forces every one to contribute a share of labour for the publick benefit’.  
Maintaining any troops in the colonies would be a waste of money and effort, would be 
resented in the colonies and would be ‘for the most part maintained for the Interests of 
G[reat] Britain only’.
19
 
Jackson maintained, however, that Parliament ought to be the ‘Universal Legislature of the 
British Dominions & must be so unless it be contended either that the British Dominions do 
not form one Intire State or that there is some other Universal Legislature’.  Parliament 
ought, however, to maintain ‘Moderation & even Abstinence, because the same Wisdom & 
Discretion that always governs the Proceedings of Parl[iamen]t have prescribed Moderation 
& Abstinence in those Cases’.  He concluded: ‘it is on this Principle, that I have argued that 
Parliament should not impose internal Taxes on America, not that Parl[iamen]t has not an 
universal & unlimited Power, but that Parl[iamen]t for its own Sake & the Welfare of all the 
British Dominions will wish that Assemblies may continue in America, (which they will hardly 
do if there be no occasion to call them together) until they supply their place by calling 
Members from America & that the People of the Colonys may from thence derive a 
Confidence in the Legislature that is essential to the well being of Gov[ernmen]t’.
20
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On the issue of Parliament’s role in the empire, most of the other American MPs appear to 
have agreed.  They all believed that Parliament was the true and sole universal legislature 
for the entire empire, but their views on the extent to which the powers of this universal 
legislature ought to extend differed quite dramatically.  Barré believed, like his fellow 
Chathamites, that Parliament had the right to tax America but should not, in practice, 
extend such an authority.  Parliament’s right and authority, he claimed, ‘should be 
acknowledged’ but at the same time, Britain had to take every step possible ‘not to destroy 
industry there, or drive them to a species of industry, which might hurt us’.
21
  The line of 
policy so far as Barré saw it remained clear: the right to tax America lay ultimately with 
Parliament; the ‘rightness’ in doing so, however, did not and would not.  Therefore, while 
Parliament could tax the colonies, it ought not to for the sake of the empire as a whole. 
Burke through similarly to Barré.  He acknowledged that Parliament was the supreme body 
in the empire, but thought that the actions should be checked to take into account the 
political realities of the situation.  ‘Sovereignty, Burke understood, was absolute in principle.  
This fact, however, did not in any sense modify the imprudence of trying to make its actions 
boundless and irresponsible.’
22
  ‘An Englishman,’ Burke said, ‘must be subordinate to 
England, but he must be governed according to the opinion of a free land.  Without 
subordination, it would not be one Empire.  Without freedom, it would not be the British 
Empire’.
23
    
This speculative Idea of a right [being] deduced from the unlimited Nature of the supreme 
legislative authority, [is] very clear and very undeniable, but, when explained and proved and 
admitted [it is] little to the purpose. The Practical, executive, exertion of this Right may be 
impracticable, may be inequitable and may be contrary to the Genius and Spirit even of the 
Constitution which gives this right at least contrary to the principles of Liberty. This Practical Idea 
of the Constitution of the British Empire to be deduced from the general and relative Situation of 
its parts[...] It must be governed upon the principles of Freedom.
24
 
Pownall agreed that Parliament was supreme in all cases whatsoever.  The issue of 
Parliamentary sovereignty was, for him, quite clear-cut.  Parliament should be the body 
which ‘animates the whole’ and which works as a mother Parliament, ensuring the various 
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colonial assemblies work in unison towards the overall benefit of the empire.  In this way, 
thought Pownall, a system of confederacy might be considered appropriate.  He objected to 
the haphazard way in which the empire worked, and sought to standardise inter-colonial 
and intra-imperial relations.  He wanted to ensure that all claims of Parliamentary 
supremacy remained ‘consistent with the very liberty that the colonies require, demand, 
claim [and w]hich a set of freemen ought to have’.
25
  Pownall’s view of the constitutional 
situation of the colonies remained clear throughout the 1760s and early 70s: 
When the King, at the restoration, participated this sovereignty over these his foreign dominions, 
with the lords and commons, the Colonies became in fact, the dominions of the realm – became 
subjects of the kingdom.  They came, in fact, and by actual constitutional exercise of power, under 
the authority and jurisdiction of parliament.  They became connected and annexed to the state: 
By coming as parts of the British realm, not as a separate kingdom (which is the case of Ireland) 
under subjection to the parliament, they became participants of the rights and liberties on which 
the power of parliament is founded.
26
 
Pownall agreed on this principle with Jackson: Americans ought to send MPs to represent 
them in Parliament.  Neither man went into any details as to how this might be 
accomplished practically, but they both believed that it was the best way to maintain 
American liberty.  Barré disagreed on a practical note: ‘The idea of a representative from 
that country is dangerous, absurd and impracticable.  They will grow more numerous than 
we are, and then how inconvenient and dangerous would it be to have representative of 7 
millions there meet the representatives of 7 millions here’.
27
  Bacon’s view was even further 
from that of Pownall and Burke.  He stated dryly that: ‘I must beg them to observe, that as 
they are colonies, and not kingdoms, they can be no more than virtually represented: and 
this they now are, being included in the commons as members of the kingdom of Great 
Britain’.
28
     
Burke and Pownall, however, disagreed over the nature of the empire itself and the basics 
of its constitution.  While Pownall advocated a Grand Marine Dominion – and a union 
formed between the varying parts of the British Empire to form one coherent whole – Burke 
believed this to be a route to tyranny.  Burke believed that the various colonies could not 
feasibly be attached to the realm and Kingdom of Great Britain.  Rather, while Westminster 
remained supreme in all cases, the empire had, in order to function, to maintain the system 
of diversified subjection: 
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Perhaps, Sir, I am mistaken in my idea of an empire, as distinguished from a single state or 
kingdom. But my idea of it is this; that an empire is the aggregate of many states under one 
common head; whether this head be a Monarch, or a presiding republick. It does, in such 
constitutions, frequently happen (and nothing but the dismal, cold, dead uniformity of servitude 
can prevent its happening) that the subordinate parts have many local privileges and immunities. 
Between these privileges and the supreme common authority the line may be extremely fine. Of 
course disputes, often too, very bitter disputes, and much ill blood will arise. But though every 
privilege is an exemption (in the case) from the ordinary exercise of the supreme authority, it is no 
denial of it. The claim of a privilege seems rather, ex vi termini, to imply a superior power.
29
 
On the issue of the central role of Parliament throughout the empire, even the American 
MPs could not agree on a course of action.  While they all agreed that Parliament ought to 
be supreme and at the head of the empire, the varying ways in which it should or should not 
become involved in colonial politics and imperial management put forth by these men 
provides a snapshot of just how difficult this problem was in the eighteenth century.   
Burke had the most realistic understanding of the nature and situation of the empire, while 
Pownall’s was perhaps the most unreasonable.  The basis of Pownall’s mistake was in the 
assumption that ‘the very word colony implied subordination’.  Pownall was not alone in 
thinking along these lines: several men with wide-ranging experience of colonial 
government, including James Abercromby, Henry McCulloh, Archibald Kennedy, William 
Bollan, William Douglass, Malachy Postlethwayt, Francis Bernard, Henry Ellis and John 
Mitchell all thought similarly.
30
  These men, and Pownall, believed that the empire had been 
built initially through the extension of direct and accountable metropolitan control.  Their 
situation had developed as a result of the ‘prevalence of self-interested behaviour among 
the colonists, the size and diversity of the empire, the growing wealth and populations of 
the colonies, and, most important, metropolitan neglect’.
31
  They therefore believed that by 
‘fixing’ such problems, through direct central control and the removal of local liberties, 
charters and practices, the empire could be made to be a stronger, more powerful, and 
united force in world affairs.  Burke was to realise that this ‘new Colony system’, which 
aimed to render ‘government powerful and paramount over the several dependencies of 
the British Empire’ was not the ways in which the British Empire was organised and run, 
sought to overturn the ‘ancient system of governing the colonies’ and ignored the principle 
that ‘Liberty and Commerce’ formed the ‘true Basis of its Power’.
32
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The central issue over Parliament’s authority and jurisdiction was, of course, taxation.  On 
this topic, the MPs were generally more coherent.  Most agreed with Pownall that ‘it will not 
bear a doubt but that the supreme legislature of Great Britain is the true and perfect 
representative of Great Britain, and all its dependencies’ but that ‘as it is not in the power of 
the House of Lords or Commons to exempt any community from the jurisdiction of the King, 
as supreme magistrate, so that it is not, nor ever was, or could be in the power of the crown, 
to exempt any persons or communities within the dominions of Great Britain from being 
subject and liable to be taxed by parliament’.
33
  That said, however, the MPs thought that 
the taxes ought to be laid ‘with the utmost delicacy and regard to the colonies’ power of 
taxing themselves’, if they were to be laid at all.
34
 
With regards to colonial taxation and the limits of Parliament’s authority over the colonies, 
Jackson was quite clear.  All laws, he thought, should be ‘built on a foundation consistent 
with the Constitutions of the Colonies, & on the Principles of Relation between the Mother 
Countries & her colonies’.  Moreover, he said ‘it is not disputed that the M[othe]r Country is 
Mistress of the Trade of its Colonys, this Right has always been challenged & exercised by 
England & all other Countries, the M[othe]r C[ountry] may prohibit foreign Trade, it may 
therefore tax it.  And the Colonys have a Compensation, in Protection but I dread internal 
Taxes’.
35
  He stated similarly in 1764 that he had ‘long since given up all hopes of preventing 
some Parliamentary Tax to be imposed on North America’ and reaffirmed that he was ‘most 
averse to an Internal Tax’ because of ‘how far such a precedent may be extended, & I have 
frequently asked, what internal Tax they will not lay’.  The only effective and legal method of 
taxing the colonies, he believed, was through ‘customs as well as Prohibitions on Trade’ 
which had been ‘laid by England from the time of the long Parl[iamen]t [and which he] 
wish[ed] to be the Rule of Conduct on this Occasion’.
36
 
Bacon believed similarly that taxing the Americans at point, and then again through their 
trade, was a bad idea in principle.  He asked: ‘if we lay a tax upon our own manufactures 
exported to our colonies, what is this, but to injure ourselves in a double capacity?’ and 
warned ‘it serves both to discourage the Americans from trading with us in those 
commodities [glass, paper and so on]; and also (as its necessary consequence) to tie up the 
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hands of our own manufacturers’.
37
  Bacon’s point of view on this issue, as with most of his 
other contributions towards the debate over the role of Parliament, revolved around his 
being a merchant.  He sought simply to ensure the best conditions for trade throughout the 
empire, as long as those conditions benefited Britain to the maximum possible potential. 
Burke, with his usual astute understanding of the reality of the situation, established that 
the basis behind the ‘quarrel’ was the ‘subject of taxation’.  He warned the House of 
Commons that they must ‘estimate the value of the object to be conceded, [to the 
Americans on the issue of taxation] before they agree to give it up.  If they were of opinion, 
that the taxation of America could repay them their expenses, or compensate their risks, 
they ought to pursue it.  If, on the contrary, it was evident beyond all contradiction, and so 
evident as to force reiterated acknowledgements, that they never could enjoy a moment’s 
quiet as long as that matter of contention continued – it was then altogether essential to 
the preservation of their own authority in all other points, as to the liberty of America and 
the quiet of the whole empire, to give it up, with such limitations and concessions, as the 
rights of sovereignty required’.
38
  He continued: 
That the Parliament of Great Britain were not the representative but (as Lord John Cavendish had 
said, some days before, with great truth and propriety) the sovereign of America.  That the 
sovereignty was not in its nature an idea of abstract unity; but was capable of great complexity 
and infinite modifications, according to the temper of those who are to be governed, and to the 
circumstances of things; which being infinitely diversified, government ought to be adapted to 
them, and to conform itself to the nature of things, and not to endeavour to force them.  That 
although taxation was inherent in the supreme power  of society, taken as an aggregate, it did not 
follow that it must reside in any particular power in society.  That in the society of England, for 
instance, the King is sovereign; but the power of the purse is not in his hands; and this does not 
derogate from his power in those things, in which our constitution has attributed power to him.  If 
Parliament be the sovereign power of America, Parliament may, by its own act, for wise purposes, 
put the local power of the purse into other hands than its own, without disclaiming its just 
prerogative in other particulars.
39
 
Burke’s message, and his vision of empire, was simply put: Parliament might be the 
sovereign body of the empire but this did not necessarily mean that it ought to have the 
right to tax the colonists directly.  Rather, Burke held a grander view of empire: one built on 
common liberty and practice in which the many different parts, held together under the 
sovereignty of the Crown, functioned almost separately to improve the whole. 
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While the disagreements over the role played by Parliament are most obvious between 
Burke and Pownall, all of the MPs here studied agreed on the basis on which the British 
Empire ought to function.  Pownall called it his Grand Marine Dominion, Bacon regarded it 
as a trading network of connexions, and Burke believed it to be the only basis on which the 
empire could function; they all believed in the primary importance of trade and commerce.  
The basis of this type of empire was, Burke thought, ‘wholly new in the world.  It is singular: 
it is grown up to this magnitude and importance within the memory of man; nothing in 
history is parallel to it.  All the reasonings about it, that are likely to be at all solid, must be 
drawn from its actual circumstance.  In this new system, a principle of commerce, or 
artificial commerce, must predominate’.
40
 
As Pownall phrased it: ‘the spirit of commerce will become that predominant power, which 
will form the general policy, and rule the powers of Europe: and hence a grand commercial 
interest, the basis of a great commercial dominion, under the present site and 
circumstances of the world, will be formed and arise’.
41
  While all of the MPs agreed on the 
basis of British wealth, prosperity and power, they disagreed on how best to maintain and 
increase their lead.  Pownall thought that all commerce should follow the forces of political 
gravity and must thereby be centred in Britain: Britain and the British colonies, he thought, 
must not ever compete with each other in issues of trade, and Britain must maintain the 
balance of power over all colonial commercial interests.  Bacon’s view was more liberal, 
however.  He believed that ‘every facility ought also to be given to their exports’ and that ‘a 
freedom of exportation ought to be permitted, not only to the American, French and 
Spanish Islands, but also to Europe’.  Unlike stricter mercantilists, Bacon believed that some 
type of free system of trade ought to exist between Britain, its colonies and the other 
European powers.  This opening of trade routes, Bacon thought, would allow for British and 
American merchants to capitalise on their inherent superiority in issues of business and 
commerce. 
Burke summed up the ways in which a commercial empire ought to work during his speech 
on American taxation in April of 1774.  He established here that the issue of direct taxation 
of the colonists was ‘absolutely new in policy and practice’ and that it was damaging to the 
make-up of the empire as a whole.   
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By his immense capital (primarily employed, not for their benefit, but his own) they were enabled 
to proceed with their fisheries, their agriculture, their ship-building (and their trade too within the 
limits [of the Navigation Acts]), in such a manner as get the start of slow languid operations of 
unassisted nature.  This capital was a hot-bed to them.  Nothing in the history of mankind is like 
their progress.  For my part, I never cast an eye on their flourishing commerce, and their 
cultivated and commodious life, but they seem to me rather antient nations grown to perfection 
through a long series of fortunate events, and a train of successful industry, accumulating wealth 
in many centuries, than the Colonies of yesterday; than a set of miserable out-casts, a few years 
ago, not so much sent as thrown out, on the bleak and barren shore of a desolate wilderness 
three thousand miles from all civilised intercourse. 
All this was done by England, whilst England pursued trade, and forgot revenue.  You not only 
acquired commerce, but you actually created the very objects of trade in America; and by that 
creation you raised the trade of this kingdom at least four-fold.  America had the compensation of 
your capital, which made her bear her servitude.  She had another compensation, which you are 
now going to take away from her.  She had, except the commercial restraint, every characteristic 
mark of a free people in all her internal concerns.  She had the image of the British constitution.  
She had the substance.  She was taxed by her own representatives.  She chose most of her own 
magistrates.  She paid them all.  She had in effect the sole disposal of her own internal 
government.  This whole state of commercial servitude and civil liberty, taken together, is certainly 
not perfect freedom; but comparing it with the ordinary circumstances of human nature, it was an 
happy and a liberal condition. 
Whether you were right or wrong in establishing the Colonies on the principles of commercial 
monopoly, rather than on that of revenue, is at this day a problem of mere speculation.  You 
cannot have both by the same authority.  To join together the restraints of an universal internal 
and external monopoly, with an universal internal and external taxation, is an unnatural union; 
perfect uncompensated slavery.  You have long since decided for yourself and them; and you and 
they have prospered exceedingly under that decision.
42
   
A flourishing empire would be based on a vast network of trading connexions throughout 
the various parts of the empire, bringing the myriad goods and products available from the 
furthest reaches of the wilderness of the Americas to British shores.  The construction of 
that ‘lead’ – the British ability in trade – into the very core of the empire’s system, these 
men thought, would ensure continued British success and perpetual wealth. 
Atlantic Arguments; Oceanic Union 
While the various ways in which Parliament ought or ought not to become involved in the 
day-to-day management were the focus of attention throughout the Revolutionary years, a 
secondary matter remains of crucial importance.  This matter, which Burke dealt with 
effectively and which historians now look at in some depth, revolves around the connexions 
made by the many different types of people in the parts of the British Empire and how they 
felt knitted together, if they did at all.  These connexions were formed around, through, in 
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spite of, and because of the Atlantic Ocean.  It was these connexions that allowed 
Americans to participate in all the liberties of the British constitution and of Britishness, and 
which allowed the numerous complex trading networks to transport goods – both raw and 
manufactured – around the globe.  These Atlantic connexions, as David Hancock has said, 
had ‘three key attributes’ including ‘decentralisation, networks, and self-organisation’.  They 
were, in other words, controlled not by the metropolitan state, but by the individuals 
involved in the Atlantic World.
43
       
A large part, politically and socially, of how these connexions worked were in part due to the 
extension of the idea of Britishness or Englishness.  Colin Kidd has discussed similar 
expansions of the concept of Britishness onto ‘North Britons’ – Scots – in the eighteenth 
century and has discussed some of the parallels between the two.  ‘Like the peoples of other 
British “provinces”,’ he says, ‘North Britons participated in the cult of English 
constitutionalism’.  They noticed, however, the ‘hypocrisy displayed by the English on the 
subject of their much-vaunted liberty’ but nevertheless ‘retained an enthusiastic 
commitment to English institutions’ and that ‘a healthy scepticism did nothing to diminish 
the widespread sense of relief that, through the Union, Scots had, by a stroke of good 
fortune, had entailed upon them the hard-won birthrights of Englishmen’.  This applied 
similarly to those in the American colonies who claimed that they had all the rights of 
Englishmen by ‘supposed biological descent’.
44
  While they had left the British Isles, claimed 
the Americans, they had not quit the realm or left Greater Britain and therefore forfeited 
none of the rights of Englishmen.   
The British-in-Britain attitude to these claims, however, remained inconsistent.  Americans 
initially hoped that ‘the interest of Great-Britain and her colonies be ever united’ and hoped 
that colonists would ‘enjoy the freedom, and other benefits of the British constitution, to 
the latest page in history!’.  Americans and Britons had ‘the same laws, the same religion, 
the same constitution, the same feelings, sentiments, and habits […] We have these general 
benefits to defend against the rest of the world, which is hostile to all, or the greater part of 
them’.
45
  As Gould has elsewhere established, the ‘legal geography’ of the Atlantic World 
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differed across the British Empire.
46
  What was considered to be acceptable – legal or illegal 
– in Britain was not always the case in the reaches of the British Empire.  Therefore, not all 
of the rights of Britons in Britain could be transferred as easily throughout the entire empire.   
Burke’s view of empire – of the bonds of the imperium – mirror quite closely the connexions 
which we see forged across the Atlantic, although set in an idealised world.  In this idealistic 
version of the British Empire, the Houses of Parliament are set as the ‘primary movers’ of 
empire but are a ‘sublime, distant, and divine power’ – Parliament’s Acts should be ‘as from 
the throne of heaven’, in other words.
47
  Parliament was the central and focal point of 
empire and ensured that all those subjects of the British Crown were guaranteed ‘in every 
nation, in every land, in every climate, language, and religion, in the vast domain that still is 
under the protection, and the larger that was once under the protection of the British 
crown’ the true rights of Britons.
48
   
In order to protect and ensure respect for Parliament as the ‘gem’ of empire, Burke thought 
it crucial that ‘the most perfect unity of sentiments, principles, and affections’ be 
maintained between Britons and Americans.  The concept of ‘liberty’ was the basis on which 
the empire should function: ‘it spreads out a large and liberal platform of common Liberty, 
upon which we may all unite forever’.
49
  
As mentioned above, however, Burke’s concept of imperial unity was not that of a single or 
simple sovereignty.  What remained crucial to Burke’s interpretation of empire was its 
heterogeneity and its many, distinct and different, parts forming a greater whole.  Bonds 
should be fostered to maintain the connexions, but a unitary view of empire should not be 
adopted.  Rather, he said: 
For that service, for all service, whether for revenue, trade, or empire, my trust is in her interests 
in the British constitution.  My hold of the Colonies is in the close affection which grows from 
common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal protection.  These are the 
ties, which though light as air, are as strong as links of iron.  Let the Colonies always keep the idea 
of their civil rights associated with your Government – they will cling and grapple to you; and no 
force under heaven will be of power to tear them from their allegiance. 
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He warned further that ‘as long as you have the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of 
this country as the sanctuary of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, 
wherever the chosen race and sons of England worship freedom, they will turn their faces 
towards you’.
50
 
Richard Jackson echoed these sentiments to the House of Commons in 1769 where he 
advised that fear would be a ‘poor engine of government’ and that, at such a distance, laws 
could not effectively ‘be carried into execution [where there was] an universal discontent 
among the people’.  Burke encouraged that ‘the circulation of power must be less vigorous 
at the extremities’ and that ‘“all Nations, who have extensive empire, derived from a 
prudent relaxation in” the peripheries and that to govern distant areas of empire at all it 
was necessary to govern them “with a loose rein”’.
51
 
Conclusion 
The ways in which the British Empire was viewed, conceptualised and idealised in the years 
immediately before and during the American War for Independence show us how 
unexpected the eventual divisions were.  Politicians were, all of them, trying to reorder and 
restore the empire along lines of peace and security after the end of the Seven Years War.  
Perhaps part of the reason why the American MPs were ultimately so unsuccessful in 
promoting their vision of empire, and of adopting any effective conciliatory policies in the 
mid-1770s, was because the metropolitan centre, and the Members of the House of 
Commons, believed Lord North when he claimed to want to bring peace to the empire.  The 
conclusion of the Seven Years War allowed Britons to really see for the first time the precise 
nature of their empire, and the various benefits it could bring.  The attempts to restructure 
and reorganise the imperial mechanics throughout the 1760s and 70s was an attempt by 
those in London to reorganise, reorder, rebuild and restore the empire as a whole. 
It is likewise interesting to note that the growth in the connexions between Britons and 
Americans politically at this time perhaps created some of the problems the two peoples 
then faced.  Pownall, for example, was one of the most educated and experienced men with 
regards to the Americas, and yet it was policies similar to that which he advocated (direct 
central control through a Secretary of State, greater cohesion and organisation throughout 
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the empire, and so on) which eventually brought Americans and Britons to blows.  This 
greater awareness and understanding of, appreciation for, and interest in the colonies 
caused the breakdown of the loose and heterogeneous systems under which the empire 
had previously existed and functioned. 
That Burke alone was able to see the distinctions between sovereignty and direct authority 
– between imperium and dominion – is likewise a testament to the difficulty with which 
eighteenth-century imperial administrators and reformers grappled.  Ultimately, the victory 
of the United States of America reshaped the ways in which Britons viewed both their 
empire and the Atlantic World.  The British Empire became one much more focused on 
building and reorganising local elites, but at the same time became far more racially diverse 
than ever before.  The Atlantic World became not an ‘inherently imperial space, but […] a 
region that could be organised as a system of independent states, an international regime 
defined by free trade and the rule of law’.
52
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CONCLUSION 
In 1776, the Second Continental Congress published in the Declaration of Independence: 
Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our British brethren.  We have warned them from 
time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us.  We 
have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here.  We have 
appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our 
common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections 
and correspondence.  They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and consanguinity.  We 
must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as 
we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends. 
That Americans could be pushed to this extreme measure shows ultimately the failure of the 
British government to react to the American situation, and of the American MPs to persuade 
an unresponsive House of Commons and British public.  While that may or may not be the 
case, the view that the British Parliament was very ignorant, very corrupt, or very sinful 
when looking at the decades before the American Revolution simply does not stand up to 
scrutiny. 
Rather, what we have found is a House of Commons with some strong American connexions 
and one far better versed in the American situation, at least in the early 1760s than had 
been thought previously.  Instead of thrashing around blindly in imperial affairs, successive 
British governments sought to standardise and improve imperial relations and based their 
policies on the knowledge, judgement and experience of those directly involved in the 
colonies.  The House of Commons debates show a multitude of opinions and facts being 
presented on the issue of America from men experienced in colonial trade and governance. 
If the problems stemmed from a British desire to reorder and recast the empire along more 
profitable and metropolitan lines, this could partially be viewed as the ultimate success of 
an Atlantic World and the connexions fostered therein.  Americans viewed themselves as 
Britons and became more British over time.
1
  While a united ‘America’ existed in the minds 
of Britons before it did that of Americans, the concept of running the entire empire 
effectively from London can be seen to be a direct consequence of greater imperial 
coherence and unity.  That politicians such as Pownall, Bacon, Jackson and Trecothick all 
sought to standardise in some fashion the relationship between Great Britain and the 
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thirteen colonies, shows us the ways in which the Atlantic World had become important to 
the British metropolitan elite.  More than that, however, the concept of a shared British 
identity was spread across the Atlantic.  What it meant to be British at this time remained 
very much in flux,
2
 and Britons were willing to share in their nationhood with their brethren 
across the ocean.  What the American MPs – along with all those who sympathised with the 
American cause – found particularly challenging was proving to an increasingly sceptic 
British population that the Americans wished to share in the benefits (and, importantly, 
bear a share of the burden) of being British.  The problems faced by Britons in shearing off a 
part of their empire and a part of themselves changed how they were to define themselves: 
‘Never again,’ stated Gould, ‘would the British think of any part of their empire as an 
extension of their own nation – at least not in the way they had before 1776’.
3
   
This thesis has sought to shift the ways in which we view the politics of the American 
Revolution.  Rather than seeing the British political side to the American Revolution as part 
solely of ‘British History’ or as eighteenth century Hanoverian politics, this work hopes to 
place the politics of the metropolitan centre at this time firmly in the Atlantic and imperial 
connexions under which they operated.  That is to say, rather than looking simply at the 
politics of the American Revolution as an event in itself, this thesis has attempted to place it 
– to place the British political scene during the 1760s and 70s – in a wider Atlantic 
perspective through the analysis of those involved in the connexions that the ocean 
afforded them.  This work has been based on Pocock’s plea that historians ensure that they 
included all parts of ‘Greater Britain’ (including Scotland, Wales Ireland and, at least until 
1783, America), but has attempted to recast that in some way into a more Atlantic or 
imperial type analysis. 
What we have found is that any claims Parliament, its enemies, or subsequent historians 
might have made regarding the supposed ignorance of its Members regarding America is 
not true.  Not only were there a larger number of MPs with personal ties to the American 
colonies (not to mention those with more informal ties, or with ties to other parts of the 
empire), but a small – and vocal – group of these men became actively and heavily involved 
in the politics of Britain regarding America.  While they formed no single group and did not 
act together, they were all well-known as American experts, deferred to on American issues, 
and spoke at length about America and the problems of imperial management.   
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What strikes most from the records and accounts of the debates, however, is the extent to 
which even these well-connected MPs – these American MPs – failed in some respects to 
grasp the reality of the situation after 1773.  By this point, most of the men had not spent 
any time in the colonies for a number of years and relied heavily on second-hand 
information.  They became, as a result, unaware of the shifting nature of the American 
condition at this time and were, as a result, unable to foretell the problems the Quebec Act 
would pose, for example.  That said, however, Burke and Barré in particular, and Pownall to 
a lesser extent, warned and foreshadowed throughout the likely American reaction to the 
Coercive Legislation.  The eventual resistance and the open rebellion of the Americans – and 
not simply just those in Massachusetts – had been predicted repeatedly in the House of 
Commons by these men.  British policy at this time was not lurching from one ignorant 
blunder to the next and British politicians were not bumbling fools incapable of governing 
their empire or understanding their American brethren.  What remains significant, however, 
was that even as the empire collapsed around them, most British MPs and politicians 
treated it as another aspect of the British political scene.
4
  The debates were filled with 
exceptional and gifted speakers trying their best to defend the liberties of all Britons spread 
across the Atlantic, but these speeches did little to influence MPs’ opinions. 
The publications of Bacon and Pownall allow us a further insight into the hopes, dreams and 
aspirations regarding the Americas.  They warned of the problems faced by imperial 
management, but sought to maintain and improve upon the situation inherited from the 
Seven Years War.  These texts can only really make sense when placed and studied 
alongside the political events of the same years.  Without them, they can appear idealistic 
and disjointed, but when considered together they show a greater depth to the arguments 
the MPs put forth in Parliament.  Two things are most striking from these texts: Bacon, a 
relatively quiet Member (when compared to, for example, Barré or Burke) worked hard 
behind the scenes to further his own political aims and objectives.  More than that, 
however, his Considerations shows him to be truly well informed on the situation in general, 
and with some practical and sensible proposals to help solve the problems.  Pownall’s later 
works – after the outbreak of war – become increasingly desperate but show that he was 
willing to abandon all hopes of a Grand Marine Dominion and was ‘finally flexible enough to 
exchange [these] for an alternative plan in which Great Britain and the other nations of 
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Europe would lay aside their mercantilistic restrictions and trade freely with a group of 
newly independent American nations’.
5
  
Through these publications and speeches and contributions, we are able to deduce the type 
of empire these men wanted.  They all hoped for a grand commercial union, enhancing the 
power and the prestige and the wealth of Britain and of America, and worked to improve 
the conditions of trade throughout the Atlantic.  Even though they predicted the open 
rebellion of Americans, the thought that Britain might actually lose the colonies at that point 
appears to have remained only a worst nightmare.  Rather than focusing on the negative 
aspects of the American situation, they provide a positive and enlightening account of how 
the empire in the eighteenth century might have been organised and governed.  Burke in 
particular is a success in this: while many challenged his belief that the Declaratory Act and 
unlimited Parliamentary supremacy did not contradict his support for American liberties, 
further analysis of his thoughts show a far more complex and a far more sublime 
understanding of the many ways in which Britons were connected, governed and bonded 
throughout the Atlantic World. 
Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom; and a great empire and little minds go ill 
together.  – Edmund Burke 
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APPENDIX I  
Acland, John Dyke (1746-78)   Army  
 Callington   1774 – 22 Nov. 1778 
 
Affleck, Edmund (1725-88)   Navy  
 Colchester   4 Mar. 1782 – 19 Nov. 1778 
 
Alexander, William (c. 1690-1761)  Merchant 
 Edinburgh  1754 – 1761 
 
Amyland, John (1751-80)   Merchant 
 Camelford  1774 – 5 June 1780 
 
Atkinson, Rickard (1738-85)   Merchant 
 New Romney  14 June 1784 – 28 May 1785 
 
Bacon, Anthony (c. 1717-86)   Merchant 
 Aylesbury  25 Jan. 1764 – 1784 
 
Baker, William (1705-70)   Merchant 
 Plympton Erle  14 Dec. 1747 – 1768 
 
Baring, Francis (1740-1810)   Merchant 
 Grampound  1784 – 1790 
 Chipping Wycombe 1 Feb. 1794 – 1796 
 Calne   1796 – 1802 
 Chipping Wycombe 1802 – 1806 
  
Barré, Isaac (1726-1802)   Army 
 Chipping Wycombe 5 Dec. 1761 – 1774 
 Calne   1774 – 1790 
 
Barrington, William Wildman (1717-93) Secretary at War (1765-1778) 
 Berwick-Upon-Tweed 13 Mar. 1740 – 1754 
 Plymouth  1754 – 24 May 1778 
 
Boscawen, Hon. Edward (1711-61)  Navy  
 Truro   21 June 1742 – 10 Jan. 1761 
 
Bristow, John (1701-68)   Merchant 
 Bere Alston  1734 – 1741 
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 St. Ives  1741 – 1754 
 Bere Alston  1754 – 1761 
 Arundel  1761 – 1768 
 
Burgoyne, John (1732-92)   Army 
 Midhurst  1761 – 1768 
 Preston  29 Nov. 1768 – 4 Aug. 1792 
 
Burke, Edmund (1729-97)   Colonial agent 
 Wendover  23 Dec. 1765 – 1774 
 Bristol   1774 – 1780 
 Malton  7 Dec. 1780 – 11 July 1794 
 
Burrard, Harry (1755-1813)   Army 
 Lymington   1780 – June 1788, 1790 – Apr. 1791 
 9 July – Dec. 1802 
 
Burton, Ralph (d. 1768)   Army and colonial government 
 Wareham  18 Mar. – 29 Sept. 1768 
 
Campbell, Alexander (1756-85)  Army 
 Nairnshire  1784 – Nov. 1785 
 
Campbell, Archibald (1739-91)  Army 
 Stirling Burghs 1774-1780, 21 Aug. 1789 – 31 Mar. 1791 
 
Campbell, James (1737-1805)  Army 
 Stirling Burghs 1780 – 22 July 1789 
 
Cathcart, Hon. Charles Allan (1759-88) Army 
 Clackmannanshire 1784 – 10 June 1788 
 
Clinton, Henry (1730-95)   Army 
 Boroughbridge 27 July 1772 – 1774 
 Newark  1774 – 1784 
 Launceston   1790 – July 1794 
 
Cockburn, Sir James (1729-1804)  Merchant 
 Linlithgow Burghs 9 Jan. 1772 – 1784 
 
Colebrooke, Geroge (1729-1809)  Merchant 
 Arundel  1754 – 1774 
 
Colebrooke, James (1722-61)   Merchant 
 Gatton   27 Apr. 1751 – 10 May 1761 
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Colleton, James Edward (c. 1709-90)  American 
 Lostwithiel  1747 – 1768 
 St. Mawes  4 Dec. 1772 – 1774 
 
Collier, Sir Geroge (1738-95)   Navy 
 Honiton  1784 – 1790 
 
Cornwallis, Hon. William (1744-1819) Navy 
 Eye   1768 – Mar. 1774, 3 Apr. 1782 – 1784 
 Portsmouth  1784 – 1790 
 Eye   1790 – Jan. 1807 
 
Cox, Laurence (d. 1792)   Merchant 
 Hontion  1774 – 1780 
 Bere Alston  14 Feb. 1781 – 1784 
 
Cruger, Henry (1739-1827)   American 
 Bristol   1774 – 1780, 1784 – 1790 
 
Cuninghame, James (c. 1731-88)  Army and colonial government 
 East Grinstead  3 Mar. 1786 – 10 Sept. 1788 
 
Dalrymple, William (1736-1807)  Army 
 Wigtown Burghs 1784 – 1790 
 
Devaynes, William (c. 1730-1809)  Merchant 
 Barnstaple  1774 - 1780, 1784 – 1796 
 Winchelsea  13 Dec. 1796 – 1802 
 Barnstaple  1802 – 1806 
 
Drummond, Adam (1713-86)   Army 
 Lymington  1761 – 1768 
 St. Ives   1768 – 11 Dec. 1778 
 Aberdeen Burghs 11 Jan. 1779 – 1784 
 Shaftesbury  1784 – 17 June 1786 
 
Drummond, Hon. Henry (1730-95)  Merchant 
 Wendover  24 Dec. 1774 – 1780 
 Midhurst  1780 – 1790 
 
Drummond, John (1754-1835)  American 
 Shaftesbury   5 July 1786 – 1790 
 
Durand, John (?1719-88)   Merchant 
 Aylesbury  1768 – 1774 
 Plympton Erle  7 Feb. 1775 – 1780 
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 Seaford  1780 – 1784 
 
Eden, William (1744-1814)   Merchant 
 New Woodstock 1774 – 1784 
 Heytesbury  1784 – 22 May 1793 
 
Fitzherbert, Thomas (?1746-1822)  Merchant 
 Arundel  1780 – 1790 
 
Fitzpatrick, Hon. Richard (1748-1813) Army 
 Okehampton  20 Oct. 1770 – 1774 
 Tavistock  1774 – 1807 
 Bedfordshire  1807 – 1812 
 Tavistock  1812 – 25 Apr. 1813 
 
Fludyer, Samuel (?1704-68)   Merchant 
 Chippdenham  1754 – 18 Jan. 1768 
 
Fraser, Simon (1726-82)   Army 
 Inverness-shire 1761 – 8 Feb. 1782 
 
Fuller, Rose (?1708-77)   American 
 New Romney  8 Dec. 1756 – 1761 
 Maidstone  1761 – 1768 
 Rye   1768 – 7 May 1777 
 
Garth, Charles (c. 1734-84)   Colonial agent 
 Devizes  15 Jan. 1765 – 21 Nov. 1780 
 
Gordon, Lord Adam (?1726-1801)  Army 
 Aberdeenshire 1754-1768 
 Kincardineshire 1774 – Apr. 1788 
 
Gordon, Lord George (1751-93)  Army 
 Ludgershall  1774 – 1780 
 
Gould, Charles (1760-1846)   Army 
 Brecon   6 Dec. 1787 – 1796 
 Monmouthshire 1796 – 1831 
 
Grant, Sir Alexander (d. 1772)  American and merchant 
 Inverness Burghs 1761 – 1768 
 
Grant, James (1720-1806)   Army 
 Tain Burghs  26 Apr. 1773 – 1780 
 Sutherlandshire 1 Aug. 1787 – 1802 
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Gulston, Joseph (c. 1694-1766)  Merchant 
 Tregony  2 Mar. 1737 – 1741 
 Poole   1741 – May 1765 
 
Hammet, Benjamin (?1736-1800)  Merchant 
 Taunton  20 Mar. 1782 – 22 July 1800 
 
Harcourt, Hon. William (1743-1830)  Army 
 Oxford   1768 – 1774 
 
Hardman, John (c. 1694-1775)  Merchant 
 Liverpool  1754 – 6 Dec. 1755 
 
Harley, Hon. Thomas (1730-1804)  Merchant 
 London  1761 – 1774 
 Herefordshire  22 May 1776 – 1802 
 
Hayley, George (d. 1781)   Merchant 
 London  1774 – 30 Aug. 1781 
 
Henniker, John (1724-1803)   Merchant 
 Sudbury  1761 – 1768 
 Dover   1774 – 1784 
 
Herries, Sir Robert (1730-1815)  Merchant 
 Dumfries Burghs 1780 – 1784 
 
Hervey, Hon. William (1732-1815)  Army 
 Bury St. Edmunds 24 Feb. 1763 – 1768 
 
Hobart, Hon. Robert (1760-1816)  Army 
 Bramber  15 Dec. 1788 – 1790 
 Lincoln  1790 – 1796 
 
Holmes, Charles (1711-61)   Navy 
 Newport  1 June 1758 – 21 Nov. 1761 
 
Howe, George Augustus    Army 
 Nottingham  1747 – 6 July 1758 
 
Howe, Richard (1726-99)   Navy 
 Dartmouth  23 May 1757 – 20 Apr. 1782 
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Huske, John (1724-73)   American 
 Maldon  26 Apr. 1763 – Oct. 1773 
 
Irvine, Alexander (c. 1754-89)  Army 
 East Looe  24 May 1786 – 24 Dec. 1789 
 
Jackson, Richard (?1721-87)   Colonial agent 
 Weymouth   1 Dec. 1762 - 1768 
      and Melcome Regis 
 New Romney  1768 – 1784 
 
Jervis, Sir John (1735-1823)   Navy 
 Launceston  31 Jan. 1783 – 1784 
 Great Yarmouth 1784 – 1790 
 Chipping Wycombe 1790 – Jan. 1794 
 
Johnstone, George (1730-87)   Colonial government 
 Cockermouth  24 May 1768 – 1774 
 Appleby  1774 – 1780 
 Lostwithiel   1 Dec. 1780 – 1784 
 Ilchester  22 Feb. 1786 – Feb. 1787 
 
Keppel, Hon. Augustus (1725-86)  Navy 
 Chichester  15 Jan. 1755 – 1761 
 New Windsor  1761 – 1780 
 Surrey   1780 – 22 Apr. 1782 
 
Lindsay, Sir John (1737-88)   Navy 
 Aberdeen Burghs 9 Jan. 1767 – 1768 
 
Livingston, Adam (c. 1723-95)  Army 
 Argyllshire  20 Feb. 1772 – 1780 
 
Luttrell, Hon. James (c. 1751-88)  Navy 
 Stockbridge  16 Dec. 1775 – 1784 
 Dover   1784 – 23 Dec. 1788 
 
Luttrell, Hon. John (c. 1740-1829)  American 
 Stockbridge  1774 – Dec. 1775, 1780 – Jan. 1785 
 
Lyttelton, William Henry (1724 – 1808) Colonial government 
 Bewdley  9 Dec. 1748 – Jan. 1755, 1774 – 1790 
 
Macartney, Sir George (1737-1806)  Colonial government 
 Cockermouth  1768 – Mar. 1769 
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 Ayr Burghs  1774 – Jan. 1776 
 Bere Alston  1780 – Feb. 1781 
 
Macbride, John (d. 1800)   Navy 
 Plymouth  1784 – 1790 
 
Mackay, Hon. Alexander (1717-89)  Army 
 Sutherland  1761 – 1768 
 Tain Burghs  1768 – Mar. 1773 
 
Macleane, Lauchlin (?1727-78)  American and army 
 Arundel  1768 – May 1771 
 
Macpherson, James (1736-96)  Colonial government 
 Camelford  1780 – 17 Feb. 1796 
 
Maitland, Hon John (1732-79)  Navy 
 Haddington Burghs 1774 – 22 Oct. 1779 
 
Mauger, Joshua (1725-88)   Colonial government 
 Poole   1768 – 10 Feb. 1769, 18 Feb. 1769 – 1780 
 
Mayne, Robert (1724-82)   Merchant 
 Gatton   27 Dec. 1774 – 5 Aug. 1782 
 
Monckton, Hon. Robert (1726-82)  Colonial government 
 Pontefract  26 Nov. 1751 – 1754, 24 Mar. – 30 Sept. 1774 
 Portsmouth  10 Aug. 1778 – 21 May 1782 
 
Montagu, Lord Charles Greville (1741-84) Colonial government 
 Huntingdonshire 5 June 1762 – Dec. 1765 
 
Montgomerie, Hugh (1739-1819)  Army 
 Ayrshire  1780 – 2 Apr. 1781, 1784 – June 1789, June – 30 Oct. 1796 
 
Moore, Daniel (b. 1701)   American and merchant 
 Great Marlow  1754 – 1761 
 
Moore, John (1761 – 1809)   Army 
 Linlithgow Burghs 1784 – 1790 
 
Morris, Staats Long (1728-1800)  Army 
 Elgin Burghs  1774 – 1784 
 
Mostyn, Savage (?1713-57)   Navy 
 Weobley  1747 – 16 Sept. 1757 
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Murray, James (1734-94)   Army and colonial government 
 Perthshire  11 June 1773 – 19 Mar. 1794 
 
Murray, John (1726-1800)   Merchant 
 Linlithgow Burghs 1754 – 1761 
 
Nesbitt, Arnold (?1721-79)   Merchant 
 Mitchell   27 Jan. 1753 – 1754 
 Winchelsea  1754 – 1761 
 Cricklade  1761 – 1768 
 Winchelsea  15 Jan. 1770 – 1774 
 Cricklade  1774 – 7 Apr. 1779 
 
Nugent, Charles Edmund (1758-1844) Navy 
 Buckingham  1784 – 1790 
 
Ogilvie, Charles (c. 1731-88)   American and merchant 
 West Looe  1774 – May 1775 
 
Oliver, Richard (1735-84)   American and merchant 
 London  11 July 1770 – 1780 
 
Oswald, James (1715-69)   Merchant 
 Dysart Burghs  1741 – 1747 
 Fife   1747 – 1754 
 Dysart Burghs  1754 – 1768 
 
Palliser, Sir Hugh (1723-96)   Navy and colonial government 
 Scarborough  1774 – Feb. 1779 
 Huntingdon  28 Nov. 1780 – 1784 
 
Parker, Sir Peter (?1721-1811)  Navy 
 Seaford  1784 – 21 Mar. 1785, 29 Mar. 1785 – 13 Mar. 1786 
 Maldon  19 Feb. 1787 – 1790 
 
Pelham Clinton, Lord Thomas (1752-95) Army 
 Westminster  1774 – 1780 
 East Retford  17 Dec. 1781 – 22 Feb. 1794 
 
Penn, Richard (?1734-1811)   American and colonial government 
 Appleby  1784 – 1790 
 Haslemere  20 Dec. 1790 – June 1791 
 Lancaster  1796 – 1802 
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 Haslemere  1802 – 1806 
 
Pennant, Richard (?1736-1808)  Merchant 
 Petersfield  1761 – Nov. 1767 
 Liverpool  4 Dec. 1767 – 1780, 1784 – 1790 
 
Percy, Hugh (1742-1817)   Army 
 Westminster  15 Mar. 1763 – 5 Dec. 1776 
 
Phipps, Hon. Henry (1755-1831)  Army 
 Totnes   1784 – 1790 
 Scarborough  1790 – 13 Aug. 1794 
 
Pigot, Robert (1720-96)   Army 
 Wallingford  1768 – Jan. 1772 
 
Pownall, John (1720-95)   Navy and colonial government 
 St. Germans  23 Nov. 1775 – May 1776 
 
Pownall, Thomas (1722-1805)  Colonial government 
 Tregony  4 Feb. 1767 – 1774 
 Minehead  31 Dec. 1774 – 1780 
 
Preston, Sir Charles (c. 1735-1800)  Army 
 Dysart Burghs  1784 – 1790 
 
Rodney, George Brydges (1719-92)  Navy 
 Saltash   13 May 1751 – 1754 
 Okehampton  24 Nov. 1759 – 1761 
 Penryn   1761 – 1768 
 Northampton  1768 – 1774 
 Westminster  1780 – June 1782 
 
 American and colonial government 
 Barnstaple   1761 – 1774 
 
Sargent, John (1715-91)   Merchant 
 Midhurst  25 Jan. 1754 – 1761 
 West Looe  19 Jan. 1765 – 1768 
 
Scott, John (1725-75)    Army 
 Caithness  1754 – 1761 
 Tain Burghs  1761 – 1768 
 Fifeshire  1768 – Dec. 1775 
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Scott, Robert (?1746-1808)   American and merchant 
 Wootton Basset 1774 – 1780 
 
Seymour Conway, Hon. George (1763-1848) Army 
 Orford   1784 – 1790 
 Totnes   1796 – June 1801 
 
Sharpe, John (?1700-56)   Colonial agent 
 Callington  1754 – Oct. 1756 
 
Shuldham, Molyneux (c. 1717-98)  Navy and colonial government 
 Fowey   1774 – 1784 
 
Stanwix, John (1696-1766)   Army 
 Carlisle  1741 – 26 Jan. 1742, 26 Nov. 1746 – 1761 
 Appleby  1761 – Oct. 1766 
 
Stephenson, John (?1709-94)   Merchant 
 Mitchell  22 Apr. 1754 – 24 Mar. 1755, 1761 – 1780 
 Tregony  1780 – 1784 
 Plympton Erle  1784 – 1790 
 Tregony  1790 – 17 Apr. 1794 
 
Stewart, Alexander (c. 1739-94)  Army 
 Kirkcudbright  16 Aug. 1786 – 16 Dec. 1794 
 
Storer, Anthony Morris (1746-99)  American 
 Carlisle 1774 – 1780 
 Morpeth  1780 – 1784 
 
Stuart, Hon. Charles (1753-1801)  Army 
 Bossiney  20 May 1776 – 1790 
 Ayr Burghs  1790 – May 1794 
 Poole   1796 – 25 Mar. 1801 
 
Thomlinson, John (1731-67)   Merchant 
 Steyning  1761 – 1 Feb. 1767 
 
Touchet, Samuel (c. 1705-73)   Merchant 
 Shaftesbury  1761 – 1768 
 
Townsend, Chauncy (1708-70)  Merchant 
 Westbury  16 Mar. 1748 – 1768 
 Wigtown Burghs 23 Dec. 1768 – 28 Mar. 1770 
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Trecothick, Barlow (?1718-75)  Merchant and colonial agent 
 London  1768 – 1774 
 
Vaughan, Hon. John (c. 1731-95)  Army 
 Berwick-upon-Tweed 1774 – 30 June 1795 
 
Waldegrave, George (1751-1789)  Army 
 Newcastle-under 1774 - 1780 
-Lyme   
 
Watson, Brook (1735-1807)   Merchant and colonial agent 
 London  26 Jan. 1784 – Feb. 1793 
 
Wilson, Sir Thomas Spencer (1727-98) Army 
 Sussex   1774 – 1780 
 
Wombwell, George (1734-80)  Merchant 
 Huntingdon  1774 – 2 Nov. 1780 
 
Wrottesley, John (1744-87)   Army 
 Newcastle-under 22 Mar. – June 1768 
  -Lyme  
 Staffordshire  5 July 1768 – 23 Apr. 1787      
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APPENDIX II  
C O M M I T T E E  O F  LO N D O N  M E R C H A N T S  ( W R I T T E N  B Y  
T R E C O T H I C K )  T O  T H E T O W N  O F  N O R W I C H ,  4  D E C E M B E R  
1 7 6 5  
From: P.D.G. Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase of the 
American Revolution, 1763-1767 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 146-7.  Original: B.L. 
Add. MSS. 22358, fo 52. 
‘Sir, the present state of the British trade to North America, and the prospect of increasing 
embarrassments which threaten the loss of our depending property there, and even to 
annihilate the trade itself have occasioned a general meeting to be called of the merchants 
in this city concerned in that branch of business. 
As the gentlemen of your city and almost every other maritime and manufacturing part of 
these Kingdoms must be affected by the distresses of North American commerce we have 
thought it our duty to acquaint you (as we now do by the copy enclosed) with our 
proceedings, as well as to ask your concurrence and assistance in support of a regular 
application to Parliament or otherwise by a petition from your body and by all the interest 
you can make with your own Members and with the Members in your neighbourhood, who 
with all other land owners we think greatly interested in the prosperity of trade and 
manufactures from which so great an additional value is derived to their property. 
We desire to be united with you in a measure so essential to the best interests of Great 
Britain, wishing to have your sentiments on the subject, through the course of which we 
mean to take for our guide the interest of these kingdoms, it being our opinion that 
conclusive arguments for granting every ease or advantage the North Americans can with 
propriety desire may be fairly deduced from that principle only.’ 
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APPENDIX II I  
S P E E C H  B Y  P O W N A L L  I N  H O U S E  O F  C O M M O N S  ( 8  
F E B R U A R Y  1 7 6 9 )  
From R.C. Simmons and P.D.G. Thomas, Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments 
Respecting North America, 1754-1783 (London: six vols, Kraus International Publications, 
1982-7), III. 103-110. Original in J. Almon, The Debates of the British House of Commons 
from 1743 to 1774 (London: 11 vols, 1766-75), VIII, 93-117. 
‘If they consider that they may be presented by their Governor, a single man, and in 
consequence of that presentment taken into custody, and sent prisoners 3000 miles, to be 
put upon their trial, which of itself, should they be acquitted is a punishment of the severest 
and most cruel nature; if they consider that they are thus deprived of the common liberty 
which we enjoy, of not being presented and put upon trial but by the inquest of twelve 
lawful men of our country – to what predicament must they think themselves reduced? – I 
own I dread the consequence if the Americans should feel that they are in that predicament; 
but I am comforted, because I am sure they will never feel it, as I am convinced that such 
commission never will nor can be issued, that such proceedings never will be, nor can be, 
carried into execution. 
I will therefore next consider this measure connected with the military manoeuvres in 
America – as a political measure, planned and designed to enforce the execution of the 
revenue laws in that country. – To be able to judge of the effect of such measure, it will be 
necessary to state the case to which it is applied. 
On one hand, you have your declaratory law, - your revenue laws as the exertion of the 
declared right – you have your commissioners to execute these laws – and the military to 
enforce this execution. – On the other hand, the Americans do universally, invariably, and 
unalterably declare, that they ought not to submit to any internal taxes imposed upon them 
by any legislature wherein they have not representatives of their own election.  On this 
principle they opposed such taxes by their petitions and remonstrances only, as yet; but 
there is something threatening in the bad temper and ill blood which seems to be forced up 
– so that the issue is well nigh brought to force.  The people of that country and the King’s 
troops are, as it were, set in array against each other.  The sword indeed is not drawn – but 
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the hand is upon it.  The word for action is not indeed yet given, but mischief is on tip-toe; 
and the slightest circumstance would in a moment throw everything into confusion and 
bloodshed.  And if some mode of policy does not interpose to remove this exertion of 
military power – the union between Great Britain and North America is broken for ever – 
unless (what is worse) both are united in one common ruin. 
[…] And here I cannot withhold an observation which a friend of mine in that country makes 
on this occasion: “If you mean to govern the country by the aid of military force, you have 
not sent a sufficient number of troops – if you do not mean this, you have already sent too 
many.” But – thank God, resistance by force and arms is not the resistance which you have 
to guard against.  The people of America are husbandmen and merchants; who have lived 
by their dependence upon, and under the protection of Great Britain – are unaccustomed to 
arms – are not trained up in a military spirit – do not (to use an expression of their own) feel 
bold to resist by arms; yet, if you attempt to force taxes against the spirit of the people 
there, you will find, when perhaps it is too late, that they are of a spirit which will resist all 
force – which will grow stronger by being forced – will prove superior to all force – and ever 
has been unconquerable: they are of a spirit to abide, nay, to court, persecution: and if 
amongst other propositions which they have taken up, they should once take it into the 
heads that they are under a state of persecution; that spirit of enthusiasm which is of their 
temper, and of their very nature, will arise; and every mischievous consequence, in every 
extreme, will accompany it. 
[…] That spirit which led their ancestors to break off from every thing which is near and dear 
to the human heart – from every connection which friendship, relations, blood could give – 
which led them to quiet every comfort that a settled and civilised country (their own native 
country) could afford; and to encounter every difficulty and distress, which a wild wilderness 
of savages could oppose to them, to struggle even for their existence:- that spirit, equally 
strong and equally inflamed, has but a slight and trifling sacrifice to make at this time – they 
have not to quit their native country, but to defend it – they have not to forsake their 
friends and relations, but to unite with and to stand by them, in one common union.  The 
only sacrifice they have to make is that of a few follies and a few luxuries.  It is not necessity 
that is the ground of their commerce with you; it is merely the affectation of your modes 
and customs – the love for home, as they call England, that makes them like everything 
which comes from thence; but passion may be conquered by passion, and they will 
abominate as sincerely as they now love you; and if they do, they have within themselves 
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everything which is necessary to the food, raiment, or the dwelling of mankind, and have no 
need of your commerce.’ 
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APPENDIX IV 
S P E E C H  B Y  B U R K E  I N  H O U S E  O F  C O M M O N S  ( 2 5  M A R C H  1 7 7 4 )  
From R.C. Simmons and P.D.G. Thomas, Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments 
Respecting North America, 1754-1783 (London: six vols, Kraus International Publications, 
1982-7), IV. 124.  Speech by Edmund Burke on the Boston Port Bill, 25 March 1774. 
‘At Philadelphia … they did not proceed to throw tea in the river, because the master of the 
ship was made sensible, so the account said, of the impropriety and danger of landing it 
there and submitted therefore to go out of the river … The noble lord who has proposed, 
and upon whose authority you have taken it, has declared two modes of remedy, one 
moderate, temperate, [the] other more lasting … Observe that the disturbances are 
universal, that the people are almost unanimous.  That is one view not of the mob but of all 
the assembly of America.  Show me one port of America … in which a single ship [    ] 
permitted … The present remedy is to struggle with the present disturbances.  What have 
you chosen?  A remedy penal to one port to operate.  A proper remedy, but from the very 
nature of it a silly remedy … Sir, can anything in the world be more uncertain than the 
operation of [this Bill]?  Whether it will increase these combinations, or lessen [them], 
whether it will irritate or whether it will terrify, are things in the womb of time … Not worth 
risking one of the principles of justice for the sake of running the risk of procuring it … I beg 
leave to have it observed that this remedy will have an uncertain operation.  If it does not 
succeed the consequence of it will be [    ].  You are to look to that.  If the town of Boston 
was not only coerced, if burnt to ashes, what would be a better course?  Much more just, 
much more moderate. (a laugh.)  Don’t laugh too soon.  Our days of laughing [    ] … You 
have to wink at the destruction of America … If you attempt to follow this example [    ] the 
next town, suppose Pennsylvania, Portsmouth.  If you follow with an example to that next 
place, though you believe in your conscience by the punishment of Boston you will a free 
reception to the tax duties in the other ports of America.  Say what will be the consequence.  
Then you will present to Philadelphia, to Charlestown, to New York, Anapolis Royal, or 
Williamsburg … Then the consequence will be, one town must always be in propose to all 
the rest of America in rebellion … Are you prepared to stand the consequences of putting a 
universal prescription on the whole trade of America? … There is in the news enough to 
satisfy people’s minds … that the ancient colony of Virginia is connected with Boston … 
  
182 
 
Suppose Virginia should fall in some scrape.  If it should, what honourable gentleman calls 
rebellion, what the noble lord says is not rebellion … You may think [to] stretch a boom 
across that bay.  If you could stretch a boom across that bay … the consequence [    ] the 
tobacco trade of England [    ] at the end.  The consequence of whole monopoly to France. … 
You proscribe the town of Glasgow, town of Edinburgh.  I mean this.  They are great towns 
in that trade.  The town of London will feel a severe blow.  Then all England will ask what is 
the example of that measure … I have, therefore, I hope, proved if the example does not 
prove effective, in other ports you cannot exercise the same [remedy].’   
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APPENDIX V 
L E T T E R  F R O M  P O W N A L L  T O  G R E N V I L L E  ( 1 4  J U LY  1 7 6 8 )  A N D  
G R E N V I L L E ’ S  R E P LY  ( 1 7  J U LY  1 7 6 8 )  
From: W.J. Smith, The Grenville Papers: Being the Correspondence of Richard Grenville, Earl 
Temple, K.G., and the Right Hon: George Grenville, their Friends and Contemporaries, vol. IV 
(London:  John Murray, 1852). 
‘Mr. Pownall to Mr. Grenville – Westthrop, Marlow, July 14, 1768 
Dear Sir, --- The fourth edition of the Administration of the Colonies is in the press, and 
printed off to the last sheet.  I have continued the Dedication of it to you, by a new and 
particular Address, stating the views of men, and the certain consequences of things as 
matters are at present circumstanced; also pointing out a measure, which I am from 
conviction persuaded ought to be taken up at least, not on the grounds of policy, but from 
necessity. 
As the tenor of this Address may carry with it suggestions that may or may not be proper, as 
it may or me not be found expedient to adopt the idea of this measure, as it may or may not 
be proper to avow it, if taken up, I have taken the liberty to send the draught of it to you 
before it goes to the press.  For as I sincerely mean, to the utmost of my abilities, to aid 
those whom this country must look up to, if ever it again returns or is forced into a spirit and 
temper of doing business, so I am sure I would not, in the most distant point, say or do 
anything respecting yourself that might be occasion of embarrassment to you. 
If you conceive that any proper use may be made of bringing forward the proposal referred 
to, in Parliament, I shall be very glad to communicate with you upon it.  I am very shy of 
obtruding myself or my views upon any one, especially on such who I conceive have 
sentiments of friendship towards me, and that is the true reason that I did not take a ride 
over on this errand myself; but if you wish to have a conversation on these American 
matters, either as to facts or opinions, I think I can not only point out how they might be 
taken up as concerns the business itself, but particularly how, as they respect the situation 
in which you stand towards them, and towards the various clanships of factions which take 
a part in them.  Whatever is settled as the measure to be taken up, ought to be agreed upon 
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early, that the various grounds on which the various parties might be led to join in it, should 
be prepared and laid. 
There is now open to you, and to you only, with consistency, a noble track of politics.  I am 
an enthusiast for you striking into it: it would do you honour, and establish you as a Minister 
of this country and, what is more, it would lead to the establishing of peace and prosperity 
in this country. 
I have a thousand things to say that I neither can nor will write about. 
As to the part I shall myself take, both here and in America, I have, upon very serious and 
deliberate resolution, determined unalterably.  In one other thing I am unalterable, my 
regard and attachment to you. 
I have the honour to be, &c. 
T. Pownall’ 
 
‘Mr. Grenville to Mr. Pownall – Wotton, July 17, 1768 
Sir, --- I am very sensible of the honour which you do to me, both in this and in the Address 
prefixed to the former edition of your Treatise upon the Administration of the Colonies, and 
am much obliged to you for the expression of your regard and good opinion. 
You say very truly in the beginning of your present Address, that our opinions differed on 
several points, but we agree entirely in our wishes that the constitutional powers of this 
kingdom and the fixed government of laws may prevail, and the rights of the subject be 
established upon true political liberty. 
As to the great question of our Parliament’s granting to America a competent number of 
representatives to sit in our House of Commons, you are no stranger to the declarations I 
repeatedly made in the House, at the time when the repeal of the Stamp Act was agitated 
“that if such an application should be properly made by the Colonies to Parliament, in the 
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same manner as those which where made from Chester and Durham, and probably from 
Wales, it would in my opinion be entitled to the most serious and favourable consideration” 
I continue still in the same sentiments, but I am much afraid that neither the people of Great 
Britain nor those of America are sufficiently apprized of the dangers which threatens both 
from the present state of things, to adopt a measure to which both the one and other seem 
indisposed. 
Some of the Colonies in their address to the Crown against some late Acts of Parliament 
have, if I mistake not, expressly disclaimed it, and I do not think it has been kindly received 
in Great Britain, when it has been thrown out in Parliament, or started in any pamphlet or 
printed paper. 
The fullest conviction of its necessity, and the hearty concurrence both of the Government 
and of the people, are indispensably necessary to set so great a machine in motion, as that 
of united all the outlying parts of the British dominions into one system. 
As to what relates personally to me, I have done my duty by endeavouring to assert the 
sovereignty of the King and Parliament of Great Britain over all the dominions belonging to 
the Crown, and to make all the subjects of the kingdom contribute to the public burthens 
for their own defence, according to their abilities and situation. 
I thought that we had the clearest right imaginable, and that we were bound, by every tie of 
justice and of wisdom, to do this; and I am convinced it would have been accomplished, 
without any considerable difficulty, if America had not received such encouragement to 
oppose it from hence, as no other people would have resisted.  To this the present 
confusion is entirely owing, nor will it not cease if we shall run into the contrary extreme of 
violence on the other side.  Nothing but a plan of wisdom, justice, moderation and firmness 
can now extinguish the flame which has so weakly and so wickedly been raised both within 
and without the kingdom.  For my own part, I shall wait the event with concern, and shall be 
ready to give any assistance I can whenever I see any practicable road opened to our safety. 
As to what you obligingly mention in your letter respecting me, that you would not do 
anything which might be the occasion of any embarrassment to me, I desire to return to you 
my thanks for this kind mark of your attention to me, but I do not see how I can be affected 
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by it, if it is fully understood and explained in your Introduction, that you speak your own 
sentiments and not mine; and if I keep myself at full liberty as to my own conduct and 
opinions, which I am determined to do, I certainly ought not to put any restraint upon yours. 
I shall always be glad to receive from you in any manner which is most convenient and 
agreeable to you, such information upon these American matters both as to facts and 
opinions, as your knowledge and experience may enable you, and your kind dispositions 
toward me may incline you, to give to me. 
I am &c &C 
   George Grenville’ 
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APPENDIX VI 
From ‘Jackson’s Arguments’ (Jackson-Franklin Correspondence) undated (1765?) in C. Doren, 
C., The Letters and Papers of Benjamin Franklin and Richard Jackson, 1753-1785 (Philadelphia: The 
American Philosophical Society, 1947), pp. 193-6. 
‘No Sober wise man can doubt the constitutional Authority of Parlt to impose Taxes on 
every sort on every part of the British Dominions. 
Because an Universal Legislature is a necessary part of every intire State, the Parlt is that 
Universal Legislature of the British Dominions & must be so unless it be contended that 
either the British Dominions do not form one Intire State or that there is some other 
Universal Legislature. 
Whatever was the Origin of Parliament; it has so long made Laws for every part of the 
Dominions of England though every part has never been actually represented by members 
whose Election they had a share that the constitutional Right of doing cannot be called in 
Question but upon Principles that will overturn every Constitution in Europe. 
It has in fact made such Laws at all times for the Colonies in America, & for the Kingdom of 
Ireland, & it likewise made Laws that bound Wales the Counties of Durham & Chester & 
many other parts of this Island before those parts sent Reptives to Parlt. 
But thought the Constitution gives this Power to Parlt, because an Universal Legislature 
seems a necessary part of every well constituted State yet this Power has always been 
exercised with great Moderation & even Abstinence, because the same Wisdom & 
Discretion that always governs the Proceedings of Parlt have prescribed Moderation & 
Abstinence in those Cases. 
It might be proved were it necessary that the Countys of Durham & Chester were once not 
taxed in common with the rest of the Km & Subsidys & [obscure] imposed by Parliament & 
when it was judged expedient to blend these Countys as well as Wales with the other Parts 
of the Kingdom it was judged just & politick to give them a share in the Election of that Body 
which when chosen was the Reptive of the whole Body of Commons of the Nation, which 
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indeed it was before, but with-out answering the Ends for which a Representation is 
designed so compleatly as it did after this Addition to it. 
The reasons that induced these Additions are set forth with so much force in the Preamble 
that the Conts giving the Right to elect Members of the Towns & County of Chester & 
Durham particularly the former, that I can add nothing to them. 
For reasons of the like kind this Right has at various times been communicated to many 
other Towns in the Kingdom, & even to the Towns of Berwick & Calais without it. 
It has never been given to Ireland or to any part of the Plantations, because it has not 
hitherto been judged expedient to make frequent Laws respecting either or to impose any 
Taxes meerly for the sake of raising Money.  Taxes it is true have been laid for the sake of 
regulating Trade, & a Post Office has been erected in America with an exclusion of all private 
persons from carrying on the same business, such an exclusion is necessary to the existence 
of a General Post office, & such a Post Office is almost necessary to the well being of a 
commercial State; but although this Institution may produce a Revenue, as well as Laws for 
regulating Trade neither can properly be called Tax Laws any more than Penal Laws can be 
called so, which yet may produce a considerable Revenue to the Govt. 
It is on this Principle, that I have argued that Parliament should not impose internal Taxes on 
America, not that Parlt has not an universal & unlimited Power, but that Parlt for its own 
Sake & the Welfare of all the British Dominions will wish that Assembles may continue in 
America, (which they will hardly do if there be no occasion to call them together) until they 
supply their place by calling Members from America & that the People of the Colonys may 
from thence derive a Confidence in the Legislature that is essential to the well being of 
Govt.’ 
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